Kerry Opposes More (And Fewer) U.S. Troops In Afghanistan

By Frank James

Sen. John Kerry, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, provided what he views as the key question against which any future U.S. strategy in Afghanistan must be tested.

... We need to ask ourselves at every turn: "will this help the Afghan people take responsibility for their country?"--and where the answer is no, we probably shouldn't be doing it.

Kerry spoke before the Council on Foreign Relations after returning from Afghanistan last week where he helped to broker an agreement from Afghan President Hamid Karzai to agree to a run-off election against challenger Abdullah Abdullah.

Anyone hoping that Kerry would give a clear exit strategy out of Afghanistan would be disappointed however. It was definitely an on-one-hand, on-the-other-hand kind of speech.

Kerry rejected both the approach of Vice President Joe Biden, who is said to support a significant reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to focus on discrete counter terrorism strikes, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan who is known to want more troops.

The senator said neither approach would deliver the outcomes Americans seek. In short, he appears to be against sending more troops or significantly reducing the current numbers there. But that doesn't mean he's for the status quo. He knows that's untenable.

More Kerry:

Our strategy has to be informed by two basic truths. First of all, we can't draw down large of numbers of troops today in order to shift to a narrow counterterrorism mission. Second, we simply don't have enough troops or resources to launch a broad, nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, nor do we need to...

...We all see the appeal of a limited counter terrorism mission-- and no doubt it is part of the endgame. But I don't think we're there yet. A narrow mission that cedes half the country to the Taliban could lead to civil war and put Pakistan at risk. Moreover, the hardest part of counterterrorism operations isn't killing the terrorists, it's finding them. Developing intelligence assets and capabilities should be one of our top priorities because it lets us transition to a more limited presence that still safeguards our interests. But for now, we need boots on the ground to get that kind of information.

On the other hand, we cannot and should not undertake manpower-intensive counterinsurgency operations on a national scale in Afghanistan. Most experts say it would take 400,000 to 600,000 effective international and Afghan troops for a fully-resourced COIN effort. Fortunately, achieving our defined mission does not require such a commitment. We don't have to control every hamlet and village, particularly when large non-Pashtun sections of the country are already hostile to the Taliban. Our allies, together with the populations of these non-Pashtun areas, can help to reduce America's principal effort to the southern and eastern theatres--and limit it to major population centers.

Kerry indicates that in his view the future of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is greatly dependent on what the Afghans do. Will they provide enough troops for security? Will local leaders work with U.S. and NATO troops. Will Western nations, including the U.S., provide enough civilian assistance to develop the country?

But he doesn't say, in his speech at least, what should be done if the Afghans don't share his clarity as to what should happen?

Maybe the U.S. should just leave? Kerry's comments however about the importance of stabilizing Afghanistan to keep Pakistan from further imploding would seem to argue against such a move, however.

Another Kerry snippet:

... What happens in Afghanistan has an impact on Pakistan. Pakistan is not only the headquarters of Al Qaeda today but could become the epicenter of extremism in the world. We have enormous strategic interest in the outcome of the struggle in Pakistan. It is a fragile democracy that is fighting a determined insurgency. It has a full nuclear arsenal and a longstanding, sometimes violent rivalry with its neighbor, India. While stabilizing Afghanistan won't solve all of our problems in Pakistan, instability in Afghanistan can only increase the risk of conflagration where the world can least afford it: next door in Pakistan.

In short, Kerry wants what so many other American policymakers want: the most stable Afghanistan possible with the smallest additional investment of U.S. lives.

But his road map for getting to the desired end state is so conditioned on the Afghans doing their part as to raise as many questions as it answers. It seems unlikely that President Barack Obama would come away from a conversation with Kerry or from this speech with any more clarity about what to do than he had beforehand.