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Analysis: Politics And Reform In Iran
 Iran
NEAL CONAN, host:
This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington.
There are headlines almost every day about impending war in Iraq and crisis with North Korea, but we hear relatively little about the third member of President Bush's axis of evil. Iran is the biggest of the three, the most populous and, since the revolution of 1979, resolutely anti-American. It's working on weapons of mass destruction, supports terrorist groups and forces women to wear the chador.
At the same time, though, its government is not exactly autocratic. Though unelected clerics retain ultimate authority, Iran does have elections. Though some newspapers are suppressed, some are not. And while some dissidents are thrown in jail, others openly agitate for greater political and personal freedom. And although Iran is an Islamic country, it does not always see eye to eye with its Arab neighbors, especially Iraq, with which Iran fought an eight-yearlong war.
So what is the nature of the threat that put Iran in the axis of evil? What's happening in the struggle between hard-liners and moderates? Can economic reforms begin to generate jobs for the huge numbers of Iranians under the age of 25? What's left of the fervor that fueled the revolution? And how might a war in Iraq affect things? Our phone number is (800) 989-8255; that's (800) 989-TALK. And our e-mail address is totn@npr.org.
Joining us now in Studio 3A is Afshin Molavi, a journalist and author of the book "Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran."
And it's good to have you on the show again.
Mr. AFSHIN MOLAVI (Author, "Persian Pilgrimages"): Well, thank you for having me.
CONAN: Certainly the designation in the axis of evil--the Iranian leadership is under no illusions about its relations with the United States. How did they respond when that happened?
Mr. MOLAVI: Well, the Iranian leadership was certainly upset about that, particularly after they felt they played a particularly constructive role in the war to liberate Afghanistan and the transitional period in Afghanistan, in installing the government of Hamid Karzai. Iran did play a key role in the bond negotiations, and they played a key role in reining in some of the more radical Shia elements that Iran is affiliated with in Afghanistan, and they felt that they should be given a reward instead of a censure, and what they got instead was this `axis of evil' remark.
What is interesting is the reaction on the Iranian street. One might have thought the Iranian street would have been up in arms about this. Now a certain segment of the Iranian street was, but there was a poll that was done in which they asked Iranians what they felt about this `axis of evil' remark, and perhaps because of their own frustration with their government, they said it was to some extent correct, by almost 50 percent.
CONAN: That's interesting, and describes a people who are very unhappy with their government.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right. Iranians are almost overwhelmingly frustrated with the current order of things in Iran. The economy is in very bad shape. We have about four million unemployed in Iran. It's an extremely young population.
CONAN: And just by comparison, that percentage for unemployment--that's about 30 percent.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right. It's about 30 percent. And there are some independent economists who put it even higher than that. And even more importantly, there's massive underemployment. You have young college graduates driving taxis, you have engineers becoming traders, you have doctors moonlighting and doing other jobs, because the state of the economy--it's in such bad shape and the wages do not correspond with the cost of living right now. So that's one of the key frustrations that is felt widely across all socioeconomic spectrums in Iran.
Secondly, there is an agitation for greater political freedoms and also greater social freedoms. And there was hope that the reform movement, which was inaugurated with the election of President Khatami in 1997, would offer greater political freedoms and greater social freedoms. And to some extent, the reform movement has delivered on some of those political and social freedoms, but they have been limited, and the Iranian people are impatient and they want it to go much further than it has gone so far.
CONAN: Talk to us about the demographic pressures on Iran today. There was a huge population explosion after the revolution.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right, and it's a very important question because nearly two-thirds of Iran's population is under the age of 30. Iran has a population--and half, by the way, are under the age of 21. So Iran has a population of 70 million people. That means of that 70 million people, 50 million Iranians were either not born or were unwitting children at the time of Iran's thundering 1979 revolution. And Ayatollah Khomeini, in the beginning of the revolution, he urged Iranians to `go forth and produce,' which was the words that he used. And in some respects, they did. And his view was that these young people, the new generation, would be the vanguard of the Islamic republic. In reality, the young people are the fifth column. They are the most serious threat to the future of the Islamic republic because of the frustration that I described about the state of the economy, their lack of political freedoms, their lack of social freedoms.
CONAN: I've heard them referred to as the third force.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right. That is something that they are referred to. And one reason that they're referred to as the third force is to distinguish them from the reformers. The reformist-conservative power struggle that is taking place right now is still an insider-only power struggle that is being played out by elites that are part of the system, a la Gorbachev in the Soviet era. It was two elites battling it out. But the third force are the young people who back the reformers, but they want the reformers to go much further, and they are therefore referred to as a third force because they don't ascribe to all of the reformers' viewpoints. And they even have argued for a secular democracy, whereas the reformers are calling for an evolution and change in the system, rather than an outright change of the system.
CONAN: You talked about, just on the basis of age, so few people remember the Iranian revolution or were just small children when it happened. There is another event in recent Iranian history, which is, of course, you know, a fundamental element of modern history, and that's the war with Iraq. This was a tremendously difficult, long and bitter struggle, though some in Iran portray it as the great national event, that they rallied together to drive out the forces of the invader.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right. It was a seminal event in modern Iranian history, I mean, and it has taken an entire generation of Iranian young men--up to nearly 500,000 Iranians died in this war. And today, you know, I visited hospitals in Iran in which I saw the victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks, and these were men in their 30s who were teen-agers at the time who are still coughing up blood from the chemical attacks, whose lungs were blistered from the inside. They are on IVs. You see many people with, you know, no legs in Iran. So the legacy and the scars of the war with Iraq remain. So there's certainly no love lost for Saddam Hussein.
CONAN: Well, joining us now to help us out on the question of how Iran wound up on the axis of evil is Patrick Clawson. He's deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, on the phone with us from his office here in Washington.
Good to speak with you again.
Mr. PATRICK CLAWSON (Washington Institute for Near East Policy): Glad to be here.
CONAN: And first of all, the question of weapons of mass destruction--we hear it talked about in Iraq and North Korea all the time. Tell us what you know about Iran's development, and start with nuclear weapons.
Mr. CLAWSON: Well, for some time the United States has been saying than Iran has got a clandestine nuclear program, and the Iranians have been saying, `What's the proof?' Well, a few months ago, satellite photos of two facilities that are pretty well built in Iran were released by an organization opposed to proliferation here in the United States. And those satellite photos show what certainly appear to be two very disturbing facilities that would really not have any use except for a nuclear weapons program. And furthermore, Iran had waited until the last minute to let the international organization called the IAEA know about these facilities. And the IAEA has been unable to visit them. Hopefully they're going to go in February, but the visits have been postponed several times now in the past.
So this is a very disturbing development, in that these are precisely the kind of facilities--an enrichment facility to have enriched uranium, and a heavy water facility to allow Iran to produce plutonium--these are precisely the kind of facilities that there have been broad international consensus would be indicators that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
CONAN: As Afshin Molavi was reminding us, Iran was on the receiving end of chemical weapons during its war against Iraq. Does Iran have a chemical weapons program of its own?
Mr. CLAWSON: Certainly does. And it's also very disturbing that Iran has claimed, in its submission to the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, to which Iran belongs, that Iran never had chemical weapons, when we know full well from Iraqi victims that, in fact, Iran had used these weapons during the war.
CONAN: And biological weapons?
Mr. CLAWSON: We don't know about that, but certainly, the US claims that Iran has got biological weapons look a lot more convincing now that we know that the United States had proof all along that Iran had a clandestine nuclear program, and the US just wasn't publicizing that until the proof became crystal clear. You could see it from a commercial satellite.
CONAN: If Iran were to develop nuclear--or weapons of mass destruction; just leave it there--would it have a way to deliver those weapons?
Mr. CLAWSON: Indeed, Iran has been developing quite long-range missiles, missiles that--well beyond what we needed to carry conventional warheads, and that has for a long time been seen as a very troubling indication that Iran was pursuing these nuclear and chemical and biological weapons, because there's no other reason to have a missile that can go 2,000 kilometers or 1,300 miles except if you've got something really powerful to put on the head of that missile.
CONAN: And finally, the other major element in the Bush administration's indictment of Iran is its support for terrorism. Iran is quite open about its support for Hezbollah.
Mr. CLAWSON: Indeed, and just before the `axis of evil' speech, there was a ship stopped by the Israelis that was carrying 50 tons of weapons, of which the Iranians first said, `Oh, we had nothing to do with it.' Well, you know, it's not a good idea if you're trying to hide your responsibility for weapons to have these weapons still in the original cases from the factories where they were made in your country. And these weapons were headed either for Hezbollah or, more likely, for the Palestinian Authority, but in any case to use in terror attacks against Israel.
CONAN: That ship was the Karin A?
Mr. CLAWSON: Exactly right. There are some indications that there'd been some other ships that might have snuck their way in, but this ship was carrying so many weapons that it could have made a dramatic difference in the level of violence between Palestinians and Israelis. For instance, it was carrying several tons of a powerful explosive called Semtex, which could have made these suicide bombs much more devastating than they have been to date.
CONAN: And I just wanted to ask you, Afshin Molavi--I know you're not a weapons expert, per se, but have you heard anything, you know, about which is controversial here?
Mr. MOLAVI: Sure. No, you know, without the access to the intelligence information, it's very hard to say what Iran has or what they do not have. And as I understand it, the IAEA has said that, right now, they are not aware of a nuclear--Iran has nuclear capability right now. Whether or not Iran is pursuing nuclear capability--the way an Iranian official put it to me one time is similar to what North Korea often says, is that they live in a dangerous neighborhood and they have been attacked by chemical weapons in the past, and what this Iranian official said is that they can be obliterated with one push of the button by Israel or the United States. This is what the Iranian official said to me.
But I think what is interesting to note in all of this is the Iranian people. The Iranian people do not support this hard line against Israel. The Iranian people do not necessarily support the Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas. The Iranian people and the Iranian street is the most pro-American street in all of the Middle East. The Iranian street is the only street that came out after September 11th and had a candlelight vigil in support of--and I think that that should be a factor in our thinking when we think about Iran.
CONAN: Patrick Clawson, thanks very much for joining us today.
Mr. CLAWSON: Thank you.
CONAN: Patrick Clawson is deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. And we're going to take your calls on Iran and its place in the axis of evil when we come back after a short break. Our phone number is (800) 989-8255; that's (800) 989-TALK. And our e-mail address is totn@npr.org. Later in the program, Iran's divided political leadership and how that affects its foreign policy.
I'm Neal Conan. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
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CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington.
We're talking today about Iran. Of course, you're invited to join the discussion. Our phone number: (800) 989-8255; that's (800) 989-TALK. And e-mail: totn@npr.org. Our guest is Afshin Molavi, a journalist, the author of "Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran."
And let's go right to the phones. Our first caller is Sharia, who joins us from Brookline, Massachusetts.
SHARIA (Caller): Hi, Neal.
CONAN: Hi.
SHARIA: Great program. It's about time. I want to highlight a major difference between the Iranian culture and that of the perceived Arab culture in the West. The argument right now about the invasion of Iraq--there was a background argument that the Arabs would be highly appreciative of power, and if they see power plays they would back off and do their best spinning; whereas Iranians are--first of all, it's a modern state. They have one of the highest levels of education in the Middle East. And as Afshin said, they are one of the most pro-Western countries in the Middle East, at least the street. And I think the United States, and especially Bush administration, would serve Iranian democratic interests much better if they support the evolutionary estate rather than pushing Iranians, which in turn radicalizes even the moderates to anti-Western views. And I think that must be taken into account in all discussions of this issue.
CONAN: Afshin Molavi, what do you think?
Mr. MOLAVI: Sure. No, Sharia raises an interesting point. And, you know, in the Clinton administration, there was a sense that they did support this evolutionary model of Iran and they did support the reformers and they offered even a road map for peace, a road map for dialogue. And the statements that the Clinton administration were saying about Iran and reform were generally positive. And the Bush administration tended to agree with that view until after September 11th, and until recently, when the Bush administration started to clearly distinguish between the Iranian people and the Iranian government, thereby even dismissing the reformers. And there have been statements by the Bush administration officials saying that `We are not interested, necessarily, in talking to Iranian reformers. We are interested in freedom for all of the Iranian people.' While it's a--so this policy seems to be one moving away from pushing for what Sharia described as supporting the evolutionary change and supporting more radical change coming from the street.
CONAN: Sharia, thanks very much for the phone call.
SHARIA: Sure.
CONAN: I want to discuss these exact points with our next guest, who is Bahman Baktiari, a professor of international relations at the University of Maine and the author of "Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: Institutionalization of Factional Politics," and he joins us on the line from Orono, Maine.
And good to have you on the program.
Professor BAHMAN BAKTIARI (University of Maine): Thank you.
CONAN: When you talk about the United States, first of all, embracing somewhat warmly the reformers, don't you get into a situation internally in the politics of Iran that whomever the United States seems to be embracing is immediately branded as the American lapdog?
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, this has been the pattern of American foreign policy toward Iran because somehow Washington has this tendency to always misread the dynamics of factional politics in Iran. So in 1980s, they misjudged the strength of the pragmatists by getting involved in arms sales, and I think in 1990s, again, they exaggerated the strength of the reformists. And today with the Bush administration, what we have--they are actually exaggerating the strength of the conservatives in terms of foreign policy and objectives vis-a-vis Iraq and underestimating the influence of the reformists. So there is a problem that here in Washington, I think they have to make a distinction between the reformers and the reform movement. And as long as we are fixated on the reformers, we will not be able to see the bigger picture that Afshin talked about earlier.
CONAN: As he also mentioned, though, of late the administration seems to be appealing directly to what we were describing earlier as the third force--you know, the young people who are dissatisfied with the regime.
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, I think there was a change in the policy because in July, President Bush made a public statement calling on the Iranian people to rise up, but during the latest student demonstrations against the death sentence imposed on the professor from Modarres University, the Bush administration was very quiet and did not seem to be encouraging the student movement. So again, they have taken a contradictory policy toward Iran.
CONAN: Afshin Molavi, the United States is also expending a lot of effort in trying to communicate with Iran on many different levels. How is that working?
Mr. MOLAVI: Well, one thing that they've done most recently is they have initiated a new radio program called "Radio Farda," and `farda' means `tomorrow' in Farsi. And what they're trying to do is reach the young generation of Iranians, this massive number of young Iranians that I described earlier that make up more than--nearly two-thirds of the population. So this radio program is a program that has a lot of music and it does sort of news bites. And that program has come under some criticism because Iran right now is at a stage in which it is a highly politicized environment, and young people are actually more interested in talking about politics than Britney Spears--not to say that they're not interested in pop culture and American music, because they certainly are, but it's an environment, when I was there, that was hyperpoliticized. The newspaper vendor was the most popular man in town. Crowds would gather to read the latest missives in the reformist-conservative power struggle in the newspapers. And so this effort to reach out through Britney Spears and the Backstreet Boys might be a little bit misplaced.
CONAN: Professor Baktiari, this ferment that we're hearing about, how widespread is it? And is it seen as a threat by those in power, whether they be moderates or conservatives?
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, yes and no. I think there's significant frustration on the part of the young and youth in Iran. There is anger, but there's also no vision that brings them together. And as we have seen in several demonstrations and opposition inside Iran--they start on a sudden reaction to a policy of the government, but then, after a couple of weeks, they just mellow out and melt out into the whole system again. So there is a problem in terms of how to ford opposition, how to maintain certain inspiration to keep it going. And I think the young in Iran are very frustrated, but again, just like what Afshin said about Radio Farda, again, we should not exaggerate the potential of another revolution that the young will bring about in Iran, because I think they do not want to see another revolution in Iran.
CONAN: Let's go the listeners. Our next caller is Michael, who's on the line with us from Providence, Rhode Island.
MICHAEL (Caller): Yeah. Hi, Neal. I really think I'd much rather see the Bush administration go out there and try to destabilize the mullahs in Iran than this idiotic war in Iraq. I mean, I think, you know, they killed at least 400 Americans or so in the embassy bombing and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and they may have had something to do with the bombing of the Lockerbie plane. You know, and it's an incredibly corrupt place. I mean, Khomeini's chauffeur--basically, all the industries were privatized and, you know, they were run by the ruling clergy. And Khomeini's chauffeur is in charge of, like, you know, $15 billion corporation or something. And, you know, the vast majority of the Muslim clerics there aren't part of the ruling dictatorship.
CONAN: Professor Baktiari, how do you react to that?
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, that's a very superficial reading of the changes in Iran, and I don't think United States can just simply go after any country. And as far as I remember on the Lockerbie case, it was Libya that was implicated and sanctions were placed on it. And in contrast to the behavior of countries like Syria in terms of its foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel, Iranians have been very pragmatic when one looks it the long-term strategy they have pursued. So I think it's a misreading of the situation and a superficial reading.
MICHAEL: Well, I don't mean the people themselves; I just mean the ruling government, which has, you know, supported terrorism more than any other place in the world for the last 25 years. I mean, every American over 35, you know, has lasting scars from the hostage crisis.
CONAN: OK, Michael. Thanks very much for the call.
MICHAEL: Ciao.
CONAN: Appreciate it.
I wanted to get to that next call, which is Dick, who's on the line with us from Los Altos, California.
DICK (Caller): Hello. I'm here.
CONAN: You're on the air.
DICK: Thank you very much. I just wanted to say that I really appreciate your program and thank you for having on some balanced views. I've personally spent three, three and a half years in Persia/Iran, and I'd just like to say that the people are some of the most wonderful people I've ever met. The country at one time had known one of the largest degrees of religious freedom in the Middle East. And I would like our government to pursue a more even-handed policy and to allow the country to evolve under their own schemes. I'm certain that the people will eventually do the right things, although this may be difficult for the current administration to believe.
CONAN: Afshin?
Mr. MOLAVI: Well, you know, I do get a sense, when I talk to American officials or when I listen to the speeches of American officials--they also have a sense that something is afoot in Iran, and it might not be such a good idea, as the caller from Providence said, to destabilize the place because it's being internally destabilized on its own.
DICK: I absolutely think our government should not try to destabilize other regimes.
Mr. MOLAVI: Yeah. No, abso--yeah. I was referring to the previous caller, and I...
DICK: Yes. No, I realize that.
Mr. MOLAVI: Yeah. And I hope you will also be able to travel to Iran again soon.
DICK: I would love to. I couldn't think of something I would much rath--I would love to do that.
Mr. MOLAVI: Yeah.
DICK: Thank you very much for this opportunity.
CONAN: Thanks, Dick.
We hear that the economy is in shambles--30 percent unemployment. We hear of great dissatisfaction, needs for all kinds of reforms. Have those problems undermined the authority of the clerics who actually run this theocracy, Professor Baktiari?
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, of course. I mean, in many ways--actually Iran's economy grew by almost, like, 4.8 percent in real terms in 2001, and I think the previous year was 5.7 percent that it had of growth, but yet, in light of the corruption and the whole massive entanglement of government industries vs. private industries, the country's economy is such a shamble that it is very difficult for any government to manage their country. So if the reformers had been able to make a tangible improvement in the economy, meaning improving the economic conditions of the Iranian population, particular the young, I would say that they would have been in a much more stronger position today. So they have not been able to do that.
CONAN: The question we asked at the beginning of the show, Afshin: What is left of the fervor that fueled the revolution?
Mr. MOLAVI: I think very little, and I think it's also--well, first of all, to say very little, you--right now, as I said, there's a great deal of pro-Americanism on the Iranian street, partly because of the idea of `the enemy of my enemy is my friend,' there's so much frustration. And secondly, it's also important to remember...
CONAN: Well, if these are young people, also this is the one thing they know that will really annoy them.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right. That's right. And secondly, when we go back to the history of the revolution, we must remember that while there was a great deal of fervor, it was not purely an Islamic revolution; it was a revolution that agitated for greater democracy, for greater freedom. It turned out that the Islamists won the post-revolution power struggle.
CONAN: And, Professor Baktiari, at this point, do you think that the United States' or the administration's hard line against Iran--in your view, it that justified?
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, I don't think it's justified, and I think this administration has come about changing its policy toward Iran since declaring it as an axis of evil because if you look at it, we have been sending so many signals to the Iranian government about cooperating on the situation with Iraq and pro-Shia opposition groups from Iraq who have support of the Iranian government have met with American officials. So there are all these communications taking place for a geopolitical purpose. So I think the administration has calibrated its approach.
But overall, I think their perception and their analysis of what is happening inside Iran is not very good, and they continue to make mistakes in terms of policy.
CONAN: You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
And now let's go to Joseph, who's on the line with us from Oklahoma City.
JOSEPH (Caller): Hello. Mr. Molavi, I found your book "Persian Pilgrimages" fascinating...
Mr. MOLAVI: Thank you.
JOSEPH: ...especially the pop culture stuff. I was really shocked. I mean, we don't get a picture of Iran that would make even comprehensible the idea that a best-seller book over there would be translated Pink Floyd lyrics.
Mr. MOLAVI: That's right.
CONAN: What?
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Mr. MOLAVI: Should I explain that one?
JOSEPH: It's true.
Mr. MOLAVI: When I was traveling in Iran, the number-two best-selling book in Iran was a translation of lyrics by Pink Floyd.
CONAN: Did they translate them into English? Because I'd like to read those.
Mr. MOLAVI: They--that's right.
CONAN: Anyway, go ahead, Joseph.
JOSEPH: I was wondering, do you fear in the future, like, a crackdown against the youth movement, perhaps a violent one? I mean, do you see a confrontation coming up? And I'd just like to ask one more quick question. What is Iran's closest ally in the region? And I'll take the answer off the air.
Mr. MOLAVI: OK.
CONAN: Thanks for the call.
Mr. MOLAVI: In terms of a crackdown, what we have is we do see periodic crackdowns against youth. Every now and then parties are raided; every now and then the morals police, which are these sort of self-appointed purveyors of what they describe as Islamic morality, go and they confront young men and women who are doing nothing untoward, harmlessly walking together in a park or harmlessly talking on a park bench. So we already do these these periodic crackdowns. Now will there be a major crackdown? I think the conservatives understand that a major crackdown also has implications for a major rebellion, so what they're trying to do is these periodic smaller crackdowns.
And, you know, when it comes to Iran's closest ally in the region, I mean, they have several allies, but, I mean, Syria ranks right up there, but Professor Baktiari may want to chime in on that as well.
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, I think you answered very correctly, actually, but on the second question that the caller asked, Iranian regime really suffers from a strategic loneliness. They do not have a good friend in terms of foreign policy, and they're trying to repair relations with many Gulf countries--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and others--but mostly on short-term basis. So in many ways today, as much as Iran has had this electoral process, the rise of the reformists and President Khatami is a very elegant speaker when it comes to dialogue of civilization, Iran still does not have those friendship with certain countries that it can depend on.
CONAN: Here's an e-mail question from Joe in St. Cloud, Minnesota, for Professor Baktiari. `What gives the unelected clerics their apparently ultimate authority in Iran? Is it just that they are favored by the army? Is there any basis in law for their sway?'
Prof. BAKTIARI: Well, Iranian system is a very peculiar system. It's not an authoritarian system or a totalitarian system because there's factionalism among the personalities in power, and there are various institutions that have strengthened those personalities. So many of the clerics have informal networks that go back for many decades into their seminaries or schools that they went back to, and their differences among each other actually allows that public fear, allows that opening in the Iranian society to take place. So it is this dilemma that there is so much disorganization--or is like organized chaos, almost. To explain the Iranian political system, it's like organized chaos.
CONAN: But doesn't the constitution give the clerics the leading role?
Prof. BAKTIARI: The constitution is a very mixed document. It allows the elected officials from Parliament--the president and city councils--to have a prominent role in the implementation of policy, but yet...
CONAN: I see.
Prof. BAKTIARI: ...allows unelected officials to be in charge of policy.
CONAN: All right. Well, that's all the time we have, I'm afraid. But, Bahman Baktiari, thanks very much for being with us.
Prof. BAKTIARI: Thank you.
CONAN: Bahman Baktiari, professor of international relations at the University of Maine. He's the author of "Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran: Institutionalization of Factional Politics." And he was on the phone with us from Orono, Maine. And our thanks, as well, to Afshin Molavi. Appreciate your coming in.
Mr. MOLAVI: Thank you very much for having me.
CONAN: Afshin Molavi's book is "Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran."
When we come back from a short break, a geographical rundown of where deadly weapons may be being developed and the logic of nuclear proliferation.
I'm Neal Conan. It's the talk of the nation from NPR News.
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