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Analysis: Future of th Arab-Israeli Peace Process
 Israel's Withdrawal Plan
NEAL CONAN, host:
This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington.
We turn now to the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Yesterday's announcement by President Bush in support of Israel's plan to keep most Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank has been met with a wave of criticism from Palestinians. One of the most contentious issues is President Bush's language regarding the right of millions of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes inside what is now Israel, a return he described as unrealistic.
What effect is all this going to have on the prospect for future peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians? Two view from our guests. Robert Malley was a special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs. He now directs the Middle East Program at the International Crisis Group here in Washington. And as always, thanks very much for joining us.
Mr. ROBERT MALLEY (International Crisis Group): Thank you.
CONAN: And David Makovsky is a senior fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, also here in Washington. Good to speak with you again.
Mr. DAVID MAKOVSKY (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy): Well, good to be with you, Neal.
CONAN: Robert Malley, let's start by talking about the three commitments Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, wanted from the United States: withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, US recognition that Israel would hold onto parts of the West Bank, and US rejection of the right of millions of Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War to return to their homes inside what is now Israel. He got what he wanted. Why and why now?
Mr. MALLEY: Well, he got what he wanted, to some extent. I think he may have wanted more, but I think he got enough for his immediate objective, which is to get support within his own party, the Likud in Israel, to endorse his plan to withdraw from Gaza. So since he wasn't negotiating with the Palestinians, he needed to get the payoff and the compensation from the US. And what he got from the US now I think will be more than enough for him to go back and sell the deal to his people, to his party. The problem, of course, is less what it does to that process as to what it does to the Palestinians.
CONAN: And exactly where are the Palestinians in this?
Mr. MALLEY: Well, they were, you know, the ones who were absent from this process, even though it's a negotiation and an issue that affects them far more profoundly than it affects us. I think to take a step back, in some ways, what the president said didn't really change all that much, and yet at the same time, everything is a little bit different this morning. He didn't change that much, because on the issues you mentioned, whether it's the issues of settlements, the fact that Israel, at the end of the day, will retain some settlements in the West Bank, or the issue of refugees; that at the end of the day, they won't be coming back to Israel. Both those principles had been enshrined in every US peace proposal in the year 2000 that President Clinton was involved with and, in fact, it were enshrined in every unofficial Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiation that has taken place since then.
CONAN: Da...
Mr. MALLEY: The problem is this time, it's being done in a way that excludes all the concession that the Israelis were supposed to make, so we have two concessions, fundamental concessions that the Palestinians have made, which have been now blessed by the US, without the second half, the other half of the coin, which is what the Palestinians want in return.
CONAN: David Makovsky, no concessions from Israel--do you see it that way?
Mr. MAKOVSKY: Well, I agree with Rob partly in terms that this is built upon what the Clinton administration did, and there's more consistency than inconsistency, but I would argue that it's a little different in terms of, you know, this idea of no concessions. You know, Sharon was the architect of the settlement movement, and like Nixon going to China, I think it creates a pathway that, in and of itself, it's not sufficient, but it enabled and facilitates future steps, and it's clear that pulling settlements out of Gaza is an important first step.
If you heard a speech that Sharon gave in Israel on the eve of his trip, I think just hours before he left, he gave a speech that Ehud Barak, his more liberal rival, could have given four years ago, where he said, `Look, these are the settlements blocks I want to try to focus on,' and those are the ones near the old 1967 border. And that's clear that those blocks constitute what Rob Malley was working on when he was in the Clinton administration, about 5 percent of the West Bank. That is not the maximalist Sharon that most people associate with, and so I think Sharon is undergoing some change. I keep my doubts whether he could complete this process, but I think he has unique stature to begin this process, and I that's what I think the Bush administration saw was worth doing, especially given that the idea of taking down settlements was supposed to be the very end of the road, and we're nowhere near the end of the road, but Sharon is actually taking it down earlier than Rabin or Barak or any of his more liberal rivals wanted to, and I think they see there's value in that.
CONAN: Robert Malley, as just mentioned, you were part of peace negotiations in the Clinton administrations, notably Camp David, Wye River. How close is this map that Sharon is apparently talking about to the map that emerged from those negotiations?
Mr. MALLEY: Well, I don't know that he has a map that he would share with us so that we are clear about, so I don't think--I think it's premature to speak about what his ultimate vision is. I think it's true, and I would echo what David just said. It would be a profound step if Israel withdrew and evacuated settlements in Gaza. No prime minister--not the visionary Rabin, not the humanist Perez, not the bold Barak--did any of that. And so it would be a quite remarkable step.
What I question is not so much the US endorsement of that step. I don't think the US has any choice. It's the price that we say we're prepared to pay for it that I don't think was necessary, and certainly if it was necessary, it didn't have to be done in this way. I think the president could have been much clearer about what both sides would get in the final deal. There's a need to recompense one side or the other, but just say, `This is what the final deal would be like,' and it would include Israeli annexation of settlements, no Palestinians returning to Israel, but at the same time, it would include everything that the Palestinians would expect to get in the deal. You can't single-handedly, unilaterally skew the balance of future negotiations by telling one side, `You already have what you want,' and the other side is going to have to then bargain from a position of weakness.
CONAN: Yeah. David Makovsky, a lot of people would say the Palestinian bargaining chips--the right of return, settlements on the West Bank--they've just unilaterally been taken off the board.
Mr. MAKOVSKY: Well, look, I agree with Rob in terms of--I believe the final status, as we would call it, deal, is going to look very much like what President Clinton put on the table in the year 2000. And actually, in the text of this agreement, which has been totally lost because there's this ironic situation that Bush, Sharon and Arafat all seem to have aligned interests, portray this whole thing as kind of a giveaway to Israel, each for their own reason, whether it's American elections, whether it's the Likud Party primary, whether it's Arafat feeling he's excluded. They all have that interest, but if you'd actually look at the text, it says there that the changes will have to be mutually agreed upon, and that means that Israel's going to keep settlement blocks, it's going to have to do what we call swaps. And Clinton articulated both explicitly in a speech on January 7th, 2001. It was his last speech of his presidency. Maybe Rob Malley helped write it. And I think Bush really implied it without saying so explicitly when he made clear that any territorial changes are going to be mutual. And to me, that is implied, while Clinton did make it explicit, but in terms of substance, it won't matter much.
CONAN: Robert Malley, is that right?
Mr. MALLEY: I can't disagree with it. You know, we all know that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at some level is as much about psychology and context and mutual feelings and apprehensions as it is about the substance. And so even though on the substance, this has not, as I said, changed that much, the optics are terrible and the reaction by the Palestinians may be partly Arafat trying to show that, in fact, the US and Israel are in cahoots against him. But it also really is resonating extremely negatively among many Palestinians, including the reformers who I've been speaking to and who are all in favor of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, wanted to work for it, but are now saying, `If we are part of this enterprise, it looks to our people that we're part of an enterprise that also includes unilateral decisions to annex parts of the West Bank and to dispossess the Palestinians of their right of return,' and it comes at a time when the US image in the Arab world is so low, so negative, and we need all the help we can get in Iraq, all the help we could get to help Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, that it is surprising to me that the administration didn't try to balance this a little bit to give more to the Palestinians in a way that would be perfectly consistent with US policy, but would make it an easier pill to swallow for people who have reasons to be skeptical to begin with.
CONAN: That's Robert Malley, director of the Middle East Program at the International Crisis Group here in Washington, formerly special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs. Also on the line with us is David Makovsky, a senior fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
An e-mail question we've gotten, and this is just one of several variants we've gotten. Angela in Corvallis asks, `I'm wondering if you think that President Bush's unprecedented declaration will incite further terrorist acts in the disputed territories and even here in the United States?' David Makovsky.
Mr. MAKOVSKY: Look, there's no way of knowing. I mean, the situation has been tense, the killing of Sheikh Yassin, and really three and a half years of suicide attacks. There have been about 280 attempted infiltrations, and so it's hard to know what can be done beyond, you know, the terrorism that's already going on and the violence and the like. I can hope--and I agree with Rob, what he said previously, you know, that there would have been some counterbalancing efforts, more quiet US-Palestinian ties. My gut feeling says the following. Once we all get beyond this Likud Party meeting at the end of the month, the whole tenor is going to shift into Israeli-Palestinian coordination on Israel getting out of settlements, because the Palestinians have a stake in it, and they have a stake in Sharon being the one to start the process.
And I tend to believe that, you know, there have been a lot of these US letters. There was a Ford letter on the Golan Heights in 1975. But when the Israelis and Syrians wanted to deal, you know, seriously on the Golan, that letter didn't stop anything. And so my gut belief is there is a confluence of interest here to start taking down these settlements, and that will ultimately prevail, regardless of missteps here and there. I think it probably will take another month until that happens. But between now and then, you know, I expect that we're going to see a lot of not too pleasant statements and I hope won't mean further bloodshed, but the bloodshed has been going on now for three and a half years.
CONAN: Let's get a caller on the line, and this is Goshiki(ph) in Douglass City, Colorado.
GOSHIKI (Caller): Hi.
CONAN: Hi.
GOSHIKI: Well, I have a quick question for you. I've been listening to your previous talk on Iraq and I'm listening to, you know, Israel-Palestinian, and I'm just surprised that nobody talks about issues of settlement, issues of terror, without the context of power and who has the power to define who is being terrorists and what concessions will be made. And as soon as you talk power, you also talk religious authority, because these are three organized religions in conflict with each other, each saying `My way is the only way, the right way, and everybody else is invalid.' So by definition, organized religions and religious tolerance are oxymorons. So, you know, without addressing those issues and just talking in a secular context of saying, `Oh, this is just plain war between two people,' I think a lot of the issues are being confused.
CONAN: What do you think of that, Robert Malley?
Mr. MALLEY: Well, I think there's a lot in that question. Let me try to address at least two points, one having to do with religion and the other with power. I think one thing we are seeing in the region--and even though, who knows what will happen and things can change pretty rapidly--but there is a trend that we're seeing, which is a radicalization of the mood throughout the region. We see it certainly in the Palestinian area. We're seeing it in Iraq. We're seeing it elsewhere. And part of the problem is that people now, whether they're secular or religious, they're tending to gravitate towards extreme views because they are in a situation of conflict because they don't see any hope and because they see clear enemies on the other side, whether it's Israel for some or the United States for others. And that's a situation that I'm particularly worried about, that there is no road map, in fact, towards a future that the people in the region who are more moderate, more secular perhaps, could rally around, and so obviously, those who have more radical discourses are more attractive.
That brings us to the other issue, which is the issue of power. The United States for me has had over the last two years, particularly after September 11th, a unique opportunity to mobilize energies on a positive vision for the Middle East: peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, some resolution of the Iraqi conflict. Instead, I think it's wasting an opportunity now because it's not bringing all those energies to work for a settlement that I'm sure David and I could agree with on, that would be fair to both, that would be consistent with the Clinton parameters, and instead, we are squandering this opportunity where there is a desire by many in the region, many of them to rally around a constructive, more peaceful future, and instead, because we've taken what David has called missteps, these missteps are going to be very costly for us in the future.
CONAN: Goshiki, thanks very much for the call. We just have a few seconds left, David Makovsky, but one of the questions has to be that none of this, of course, is guaranteed to happen. As I understand, Israeli officials say withdrawal wouldn't take place before the summer of 2005. Obviously, between now and then, one never knows--leaders of both Israel and the United States may have been changed.
Mr. MAKOVSKY: Right, right. Well, that's why it's even more important, after the Likud Party meeting is over, to begin a coordination for Israelis and Palestinians. Because if we've learned one thing, we've learned when there's a vacuum, extremists gain. I tend to think that the settlement take-down will happen before the summer of 2005, and I think it's important it does, because from a Palestinian side, they see all addition, no subtractions; fences, settlements, outposts, checkposts. And the Israelis really, in their mind, according to the polls, a majority believe that most of the West Bank's going to go and Gaza certainly is going. And now you have Ariel Sharon, who's starting it that way, in that direction. So I think the quicker you get into the implementation, even if it's not completed for a bit, but that people will see not just words, but deeds, A, and B, that this has to be coordinated. Israel's not just going to take the keys to...
CONAN: And...
Mr. MAKOVSKY: ...Gaza and throw it over a fence and...
CONAN: And I'm afraid that's where we're going to have to leave it. David Makovsky and Robert Malley, thanks to you both.
In Washington, I'm Neal Conan, NPR News.
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