Interview: David Kay Discusses the Work Ahead for the U.N. Weapons Inspectors

Weekend Edition Sunday: December 8, 2002

LIANE HANSEN, host:

David Kay was the United Nation's chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1992, and he's with us in the studio this morning.

Good morning, David.

Mr. DAVID KAY (Potomac Institute for Police Studies): Good morning, Liane.

HANSEN: First of all, are you surprised by the size of the document, almost 12,000 pages?

Mr. KAY: You know, not really because I expected the Iraqis to provide voluminous information as a way of buying time, and time, they believe, is the only real defense they have against a US military blow.

HANSEN: President Bush is saying that it's not the responsibility of the inspectors to uncover illegal weapons hidden in Iraq. This is what he said in his weekly radio address yesterday.

SOUNDBITE OF RADIO ADDRESS

President GEORGE W. BUSH: The responsibility of inspectors is simply to confirm evidence of voluntary and total disarmament. Saddam Hussein has the responsibility to provide that evidence as directed, and in full.

HANSEN: Is that in line with the way you saw your job, David Kay?

Mr. KAY: Well, it's not really the way we saw our job to begin with. We thought when we went into Iraq in 1991 that, concurrent with Resolution 687, the Iraqis would render their weapons to us and our job would actually be inventory and destruction, not finding. Now when it became clear the Iraqis had no intentions of living up to that part of the resolution, we then became detectives trying to find the weapons material itself, with some success in the early days certainly, but overall a sense of lack of fulfillment.

HANSEN: There's been some tension between the White House and Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector. The administration has said it would like the team to encourage Iraqi scientists to defect, bring with them their knowledge of Baghdad's weapons programs. And Hans Blix has said that the inspection team would not serve as a defection agency. Is that part of the job of weapons inspectors?

Mr. KAY: It's really not part of the job of weapons inspections, but what is part of the job is getting the best information you can on what the Iraqis are doing. And I'm convinced, and I think most inspectors are convinced, that comes from Iraqis who are inside the program. Now in my days we had to interview the Iraqis surrounded by their own security officials, and that had a chilling effect. We also had Iraqis who said, `We'd be willing to talk to you, but you've got to get us out of here. We can't do it and survive.'

Now the resolution itself provides new powers to Hans Blix. A, he's supposed to be able to interview Iraqis in country without Iraqi security officials. And for those who want to flee--it's not a case of abduction, but those who request to flee in order to provide the UN with information, the resolution says the inspectors are to do that.

HANSEN: Let's talk about the exchange of information, because another sore spot between the Bush administration and Hans Blix is over the information. The US hasn't shared with inspectors secret evidence it claims to have on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Hans Blix said on Friday that such information would be welcome. What about this? Did the US share intelligence information when you were on the UN team?

Mr. KAY: The US and other countries shared information when I was on the team, and it was absolutely crucial to the successes that we did have. Now let me say I understand part of the administration's position right now is they were even concerned in our days that there were serious leaks from the UN inspection service that would get to the Iraqis. Now if there are leaks prior to the declaration being delivered, you're afraid the Iraqis will adjust the declarations to reflect the new facts they've ...(unintelligible). I suspect that you will have greater sharing in the weeks ahead.

HANSEN: The UN Security Council, however, on Friday decided that sensitive material in this Iraqi declaration might lead to a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And they would not want that to be shared with member nations, and it would be kept into the files of the inspection team. So, I mean, what do they fear? Where do they fear this information is going to be spread? It comes from Iraq in the first place.

Mr. KAY: Well, certainly not spreading it back to Iraq is their fear. Their fear is that, in fact, for example, Syria is on the Security Council, and in the Board of Governors of the IAEA, Iraq used to be a member. Iran is very often there, as well as other countries of proliferation concern. What I don't understand is, our work-around to this was always to share it with the five permanent members fully, and share less with the broad membership of the Board of Governors or the Security Council. The five permanent members already have weapons. Their people are cleared for it. So, I mean, it's a little bit being hung up on a diplomatic nicety that's just not needed.

HANSEN: So now we have all of this information going to different places. It's going to take a while to filter through this information in the various places. Then what happens? Everybody gets together, gives their own opinion about what's happening, form a majority opinion, then let us know what's going on, or the UN obviously know what's going on?

Mr. KAY: I think there are several separate things that will happen. First, the US, the British and other permanent members who have the best basis to analyze the documents will form their own opinion about the completeness and the gaps which are important. And it will help the US and others provide the inspectors evidence of where there is suspected non-compliance and guide future inspections. So you will have a net assessment made by the UN, as well as the permanent members at least. And part of that will be used to guide inspections, but quite frankly part of it may be used by the US to say, `There is already a major material breach by the Iraqis. They have lied on significant issues and omitted information,' and taking that directly to the Security Council for action.

HANSEN: Then what does that do to the role of inspectors if the United States says, `Well, we've got our information'?

Mr. KAY: Well, I think what the US will have to do is lay that information out before the council to develop a compelling case. I think no one is going to accept just a statement that we have information. It's going to have to be assessed.

HANSEN: David Kay was the United Nations chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1992. He's currently a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

Thank you very much for coming in.

Mr. KAY: Happy to be with you.

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