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Interview: David Kay, Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector for the U.N. From 1991 to 1992, Discusses the Return of Inspectors to Iraq
Weekend Editon Sunday: November 17, 2002
 U.N. Weapons Inspectors
LIANE HANSEN, host:
Weapons inspectors return to Iraq this week for the first time in nearly four years. An advance team, led by chief United Nations inspector Hans Blix, and Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency, arrives in Baghdad tomorrow to reopen offices that were vacated in December 1998. Iraq has agreed to cooperate with a tough new Security Council resolution which warns of serious consequences if Iraq interferes with the right of weapons inspectors to go anywhere at any time.
Here to discuss what it's like to hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein's Iraq is David Kay. He was the chief nuclear weapons inspector for the United Nations from 1991 to 1992. He's currently a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Good morning.
Dr. DAVID KAY (Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies): Good morning.
HANSEN: Weapons inspectors left Iraq four years ago after the Iraqis thwarted their attempts to go to what became known as the presidential palaces. Now based on your experience in Iraq, I mean, what are the methods of diversion or deception do you think that Iraqi officials can use on the current team of weapons inspectors?
Dr. KAY: Well, fundamentally what they will try to do is put the weapons program--not just weapons, the documentation, the production arrangements here in places where it's very hard to find them. This is range from underground facilities which are difficult to detect to places where it's difficult to inspect--mosques, private houses, universities, hospitals. But then it gets more cunning than even that because fundamentally all you have to do is delay inspectors from getting someplace you don't want them to. I still remember a spontaneous demonstration in Baghdad that delayed a convoy of inspectors for about four hours. Now there are no spontaneous demonstrations in Baghdad under Saddam Hussein. But it's an effective way. We've also arrived at facilities and been told `We can't find the key for a building.'
HANSEN: What's the psychological component here, for example? How do the weapons inspectors begin to develop a relationship with Iraqi officials, and to build a relationship that is trustworthy, one that is not just deceptive?
Dr. KAY: It was easier in some ways than I thought it would be. Because most of the Iraqi senior scientists, at least in the nuclear area, have been trained in the West, many in the United States. The problem is you also have security officials, goons, really, who are standing behind the people you're trying to develop a relationship with and so it becomes dangerous for the people you're interviewing to develop too good a relationship. I remember one official who made a slip, a crucial piece of information, that led to the discovery of a previously unknown centrifuge facility. The Iraqis told me the next day he'd been shot. I don't know if he had been shot, but it was clearly an effort to chill my inquisitiveness, to let me understand the consequences of my actions for the Iraqis.
HANSEN: The language of the Security Council resolution reminds Iraq that it does indeed face serious consequences if it doesn't comply with these particular obligations? What kind of burden does that put on the weapons inspectors themselves, particularly psychologically, knowing that what they do, what they discover could be the trigger for a large-scale conflict?
Dr. KAY: As a team leader, you try to keep your inspectors from worrying about that. The second inspection team I took in occurred after the Iraqis had been found in material breach. This was in July of 1991, and the US, President Bush, current President Bush's father, had said that if the Iraqis continued their concealment efforts, military action would be the only alternative. When I arrived, I was greeted by a large Iraqi delegation and I still remember to this day what they said as we stepped off the plane. It was `Dr. Kay, we're so glad to see you.' And I said, `Well, that's surprising. You weren't glad to see me leave when I left with the last team.' And they said, `Oh, no, we know now that you're here, President Bush will not bomb us.' It was an effort, I think, to transfer that responsibility for military action not taking from the Iraqis to the inspectors and, quite frankly, you do not want to do that, because the inspectors have a professional job. They should not be worried about these larger responsibilities.
HANSEN: The composition of the inspectors, the teams, are going to be a bit different than the 1990s. These are all going to be full-time United Nations employees, and the last time, you had inspectors from all kinds of different countries. Is this a good change?
Dr. KAY: I actually think it's not a good change. It's hard to develop a good nuclear weapons inspector from someone who has never worked around nuclear weapons. The other reason I think it's not a good idea, the results are requiring full-time UN employees is they have, and are only going to be able to field, a maximum of about a hundred and twenty-five inspectors at any one time. Now this is in a country that's the same size, roughly, as France, or roughly the same size as the state of California. In the first round, we were able to surge the number of inspectors. We had one team that was a hundred people; less impartial, but a lot more effective.
HANSEN: Another difference this time is that the inspection team is not going to share information with American intelligence agencies. Is this wise?
Dr. KAY: Here, again, the reasons are understandable, attempt to be impartial. I think they're denying themselves probably the most--in my experience, the most important tool an inspector had available. I still have a hope that as the inspections begin, they will step away from this ideological position and politically correct position of not using intelligence supplied by member states, because without that intelligence, there really isn't a hope of penetrating the Iraqi deception schemes.
HANSEN: What's your sense? Are you optimistic about this round of inspections or pessimistic?
Dr. KAY: Based on the past 11 years of Iraqi behavior, I really have no reason to be optimistic. I try to remain skeptical and believe that it's best to test and let's find out. For the sake of Iraq and the sake of the Middle East, and of really arms control, I would like to see this come to an end that did not involve the use of military force.
HANSEN: David Kay is a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Virginia. He was the UN's chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1992. Thanks for coming in.
Dr. KAY: Happy to be with you.
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