Impact of the North Korea Test on U.S. Policy

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ROBERT SIEGEL, host:

For more on diplomatic options on North Korea, we turn now to the chief U.S. negotiator on North Korea, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill. Ambassador Hill, welcome to the program once again.

Mr. CHRISTOPHER HILL (Assistant Secretary of State): Thank you very much.

SIEGEL: You're the head of the U.S. delegation at six party talks on the North Korean nuclear program, and I wonder, first, we heard President Bush earlier today saying that the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or to non-state enemies would be considered a grave threat. North Korea would be held fully accountable. What does that mean?

Mr. HILL: Well, I think he's making it very clear that we are not going to stand by and allow North Korea to transfer these very dangerous materials to non-state actors, namely terrorist groups.

SIEGEL: So far, some have criticized the administration's policy toward North Korea as amounting to big denunciations - North Korea's in the axis of evil -but a little softer on action. What actually are we threatening here if there were a distribution of weapons?

Mr. HILL: Well, first of all, we have made very clear for a long time now that this is not just a U.S. problem. This is a problem for the region, this is a problem for the world, and that's why our diplomacy has really stressed multi-lateral diplomacy. And what's important is we have been working very closely with a number of partners, namely China, but the others as well - South Korea and Japan and Russia - and what we've been trying to do is arrange a solution.

And if we're not going to be able to get a solution there, we certainly are going to work together, and we're doing that in the U.N. today, to make sure we can fashion an arrangement by which it's going to be very hard for North Korea to transfer any of this material.

SIEGEL: You've been dealing with the North Koreans for years now to no avail, and today the U.S. proposed stringent sanctions. Do you get the sense that that would be enough, that that would deter the North Koreans from their present nuclear course?

Mr. HILL: Well, you know, it's hard to say. They are a very, very stubborn leadership. Now, we have made very clear that we're prepared to chart a future for North Korea, and that came to this six party agreement we reached a year ago, where in two and a half short pages, albeit rather dense pages, we laid out a scenario where if they go rid of their weapons they could have a real opening to the international community.

And it appears for now they don't seem to be interested. They appear to be choosing another route, a route that will lead them into very, very deep isolation. And we're going to have no choice but to accommodate them on this isolation.

SIEGEL: I've heard it said that if China were simply to say because of your actions in North Korea, we're going to cut off economic assistance to you, and by doing so, thereby risk instability in North Korea, which they're not obviously very interested in doing. But that might have real resonance in North Korea. That might really have an effect on them. Is that true?

Mr. HILL: Oh, I think it's fair to say that China probably has more leverage than other countries do. For example, there's clearly more trade between North Korea and China than there is between North Korea and the United States. And so we have looked to China to take the lead in some of these efforts. But you know, the Chinese are not very happy with the current situation. I mean, their statement today was very strong, very much in sync with ours, and I'd say we're working pretty well with China right now.

SIEGEL: What's the acid test here in action for the Chinese? What are you hoping they'll do?

Mr. HILL: Well, obviously, we have to see how we work with the Chinese in New York, because we want to work pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a tough resolution that will have some real teeth to it, namely a Chapter Seven resolution. So I think where the rubber meets the road will be in New York at the Security Council. That's where we'll see where the Chinese are.

SIEGEL: And at this point, should we look back on the past few years and say the policy to date failed? It didn't deter the North Koreans from doing this.

Mr. HILL: Well, certainly, we wanted to deter the North Koreans. We put a pretty good deal on the table, a deal that I think was very much in their interest, and we worked very closely with our partners. And one of the reasons we worked closely with our partners is not in the certain belief that we were going to get the North Koreans to go away from a program that they've been engaged in for some 30 years - I mean, this didn't just start last year for the North Koreans - but one of the reasons we engaged in this multilateral process was that in the event North Korea was not deterred, we would have this collective experience, we would have this really sense of community that we've developed among the five parties, I should say, and then we are prepared together to move to the next stage, and I think we have a real common understanding, and we'll see in the days ahead in the New York Security Council how well we've done.

SIEGEL: So if I hear you right, you're saying Plan A failed policy, but there was a Plan B implicit in that and that's a success.

Mr. HILL: Well again, I think North Korea failed. North Korea failed to understand its future. It is not our failure that North Korea cannot see its future. It is our responsibility to react to the situation, to deal with the situation and frankly to deal with all the options we have with the understanding that there's one option we don't have, and that is to walk away from this.

SIEGEL: Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, chief U.S. negotiator on North Korea. Ambassador Hill, thanks a lot for talking with us.

Mr. HILL: Thank you.

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