MELISSA BLOCK, host: The public appears to be divided on the response to Irene. Some think the government overreacted, while others feel not enough was done. In each case, people are reacting based on what happened to them. That's utterly human, but new psychological research suggests this way of looking at things has a perverse affect on policy makers trying to keep us safe. Here's NPR science correspondent, Shankar Vedantam.
SHANKAR VEDANTAM: Put yourself in the shoes of government officials as Hurricane Irene approached. President Obama and other policymakers were looking at satellite imagery and other meteorological data.
President BARACK OBAMA: I cannot stress this highly enough. If you are in the projected path of this hurricane, you have to take precautions now.
VEDANTAM: The recommendations were based on estimates of how dangerous the hurricane would be. But psychologist Peter McGraw at the Leeds School of Business in Boulder, Colorado, said officials also had to be thinking about how they were going to be judged after the hurricane. Officials wanted to make the right call, but they also wanted to avoid blame. So they could weigh the odds and calibrate their responses to the risk in a very rational manner or they could...
PETER MCGRAW: Present worst-case scenarios, to present the worst possible case that people might face. When things fall short, then they're not as upset.
VEDANTAM: People can blame officials for hyping things, but
MCGRAW: They don't become outraged about that, versus being told, oh, it's safe to stay here and then have your house destroyed.
VEDANTAM: Risk management expert Howard Kunreuther is with the Wharton School in Philadelphia. His work shows that people say they want to officials to focus on the dangers that are the most likely, but they expect officials to protect them against the things they fear most, which are sometimes extremely unlikely. Experiments done after 9/11 show that's not just true with natural disasters, but all kinds of threats.
HOWARD KUNREUTHER: Individuals thought it was more likely for terrorists to strike a civilian object with a truck loaded with explosives than a hijacked airplane. However, they were much more concerned about blaming the government for failing to prevent the hijacked airplane attack than the truck loaded with explosives.
VEDANTAM: So if you're an elected public official, should you focus on truck bombs, which are more likely, or airline security, which makes the public more scared? Policymakers, therefore, face a dilemma. They can keep people safe, but risk making them angry or keep them happy and risk making them unsafe. Princeton University psychologist Alexander Todorov said the disconnect between how we say we want policymakers to behave and how we judge them stems from a psychological bias.
ALEXANDER TODOROV: We have known in psychology for many years something that is called hindsight bias, that looking back at the events that happened in the past, they look way more predictable than they actually were.
VEDANTAM: The hindsight bias allows people to blame others for their own actions, says Kunreuther.
KUNREUTHER: The disconnect is that often before the event, people will say, it's not going to happen to me, so they don't pay attention themselves by taking measures like purchasing insurance or making their house safer. But after the event, there's a feeling that someone should've helped us here. We have a reason to blame them.
VEDANTAM: In a recent paper published in the Journal "Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes," McGraw, Kunreuther and Todorov said one way around the conundrum is to insulate officials from the consequences of unpopular decisions. They proposed that risk analysts have fixed terms. This would mean, for example, that if an official accurately judges that the risk posed by a hurricane is small, she shouldn't have to inflate the risks in order to avoid blame if the hurricane turns out to be catastrophic.
Thomas Kean, former Republican governor of New Jersey and one of the chairmen of the 9/11 commission, said one way he found around the conundrum was to let people into the thinking that went into his decisions.
THOMAS KEAN: If you tried to fool the public in some way or another, then you get into trouble. But if you're right out with it, you said I can't do this, I can't do that, this is why, I found the public very understanding. They weren't always with you, but, you know, the public doesn't always have to agree with you to support you.
VEDANTAM: That could be useful advice as officials prepare for Hurricane Katia, which may or may not be around the corner. Shankar Vedantam, NPR News.
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