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TERRY GROSS, host:

This is Fresh Air. I'm Terry Gross. We've been doing a lot of shows about the financial crisis, talking to people who are good at explaining how we got into this mess. To understand our economy, you have to understand China's investment in American markets, a big investment, to the tune of about $1 billion a day. China's investments in U.S. Treasury notes and other holdings have financed a lot of America's public and private debt. Why does China invest so much money in America? Is it likely to continue, considering how much of its American investments have been lost in the past year? And what would it mean for our economy if China started selling its holdings or just not buying as much?

My guest, James Fallows, has written about these questions. He's in Beijing. He's been reporting from China for The Atlantic since 2006. In the current edition of the magazine, he has an interview with the head of the China Investment Corporation, who oversees many of China's American holdings. Fallows also has a new collection of his articles about China, called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." I asked him how much China has invested in the U.S.

Mr. JAMES FALLOWS (National Correspondent, The Atlantic; Author, "Postcards from Tomorrow Square: Reports from China"): These estimates are hard to nail down precisely because the Chinese government is pretty cagey about what it lets out, but the best guess now is there's roughly $2 trillion that China has amassed in U.S. dollar holdings. The significance of U.S. dollar holdings is that means money that pretty much has to be kept in the United States - not all of it, because there are dollars that can be used elsewhere - but mainly, it's around $2 trillion. That's in U.S. Treasury notes, the U.S. stock exchange, other kinds of U.S. investments. It's going up - it's been going up recently for by about $1 billion each day.

GROSS: That's a lot of money. So...

Mr. FALLOWS: It is.

GROSS: So, has the China investment in the U.S. market help create the bubble that we had been living in, the one that burst? And has that investment given us a sense of prosperity and access to money that we really shouldn't have counted on?

Mr. FALLOWS: You'd have to say yes, and most people - there was a time three or four years ago when people were looking at this interaction between China and United States, and people described it as a, on the whole, positive phenomenon, because the idea was that China, which was mainly intent on creating manufacturing jobs for people who are pouring out of the countryside and were looking a way to get into the modern economy, it wanted to sell things. And so, it was collecting all this money from its sales to the U.S., and Europe, and the rest of the world. The United States wanted to have money to invest in various things, or to use, or to consume.

And so, the Chinese, who were reaping all these dollars from their sales of exports to U.S. and other places, were giving a cushion to consumption in the U.S., and consumption, not just in the sense of the extra thing you could buy in the store and the loan could you take out, but mortgages keeping their rates lower than they would otherwise be; the tax rates in the U.S. keeping them lower than they would otherwise be; interest rates across the board. So, to the extent the bubble in the U.S. was caused by having too much money, which was working for places to be invested, and that, therefore, was invested in risky ways, China was a crucial part of that.

GROSS: Now, you actually talked to the guy who decides what to invest in the U.S. markets. His name is Gao Xiqing; he's the president of the China Investment Corporation. He doesn't make all of the investments, but what has he invested, about $2 billion?

Mr. FALLOWS: He has about $200 billion...

GROSS: Uh, excuse me.

Mr. FALLOWS: That's under his organization's control. You know, two billion, 200 billion, this stuff all adds up overtime.

(Soundbite of laughter)

GROSS: Yeah.

Mr. FALLOWS: It's a lot of money that he has.

GROSS: He gave a couple of warnings to America. He said things like, we'd love to support you guys if it's sustainable. But if it's not, why should we be doing this? After we're gone, you can't just go to the Moon to get more money. And I mean, what he's saying, of course, is true. But at the same time, it also makes you wonder; can China use its financial leverage to control our behavior, or use it as a form of blackmail? Like, we'll keep investing as long as you don't put up a fuss about our human-rights violations; you don't try to meddle in any policy that affects China.

Mr. FALLOWS: The direct answer to your question is: I don't think they can use the leverage that crudely or directly - for reasons I'll come back to - but let me give you the indirect background to this first, because I think it conditions the kind of statements that we'll be hearing more of out of China over the years to come as their financial might grows. In the short term, it really is true that China and the U.S. have a kind of mutual-destruction pact. They have to keep each other going in the short term for this reason. China has so much of its saved wealth sunk in American assets, in U.S. dollars themselves, in dollar-priced shares in the stock exchanges, in U.S. Treasury notes, everything else we hear about all the time that if they try to pull that out suddenly, the United States would suffer, but so would China, too. Their value of the dollar would go down and with it, the rest of their assets; values of U.S. shares would go down, et cetera, et cetera. So, in the short term, I think there's little plausible threat the Chinese would pull this money out.

The real concern is in the long run, if, as Mr. Gao was suggesting in this interview, China began to think that the U.S. would not ever put its financial house in order and wouldn't really be a reliable base for investment or target for investment in the long run, then they might steer - start steering the money to other places, to euro investments, to the yen, to domestic - more domestic investments in China, et cetera. And while - so I think this means that while in some kind of crisis or negotiations over Tibet or what have you, it's unlikely the Chinese will say, agree with us or else we'll take this money away. But as part of their calculation of where to put the money, it's only sensible they would have in mind, in the long run this creates yet another strand, which makes it harder for the U.S. to challenge them, too, in the long run. So, I think it's a long-term political complication or political aspect as opposed to a crude sort of short-term threat or weapon they'd be able to use.

GROSS: Let's get back to Mr. Gao, the man in China who is president of the China Investment Corporation and makes a lot of the decisions about where China should be investing its money in U.S. markets, in U.S. Treasury notes. Did you get a sense from Mr. Gao about whether he plans to continue buying American holdings?

Mr. FALLOWS: There was something I did not say in The Atlantic article I wrote about this interview - I only hinted at it - but it was clear to me, by inference, from our discussion - I had a - my interview with him was shortly before the U.S. presidential election. And Mr. Gao made a joke, saying that for years and years, Chinese communist officials had followed the dictum of Chairman Mao that they should always stick with the Republicans in U.S. politics, because Mao had said the Republicans are predictable; you know what they're going to.

But I - it was clear to me that the Chinese sentiment was if the Republicans had won - if Senator McCain had won rather than Senator Obama - the last election, they would have a less optimistic sense of whether the U.S. will be able to address its economic problems. They'd come to the sense the Republicans were worse at handling the economy than the Democrats were likely to be. So, I got the sense they viewed the election as a long-term indicator about whether they could stay in the U.S. market, and they probably are more likely to stay with the Democrats now in power than they would have been otherwise.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is James Fallows. He's the national correspondent for The Atlantic. Since about 2006, he's been based in China, writing for the magazine, and now he has a new book called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square" that collects the pieces about China. He's written for The Atlantic, and he's speaking to us from Beijing. Now, to understand why China has so much money to invest in the U.S. in the first place, you need to understand something I didn't understand I started reading you, Jim, and that there's a mandatory savings policy in China. Would you describe what that policy is and what the reason for it is?

Mr. FALLOWS: Yes. And this to me has been really fascinating to report on and write about, because while there is, in effect, a mandatory savings policy, it doesn't work the way most people in the U.S. or in Europe would think if they heard that term. Because when we hear that China, as a whole, has a 50-percent savings rate - which is by far the highest in the world now, and certainly is many, many times higher than the U.S. savings rate, which has been zero in some recent years - what we think of is families who are stuffing their little RMB notes under the mattress, or putting them in some bucket, who are consciously saving half of each paycheck they get in order to put it away for the future.

Certainly, it is true that individual Chinese families have to be more frugal than in the U.S., because the social safety net in this communist country basically does not exist. There's no equivalent to social security; there's no nationally provided medical care, et cetera; people have to save for these long-term contingencies. But the real savings decisions in China, the real reason there's so much money left over is shipped to the U.S. and other places, doesn't have anything to do with the way families behave. It's the way the government has decided to manage all the money that's coming in from the exports that the people buy in the U.S. and elsewhere.

And it's a little tricky to explain in real time now, but the essence of it is, let's suppose you run a little company is southern China, and you're making watches; you are making whatever. You sell those watches to a wholesaler in the U.S., and that wholesaler gives you dollars. Most of those dollars are not useful to you because the things that are your main expenses you have to pay for in Chinese currency, the RMB or the yuan. So, you have to change that money into Chinese currency to be able to pay your workers, to buy their food, to heat your factory, to pay whatever expenses you have going on.

So, you go to the local bank; you give them the dollars you've earned; they give you back Chinese RMB, step one. So, the manufacturer is doing fine. He has the money that he needs. Step two, that local bank, if it were a counterpart in California or in London or someplace else, the local bank could decide what to do with this foreign money that suddenly was in its hands. If it was a bank in London that had dollars from some British exporter, it could decide that it wanted to sell them for more on the international currency exchanges. It might want to buy Swiss Francs; it might want to buy euros; it could do whatever it wanted. In China, that's not the case.

In China, the local bank is required to turn the money, as if it were contraband, into the central authorities, give to the People's Bank of China, because only the central government of China and a number of its operating branches can decide how to deploy this money China, collectively, has earned by operating overseas. The factory gets its money, the workers get their money, the suppliers get their money, but then the central government decides what to do with the surplus. And that's - it's that decision at the top, about how much to use within China and how much to send back overseas - to invest in the stock market, in treasury notes, in all the rest we're familiar with - that's how China has so high a savings rate and is what makes a generally free, largely uncontrolled economy controlled in this one crucial choke point.

GROSS: I guess one of the things that's really confusing for an outsider to understand is, why would China take so much of its money - the Chinese government - and invest it in the U.S. stock market or U.S. treasury notes, instead of investing in its own infrastructure - building more schools, better sewerage systems, all the things that China really needs pretty desperately?

Mr. FALLOWS: One reason why China wants to keep a lot of money overseas is essentially for safety reasons; that life is unpredictable as we see right now, when Chinese exports are plummeting, and they want to have some kind of cushion. And for a country that for almost all of recorded history has been very, very poor - or recent history, has been very poor, to have some kind of cushion is a source of reassurance and security; that's number one. Number two is I think it does not escape the notice of the Chinese leadership that there are long-term political ramifications of having so much money invested in the United States. To put it in a nice way, it's another strand of connection between the U.S. and China. To put it in a less nice way, it's a kind of leverage the China has over the U.S. So, that there's at that element, too.

Then there is a question of what they would - what would be the consequences if they use the money inside China? At least until fairly recently, the Chinese economy has been running at a such a white hot rate and pace that there was a fear that if there were any more spending on roads and buildings and airports and everything else that's being built around the country, then inflation would be revved up to an unacceptable rate. That's not so much the concern right now, but there's a sense that even though China is really short on all kinds of infrastructure, that it couldn't afford to build it any faster than it was doing so.

So, that was - that was a deterrent to using more of it domestically. And then, there was a sense, again, until quite recently, that this was a way for China to build its wealth, that investing the U.S. markets would be a good just financial investment in the long run. So, those are all the different components of why Chinese people who are poor only live - live on only half the money they produce and give the rest to the U.S. so that America can live better than it naturally would.

GROSS: You've got to say, just kind of bizarre that China, which is still officially a communist country, is investing so much money in the American markets...

(Soundbite of laughter)

GROSS: Which is, of course, a capitalist country. It's bizarre; I don't know what other word to use.

Mr. FALLOWS: I guess my standards of bizarre have been left at the wayside many, many months ago here. It's - just as a side note, I find that one reason why I look forward to waking up each morning here - even if the air is going to be opaque, even though I know five bad things will happen to me that day - is you're going to see all sorts of things which don't fit into your normal explanation of how the world works. And it's interesting also, I like most of the people I know in China; I like the excitement of what's going here.

But the bizarreness of the - there's a particular bizarreness which goes to the nature of current communist China. Certainly, it is a communist regime. The Chinese Communist Party is in control, and there's no two ways about that, but the economy in many, many ways is way more wide open than what you see in North America or Europe now. And perhaps the way in which it's most communistically controlled is the one we've been talking about right now, which is the currency-flow interaction with the rest of the world. So, that's -if you wanted to...

(Laughing) To think that there was any economic residue of communism, that's where you'd look for it.

GROSS: If you're just joining us, my guest is James Fallows. He's national correspondent for The Atlantic, but he's actually been based in China, writing about China for The Atlantic, since 2006. Now, he has a new book collecting his articles for the Atlantic about China. It's called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." Let's take a short break here, and then we'll talk some more. This is Fresh Air.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: My guess is James Fallows. He's national correspondent for The Atlantic. But since 2006, he's actually been reporting from China. He has a new collection of his articles about China called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." You mention an expression that Lawrence Summers, who was a former secretary of the Treasury and is now going to be high up in the Obama administration, he coined the expression, "the balance of financial terror," between the U.S. and China. What does that mean?

Mr. FALLOWS: This is was an allusion, of course, to the nuclear balance of terror during the Cold War years, where both the Soviet Union and the U.S. lived in threat of imminent destruction by the other, and therefore, this was suppose to domesticate their behavior to each other and in military matters. In financial terms, what Summers meant was that China and the U.S. had become so dependent on each other that each had the power to wreck the other's economy; China, as we've discussed, by - if it decided to pull out its dollar assets in a big rush, even though that would hurt them badly; the U.S., it if decided to cut off trade with China, even though that - it would hurt both of the parties.

And I think what Summers was arguing was that these balances of terror are great as long as they last and as long as they terrify each party into the right kind high-road behavior, that when something goes wrong, it can go wrong in a big hurry. And I think that's what we're seeing right at this moment, and the Chinese, interestingly, are seeing it in a way that I think almost none of them anticipated; certainly the officials didn't talk about ahead of time. When the balance of terror was discussed, usually the threat seemed to be that China would have a fire sale in the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. would be hurting badly. Instead, what's happening is that the collapse in consumer demand in the U.S., painful as it is within the U.S. itself, is being surprisingly more painful in China because it means that - because China has been, export-wise, so dependent on the U.S. market that's just been cut out all of a sudden. And so, China is recognizing that hiccups in the U.S. can cause real distortions here in China, even though China is so strong in many ways, et cetera, et cetera.

GROSS: Is the $700 billion economic bailout package and the proposed $700 billion, approximately, stimulus package that President-elect Obama wants, are those things dependent on the continuation of China investing in U.S., you know, Treasury notes and the U.S. stock market?

Mr. FALLOWS: To the extent everything at America's current financial setup is dependent on the Chinese, in particular, continuing to invest in the U.S., along with also the oil states and the Japanese and others, yes, the bailouts then are dependent on Chinese participation. But I think they're not dependent on the Chinese in a way that many Americans assume and it's often written about in the U.S. press. There is the idea - I've seen in a number of columns and news stories that, since the Chinese have this $2 trillion in American dollar assets, they could apply some of that to the bailout, to other sorts of things the U.S. needs.

The problem is those $2 trillion are already in dollars. They're already in shares of Black Stone(ph); they're already in Treasury notes; they're already in real estate or whatever else they're in. It's not new money China can bring to the U.S.; it's money that it already has brought there over the last decade or so. So, there is an additional, let's say, billion dollars today, maybe something less than that now China's bringing, but it's not as if there's this $2 trillion bag of riches the China will be able to share with us to bailout Detroit. So, yes, we depend on them in the long run, but they can't really do much to help with this current stimulus package.

GROSS: Is China still investing at that rate of a billion a day, or are they cutting back?

Mr. FALLOWS: It - the flow depends on the Chinese trade surplus, which is behaving in an interesting way. As I think many of your listeners will know, last month, when the most recent figures came out, China's exports to the rest of the world, largely the U.S., had dropped for the first time in a very long while, but China's imports had dropped by even more. So, China's trade surplus, which is the source this money, actually went up in the most recent period, but most people think that in the year or two ahead, China won't have quite the same volume, the quite the same billion dollars per day to put into dollars.

But so far, the assumption on the Chinese side seems to be that they have to do something with their money, and the U.S. is still, for the moment, on the whole, the most attractive investment site for treasury notes, which are safe; for the stock market, which I think will come up again some other day; and for all the other financial tunings which have made the U.S. the center of the world's financial markets.

GROSS: James Fallows, speaking to us from Beijing. We'll hear more of the interview in the second half of the show. Fallows has been reporting from China for The Atlantic since 2006 and has written for the magazine for over 25 years. His new book is called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square: Reports from China." I'm Terry Gross, and this is Fresh Air.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: Coming up, we listen back to an interview with mystery writer Donald Westlake. He died last Wednesday at the age of 75. His novels "Point Blank," "Payback" and "The Hot Rock" were adapted into films. His screenplay for "The Grifters" was nominated for an Oscar. Also, Maureen Corrigan reviews the new novel by Jayne Anne Phillips, and we continue our conversation with James Fallows.

(Soundbite of music)

GROSS: This is Fresh Air. I'm Terry Gross. Back with James Fallows, who has been reporting from China for The Atlantic Magazine since 2006. He has a new collection of his articles about China, called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." Fallows was in Beijing when we recorded our interview yesterday.

You know, there was a time when you were writing about a technology for The Atlantic, and you've been writing a little bit about what it's like to navigate around the Internet in China. And most Americans know that China has kind of a firewall; there's the sites you're allowed on and the sites you are not allowed on the Internet in China. So, what do you have to do to get around that and get to whatever site you want?

Mr. FALLOWS: There is a simple way to get around the - any - the entire blockage, the so-called great firewall of China, and that's to spend, as I do, $40 a year for a so-called VPN, or virtual private network, or to use proxy servers or other kind of free services. If you try, you can get around all the different ways the sensors have tried to keep people within China from getting to sources of information outside world.

What's fascinating about this, I think, is that Chinese authorities don't really care about me and whether I'm able to go see some Free-Tibet site that's being run from London. They don't really care about people in China who have $40 a year to get these services or people who can read English well enough to be able to see what's available in the rest of the world. What they really care about is making it just inconvenient enough for most Chinese people to get outside the strictures that they won't bother and that most Chinese people will spend most their time reading Chinese language sites that are run in China and supervised by the Chinese authorities and that does the job.

And it's a kind of subtle repression, which is different from the way we usually think of how the Chinese government operates, and is in its own way admirable in its cunning. You know, of course one deplores any constraint on free expression, et cetera, et cetera, but I find myself admiring the ingenuity with which it's set up.

GROSS: And as you point out in your writing, if you're Chinese and you want to write a blog in the Chinese language, you, kind of, have to do it on the official government site if you want Chinese readers, because that's where everybody is.

Mr. FALLOWS: There's a really interesting sociological point about this. There is, of course, a huge Chinese Diaspora of Chinese-speaking, Chinese-literate people around the world - lots in the U.S. and Australia and Europe, other places - who often are writing things in Chinese that are part of the ongoing political discussion in China. But one observer was telling me that if you want to be in the Chinese game, you really have to be inside China; that people, in the long run, they get kind of cut off on the flow of discussion; they lose their feels; like people writing about American politics from Kazakhstan or wherever, there's a way in which you become cut off.

And so, most of the attention by the Chinese audience is to sites that are located within the country, and once they're in the country, the government really has the whip hand, as we say. People use - if you go to an Internet cafe, you have to register with your real name. There are Internet sensors and Internet spies and people who are there kind of as agitprop counter-bloggers; if some subversive blog comes up, they'll have a lot of hostile comments on it. So, once you're within territorial China, then...

(Laughing) I will use this perhaps unfair analogy...

It reminds me of a whole county run by Fox News...

(Soundbite of laughter)

Mr. FALLOWS: Where there is one line that comes out and may be different from Fox News', but the same kind of thoroughness that goes with it.

GROSS: So, what was it like for you to watch the election from China?

Mr. FALLOWS: What was the most different about being in China from being other parts of the world and perhaps from being in the U.S. is there was less emotional content in the election here, I think, than the other places. I - this is a widely observed phenomenon in China, and I think I can explain this way. One is there is a preference - there's has been a preference for China for the familiar-known quantity in the U.S. of making no ripples. If it would have been possible to have George Bush in office another four years, he would have won by big landslide in China. Partly that's because he's been relatively good for China; partly because they always want more of the same. If it couldn't be George Bush, they would want to have Hillary Clinton, because she also was somebody they'd been familiar with in the past, despite some of her own disputes with China.

And they were two others factors which, I think, affected the Chinese view. One is they view Democrats as being, on the whole, trouble for China on trade issues. They thought regardless of anything Obama said, there might be trade problems, and a delicate point, but a true one. The fact that Obama will be the first non-white president of the U.S., which was a symbolic plus in so much of the world, I think, was a symbolic minus here. That attitudes - racial attitude towards - within China are what Americans would view as anachronistic. It is still quite natural for educated people to say that whites are - they view whites as talented and blacks as untalented, black is having bad works habits, blacks as not being educated. And so, the idea that a black person could be the head of this powerful nation took more adjustment within China than in other countries.

GROSS: My guest is James Fallows, and he is national correspondent for The Atlantic. But since 2006, he has actually been reporting from China for The Atlantic. And his new book, which collects many of his articles from China, is called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." He's speaking to us from Beijing. People who read your blog on The Atlantic know that your father died very recently, and you blogged about that, you know, a much more personal kind of writing than writing about the Chinese economy. Can you talk a little bit about why you've decided to blog about personal things like that as well as the more, you know, policy- and social-oriented things that you write about and what impact it's had on you to share that?

Mr. FALLOW: It's a fair question for which I'll give a journalistic answer and a personal answer. Journalistically, I've recorded a whole range of things - from policy to what I liked about this kind of food or what I hated about that kind of thing I'd just come across. And since a very, very important - the most important thing in my life at that time was the fact that my own father was dying after my mother had very suddenly died four years ago, that was something I wanted to note. The other reason was a personal reason. My father was - he was a remarkable man whose remarkability(ph) is the opposite - was the opposite from what I normally encounter in my journalistic life. In my journalistic life, I'm normally writing about people who are doing things to be noticed on a large scale, and I'm trying to note them on a large scale, in the magazine and books and even in blogs. And they're people whose - part of their impulse in doing things is to be known to do things around the world.

My dad, by the contrast, had lived his entire adult life in one small town, where he raised his family, and for the years since - from 1954 when he move there to 2008 when he died, everything about his life was being a small-town doctor, a civic leader, the chairman of every board, somebody who, with my mother, poured their hearts and lives and souls and spirits into raising their family and making their town a better place. And people like that, their achievement is not often - is not always as fully recognized. So, I wanted to try to recognize, with my personal bias, what his life had meant to the people he had touched - his patients at his little clinic, the people of the town where he was on the school board and the library board and everything else. And so, he had been a joyous and active person and also representative of his generation in particular way that I wanted to note that.

I'll say one other thing. You'll be sorry you got me started. My dad graduated from high school in 1943, and it was just at a moment where he was deciding for the military, would he be a military pilot or he'd be a military doctor? And through testing, they decided he should be a military doctor, and he was rushed through college in two years, Brown Medical School (ph), never get a college degree. And so, for all the rest of his life, he thought he'd missed those two years of college and he was going to make up for it. So, he taught himself language after language, and he learned every new skill you can imagine. He viewed the rest of his life as an exercise in acquiring areas of knowledge and areas of fascination that he hadn't had the chance to. Those two years that he missed in college made for 65 years or so of continuing education. There was a sense of joy and richness in his life, again, that I wanted to honor.

GROSS: Well, Jim, I'm sorry about your father, and thanks for talking with us a little bit. I want thank you...

Mr. FALLOWS: Thank you for giving me the opportunity.

GROSS: Yeah, and I want to thank you so much for doing this interview and under extenuating circumstances.

(Soundbite of laughter)

GROSS: Because of various technical problems were - we've recorded this in the middle of the night, China time.

Mr. FALLOWS: It's a sprightly 2:45.

GROSS: 2:45? Oh, geez. All right.

Mr. FALLOWS: So, what's nice is that there is no risk of falling asleep because they turn off the heat in all of Beijing buildings at midnight. So, it's a crisp 10 degrees in here.

GROSS: Oh, are you kidding?

(Soundbite of laughter)

Mr. FALLOWS: No, but it's a - I can see my breath.

(Soundbite of laughter)

GROSS: OK. Well, thanks for making the sacrifice to do the Fresh Air interview.

Mr. FALLOWS: Well, thanks for your questions on this wide range of topics which I really appreciate.

GROSS: James Fallows has been writing for The Atlantic for over 25 years; his new collection of articles about China is called "Postcards from Tomorrow Square." We also want to thank NPR's Beijing correspondent, Anthony Kuhn, for engineering the interview and for doing it in the middle of the night. Coming up, we'll listen back to an interview with mystery writer Donald Westlake. He died New Year's Eve. This is Fresh Air.

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