Feith Regrets Not Pushing 'Law and Order' in Iraq The U.S. government has been criticized for many aspects of its handling of the Iraq war. But Douglas Feith, an architect of the war, says one of his biggest regrets is not convincing top Pentagon officials to pay more attention to law and order immediately after the fall of Baghdad in 2003.

Feith Regrets Not Pushing 'Law and Order' in Iraq

Feith Regrets Not Pushing 'Law and Order' in Iraq

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First of a two-part interview

Douglas Feith, an architect of the war in Iraq, has written War and Decision. Courtesy Douglas Feith hide caption

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Courtesy Douglas Feith

Douglas Feith, an architect of the war in Iraq, has written War and Decision.

Courtesy Douglas Feith

Options on Iraq (2001)

Months before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a memo by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld weighed a variety of U.S. options regarding Iraq, including "a fairly significant U.S. strike" against Iraqi facilities and "initiating contact with Saddam Hussein."

'Parade of Horribles' (2002)

In 2002, Rumsfeld decided to give President Bush a list of possible calamities in the event of military action against Iraq. Douglas Feith soon began referring to the memo as the "Parade of Horribles."

The U.S. government has been criticized for many aspects of its handling of the Iraq war. But an architect of the war says one of his biggest regrets is not convincing top Pentagon officials to pay attention to law and order immediately after the fall of Baghdad in 2003.

The Iraqi capital erupted in looting and fire, eventually growing into an insurgency.

These events seemed to surprise Pentagon officials, who had expected a short occupation. Yet Douglas Feith, a former undersecretary of defense for policy and the author of a new book called War and Decision, insists that his office produced a memo warning of the danger.

"We specifically said it's extremely important that top priority be given to public safety, security, law and order, or you could get into a situation of win the war and lose the peace," Feith tells Steve Inskeep.

Feith says he regrets that he "didn't make more of that memo. Looking back, I think there were a lot of problems that flowed from the lack of law and order, the looting and the other disorder in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam."

Before the fall of Baghdad, Feith's office was planning for Iraq's future.

A noted writer on Iraq, George Packer, compares Feith's performance to a top disaster official during Hurricane Katrina.

"Douglas Feith was the Michael Brown of the Iraq war," Packer says. "The planning was such a fiasco. It was such a failure of imagination, of coordination, that within two weeks of the fall of Baghdad, I think we were already in a very deep hole from which we still haven't dug our way out five years later. And that can be directly attributed to the failures of planning that took place in Feith's office before the war."

Tuesday, in the second part of his interview with NPR, Feith discusses the planning for a new Iraqi government and the influential Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi.

Excerpt: 'War and Decision'

'War and Decision'

The 'Parade of Horribles'

Rumsfeld resolved to give the President a comprehensive list of possible calamities in the event of military action against Iraq. The decision on war was pending, and Rumsfeld, of course, would be associated with it. Weighing risks had naturally been part of the policy-making and planning processes on Iraq all along, but Rumsfeld thought it would be valuable to review all together the major problems we could anticipate, to get them in writing and air them with the President and the National Security Council— well before irrevocable decisions were made. No one asked him to do this, but an exercise of this kind was an important check on the assumptions underlying our planning (1).

Rumsfeld had shown me a version of this list back in August, and I had given him some written comments in response. Now, in mid-October, Rumsfeld called a "drop everything" meeting with Wolfowitz, Myers, Pace, and me. As we sat down at his office conference table, Rumsfeld handed each of us the draft of his list of possible problems and disasters, which had been substantially revised since the August version. Highlighting roughly twenty items, it made for grim reading.

After letting the four of us absorb it for a minute or two, the Secretary asked us to sharpen the list, add to it, or otherwise improve it. We spent more than two hours in intense discussion reworking the paper. To relieve some of the tension inherent in the task, I began referring to the memo as the "Parade of Horribles." By the time we finished with our revisions, it had grown by another ten items or so.

The ultimate version of the Parade of Horribles memo was dated October 15, 2002. Its key political warnings can be summarized as follows:

• The United States might fail to win support from the United Nations and from important other countries, which could make it harder to get international cooperation on Iraq and other issues in the future. We might fail here by not properly answering the question: If the United States preempts in one country, will it do so in other countries, too?

• The war could trigger problems throughout the region: It could widen into an Arab-Israeli war; Syria and Iran could help our enemies in Iraq; Turkey could intervene on its own; friendly governments in the region could become destabilized.

• The United States could become so absorbed in its Iraq effort that we pay inadequate attention to other serious problems—including other proliferation and terrorism problems. Other countries in the Middle East and elsewhere might try to exploit our preoccupation to do things harmful to us and our friends.

• The war could cause more harm and entail greater costs than expected, including possibly a disruption in oil supplies to world markets.

• Post-Saddam stabilization and reconstruction efforts by the United States could take not two to four years, but eight to ten years, absorbing U.S. leadership, military, and financial resources.

• Terrorist networks could improve their recruiting and fundraising as a result of our being depicted as anti-Muslim.

• Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia.

Most of these dangers, Rumsfeld noted, would become more likely and more severe with a longer war, underlining the tactical importance of speed and surprise (2). This was one of the factors arguing for a smaller force.

In addition, the memo included these three notable items:

• "US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world."

• "World reaction against preemption or 'anticipatory self-defense' could inhibit US ability to engage [in cooperation with other countries] in the future."

• "US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East...."

This was a serious and disturbing memo. The concerns it listed included military, diplomatic, and economic matters. The list was more wide-ranging and hard-hitting than any warning I saw from State or the CIA— even though their leaders are widely viewed as the Administration's voices of caution on the war. Even so, this memo did not anticipate postregime violence of the type that we have encountered in the insurgency—an effort organized, financed, and directed largely by former Baathist officials, in strategic alliance with al Qaida fighters and other foreign "holy warriors."

Rumsfeld distributed the Parade of Horribles memo at a National Security Council meeting and discussed the items one by one. (That meeting was "principals only"—I was not present.)

One of the standard accusations made against the Pentagon's leadership (and other Administration officials who supported the President's war policy) was that we "cherry-picked" intelligence. The term implies that we tried to manipulate the President by highlighting bits of information that argued for war while obscuring or hiding other material. The fact is that Pentagon officials were not in a position to cherry-pick. We did not control the flow of intelligence to the President; he received it daily, directly, and voluminously from the CIA.

But, more important, Rumsfeld and his team did not operate that way. The Parade of Horribles memo was typical of how we viewed our responsibility to advise the President. Had we worried that our views required protection from inconvenient facts, we would not have embraced those views in the first place. Our strategy in interagency debates was to put forward our own ideas together with countervailing thoughts. We often heard the comment that we set out the case against our own ideas more compellingly than our opponents did. We figured if we showed how our analysis withstood strong criticism, we could be more effective—not to mention more honorable—than if we tried to keep the President in the dark about relevant facts or analyses. Our approach, as reflected in this important memo, was precisely the reverse of cherry-picking.

Beyond its influence on the rest of the Administration, the work on this list helped guide our own Iraq planning efforts. For example, when the Joint Staff briefed the Principals Committee two months before the war, its presentation of "Some Potential Post-War Challenges" mapped more than a dozen issues of concern, many of them rooted in Rumsfeld's memo. In particular, the list of dangers sharpened our appreciation of the value of tactical surprise and of maximizing the speed of major combat operations. A number of the potential calamities—humanitarian crises, Saddam's destruction of Iraq's oil fields, regional instability, and terrorism by Iraqi agents against the United States, for example—were likelier to happen, and to be more severe, if the fighting to overthrow Saddam were prolonged.

The fact that we anticipated various problems, of course, did not mean the Defense Department or the Administration could avert them all. Even the best planning cannot ensure a problem-free war. Nevertheless, it's fair to ask whether the department and the Administration took the exercise seriously enough and performed all the practical follow-up work that was called for. This is a subject that deserves comprehensive review, building on the several "lessons learned" studies that have already been done by the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command, and other military organizations.

(1) Rumsfeld noted at the end of the memo that it would have been possible, of course, to write a similar memo listing the dangers involved in leaving Saddam in power.

(2) Speed and surprise did indeed prove important: Our troops found that Iraq's bridges and oil fields had been prepared for demolition—but the wiring had fortunately not been completed.

Excerpted from War and Decision. Copyright 2008 by Douglas J. Feith. Reproduced with permission from HarperCollins Publishers.