Iran
Principals Committee

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
You Are the NSC Principals Committee

Members:
• Secretary of State.
• Secretary of the Treasury.
• Secretary of Defense.
• Chief of Staff to the President.
• Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Others:
• Director of Central Intelligence.
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
• Attorney General.
• Director of OMB.
• Secretary of Commerce.

Others (cont):
• US United States Trade Representative.
• Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
• Secretary of Agriculture.
• Others as appropriate.
Agenda

• Opening Remarks (NSC - 5 minutes)
• Threat Assessment (DCI - 45 minutes)
• Planning Military Options (OSD, Commander CENTCOM - 60 minutes)
• Strategic Communications Plan (NSC - 20 minutes)
• Summary (NSC - 5 minutes)
Agenda

• Opening Remarks
• Threat Assessment
• Planning Military Options
• Strategic Communications Plan
• Summary
Iran’s Nuclear Program

- Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
  - Says that it will free up oil and natural gas for export, generating hard currency.
  - Objective is 10% of capacity by 2020.
- Russia and Iran signed a protocol for peaceful cooperation in nuclear power, December 2002.
Iran’s Nuclear Program: Last 18 Months

Sep 2003
IAEA gave 31 October deadline to Iran: guarantees and snap inspections

30 Oct
IAEA head said Iran’s report was comprehensive but still questions

6 Oct
Iran’s IAEA representative threatened to withdraw from the NNPT

14 Nov
Iran’s Foreign Minister said they were committed to “complete transparency”

18 Dec
Iran signed protocol allowing “comprehensive” access to sites - not ratified yet

13 Sep
IAEA Board of Governors; US unable to generate support declare Iran in non-compliance to take the issue to UNSC

Nov 2004
IAEA Still Not Ready to Report

Mar 2004
Announced it was barring inspectors from entering the country.
The Intelligence Dilemma

• Iran is probably three years from a weapon.
  – Unless someone has given help we don’t know.
  – Unless they have been able to make purchases we don’t know.

• There is the nuclear program we see, and there are the nuclear programs we don’t see.
  – Possibly more than one weapons program.
  – Work is deep underground and may be inside cities.

• The intelligence dilemma is that we will most likely not know when they have crossed our red lines.
The Targeting Dilemma

- Dispersed nuclear weapons will be very difficult to locate even with advances in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
  - The more weapons Iran has the more the problem is compounded.

- Waiting makes the military problem that much more difficult.
Russian S-400 Air Defense System
400 KM Range

More Difficult
Iran’s Nuclear Program

Feb 2003

• Iran announced mining uranium deposits at Saghand
• Also that it was constructing enrichment facility at Natanz

100 Miles South of Tehran
Arak (150 Miles South of Tehran)
Bushehr Nuclear Reactor
Bushehr Nuclear Reactor

- 10 August - Russian announcement that more than 90% of the project has been completed.
- Procurement has been completed.
- Remaining work includes assembly of equipment, systems integration and preparing for operations.

...probably won’t be operating until 2006
Shahab-3

Photo: 22 September 2003

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
Shahab-3

Most likely capable of delivering chemical weapons...
The Atlantic Monthly War Game

~1500 Km
~(850 miles)

Shahab-3

Tehran
Baghdad
Chemical and Biological Weapons

• Chemical weapons programs.
  – Iran has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  – Production capacity is ~1000 tons per year.
  – Inventory includes blister, blood and choking agents.

• Biological weapons programs
  – Iran has ratified the Biological Weapons convention.
  – Most efforts are advanced research and development.
  – Probably has a small BW arsenal.

Facility at Esfahan
Iran’s Involvement in Iraq

- They want stability but their primary weapons is instability.
- Iran has a network of tactical connections
  - Iraqi universities given equipment by Iran.
  - Assistance on humanitarian projects.
  - Iranian-made weapons have been found in Najaf.
- Quds (Qods), special forces component of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are in Iraq.
  - Officer shot in Baghdad in April
F-16's
100 feet / 390 KTAS
Lo-Hi-Lo Profile

F-15 Cap

1981 Osirik Attack

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
Israeli Air Attack Options

- Turkey
- Iraq
- Saudi Arabia ('81 route)
Nuclear Related Facilities

Tehran
Judgments

- The regime in Iran is confident and strong. It is unlikely that any internal process will lead to regime change.
- Iran is deeply and broadly involved in Iraq.
- Nuclear Program:
  - Iran’s nuclear program is probably one of the leadership’s most important priorities.
  - The Intelligence Community consensus assessment is that Iran could have a nuclear weapon in three years.
  - Iran already has a nuclear weapon delivery capability.
- The US is probably a major target of Israeli threats of preemption.
Agenda

- Opening Remarks
- Threat Assessment
- **Planning Military Options** (OSD, Commander CENTCOM - 90 minutes)
- **Strategic Communications Plan** (NSC)
- Summary (NSC)
CENTCOM Planning Objectives

Provide the President with a set of military options to deal with Iran.

1. To punish Iran for its involvement in Iraq and support of terrorism. (Ready to Execute)
2. To set back its nuclear program significantly. (Ready to Execute in 90 Days)
3. To change the regime in Tehran. (Ready to Execute in 6 Months)
To punish Iran for its involvement in Iraq and support of terrorism.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran)

1st IRGC Armored Division
Tehran
1st IRGC Infantry Division

Esfahan
1st IRGC Engineering Division

Drezfel
2nd IRGC Armored Division

Khorramabad
12nd IRGC Infantry Division

Low Risk Stealth (Global Power) and Cruise Missile Attacks One Night Operation
To set back its nuclear program significantly.

Low Risk
Stealth (Global Power)
Cruise Missile Attacks
Land and Sea Based Aircraft
Special Operations
~5 Day Operation
Preemption Target List: Working Concept of Operations

- 125 targets associated with nuclear and chemical and biological storage/production facilities
  - 10 nuclear R&D site targets
  - Missile delivery systems
  - Command and control
- ~300 aim points
  - ~20 requiring penetrating weapons
To change the regime in Tehran.

Moderate Risk

- Operational fires that would include the traditional air operation.
- Unconventional warfare using Special Operations Forces.
- Operational maneuver using ground forces.
- Influence operations.
- Support of opposition groups inside Iran.
## Concept Evolution

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<th>Concept Evolution</th>
<th>Old Concept (Generated Start)</th>
<th>1st OIF Concept (Running Start)</th>
<th>2nd OIF Concept (Hybrid)</th>
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Regime Change Operation ~30 Days

- ~3 Divisions
  - 2 Heavy
  - 3 to 4 Separate Brigades
    - Special Operations

Special Operations
- ~Brigade
- From Afghanistan

Conceptual Options
Most Desirable Deployments Ports

- Sea Ports of Debarkation
- Aerial Port of Debarkation
- Sea/Aerial Port of Debarkation

Conceptual Options
Theater High Altitude Area Defense

Can defend a large number of assets, destroying missiles in the midcourse phase.
Heavier Option

Conceptual Options

Southern Axis Added

Tehran

Baghdad
Inside Out
~G+14

Special Operations
CIA Action Teams
Dealing with the WMD

• Plan WMD Exploitation, Disposition, and Monitoring and Redirection activities.
• Position WMD elimination forces and capabilities.
  • Locate and identify WMD.
  • Secure located or suspected WMD sites.
  • Conduct WMD exploitation.
  • Establish/maintain sensors around sites.
  • Conduct decontamination.
  • Conduct evacuation of downwind areas.
  • Inventory/categorize contents of sites; document scope of program.
  • Collect/analyze forensics evidence.
• Destroy, dismantle, render safe, remove, transfer, or verifiably dispose of WMD.
• Prevent/reduce the chance for misuse of sensitive materiel.

Compress

Conceptual Options
Ideal Conditions for “Strategic Surprise”

- Pre-positioning and Infrastructure Projects
- Unit Rotation in Iraq
- Appearance of Popular Uprising in Iran
- Iran (Strategic Surprise)

Deployment and Buildup
Air Operations
Ground Attack

20 Days
30 Days

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
Conceptual Options
The Problem: Azerbaijan Airlift Entry Points

- **Dollyar**: 1 C-17 or 2 C-130s
- **Gyandzha**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Yevlakh**: 2 C-130s
- **Sumgait**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Nakhichevan**: 1 C-17 or 2 C-130s
- **Kara Chala**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Lankaran**: 2 C-130s
- **Kyurdamir**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Baku-Kala**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Baku-Bina**: 3 C-17s or 2 C-5s or 6 C-130s
- **Baku**: 2 C-17s or 4 C-130s
- **Baku**: 2 C-130s
- **Sumgait**: Lankaran
- **Baku-Kala**: Nakhichevan
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Managing Strategic Risks
Potential: Restriction of the Strait
Oil Prices

- Some energy economists estimate a “fear premium” of $10 to $15 per barrel.
- If we can reduce the fear component, we can have a greater impact on oil prices than a few million additional barrels per day from OPEC.

But this is a problem for others in the USG…
Longer Range Objectives in Azerbaijan and Georgia
Managing Strategic Risks

• The region is like a mobile. Once an element is set in motion, it is impossible to say where the whole thing will come to rest.
• An attack on Iran could destabilize governments in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.
• Success will have more supporters than failure.
Decision: Iran Preemption Planning

- SECDEF is authorized to begin special operations inside Iran for the purpose of developing intelligence to support a preemptive attack against Iranian nuclear and defense facilities.
Decision: Iran Planning

Objectives

• SECDEF is to develop a campaign plan within the next six months.
• The purpose is to provide the President the military options to deal with Iran
• Working objectives of the plan should be:
  – Cripple the Revolutionary Guard
  – Significantly degrade the capability of Iran to produce weapons of mass destruction and inventories of weapons of mass destruction.
  – Change the regime.
  – Minimize stability operations.
Estimated Program Costs

- Approximately 30 projects
- Estimated costs: $700 million
  - Some would come from the Supplemental for the war on terrorism, Iraq and Afghanistan.
  - Some would come from other appropriations.
  - No official notification to the Congress at this point in order to maintain security.
- Supplemental will be required if we execute, but we do not want to make an estimate at this time.
Decision: Iran Planning

Objectives

• SECDEF, in coordination with the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Government of Iraq:
  – Is authorized to begin building levels of supplies in Iraq that can be used “to support the global war on terrorism.”
  – Is authorized to provide additional construction inside Iraq that will provide air bases with the capabilities to ensure territorial integrity.
Decision: Iran Planning

Objectives

- SECDEF, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to begin discussions with Azerbaijan:
  - To preposition supplies in Azerbaijan that would support the global war on terrorism.
  - To work toward expansion of air bases in Azerbaijan to increase options for US forces in support of the global war on terrorism.
  - To offer limited US assistance to resolve the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh
Decision: Iran Planning
Objectives

• SECDEF, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to begin discussions with Georgia:
  – To preposition supplies in Georgia that would support the global war on terrorism.
  – To work toward expansion of air bases in Georgia to increase options for US forces in support of the global war on terrorism.
Decision: Iran Planning
Objectives for SECDEF

- Authorized to begin special operations inside Iran
- In coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to begin discussions with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iraq.
- Is to develop a campaign plan within the next six months.
  - The purpose is to provide the President the military options to deal with Iran
  - Working objectives of the plan should be:
    - Cripple the Revolutionary Guard
    - Significantly degrade the capability of Iran to produce weapons of mass destruction and inventories of weapons of mass destruction.
    - Change the regime.
    - Minimize stability operations.
Agenda

- Opening Remarks
- Threat Assessment
- Planning Military Options
- **Strategic Communications Plan** *(NSC - 45 minutes)*
- Summary *(NSC - 5 minutes)*
Lessons of
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

• Someone (White House) must be in charge of the message.
  – Must be coordinated from tactical to strategic level.
  – Overt and covert efforts must be coordinated.
    • Public affairs
    • Public diplomacy
    • Information operations
  – Must be planned with the kind of attention given to military operations.

• Audiences
  – US Public
  – People in Iran
  – Middle East
  – Europe
  – Rest of the world
Strategic Communications: Focus

• Theme: The United States must take the offense against terrorist; we can’t wait to be attacked.
• And:
  – Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction.
  – Iran is disregarding its treaty obligations.
  – Iran is actively involved in terrorism.
  – Iran is trying to destroy democracy in Iraq.
  – Iran is a threat to the region.
  – The majority of the people in Iran want to be free of the oppressive rule there.
**Issue: Support in the United States**

*U.S. Right or Wrong Going to War in Iraq?*

- Pew Research poll for June 3-13 shows a reduction in those following Iraq closes from April June (54% to 39%)

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Time Magazine, May 24, 2004

- 52% 52%

ABC/Washington Post, June 21st

- 54% 54%

CNN/USA Today, June 24th

- 60% 18 to 30 year olds

Newsweek, July 7

- 52% 52%

ABC/Washington Post, June 21st

- 60% 18 to 30 year olds
Strategic Communications Plan

Phases

• Methodology: Stay Ahead of the Story
  – Strategically, criticism of Iran will come faster than argument can be made against the points.
  – Tactically, we’ll continue to dominate the 24-hour cycle but work to reduce perspective by others this time.

• Phases
  – Building the Base
    • Sub-theme: Iran is bad, but diplomacy is the best option for dealing with the problem.
  – Expanding Support at Home and Overseas
    • Sub-theme: (1) Diplomacy is failing. (2) This is not just a problem for the United States,
  – The Time Has Come
    • Sub-theme: Diplomacy has failed; we have no choice.

• Timing: Communications plan and the military plan have to be synchronized.
Coverage of Iraq

~ 400,000+ During the War

~ 300,000 During the Jan-June

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Coverage of Iraq

Small sensitivity to events

Kerry at the Convention

6 GI's Killed

7/24/04 7/31/04

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
Coverage of Terrorism and Iran

• Terrorism message has been difficult to maintain.
• Iran has not reached mass coverage yet.
Iran: Time for a New Approach

Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations

Issue: Alternatives Positions Must be Discredited
Phase 1: Iran Strategic Communications Plan

• White House Office of Global Communications:
  – Daily Global Message
  – White Papers on Iran
  – Coordination with think tanks
  – Interviews with foreign policy correspondents of the major outlets
  – Congressional leaders

• Secretaries and Deputies of State and Defense:
  – Military personnel
  – Influential foreign policy organizations
  – Overseas
    – Major foreign policy organizations
    – Press
  – NATO
  – G-8
Phase 1: Iran Strategic Communications Plan

- CENTCOM message in theater to defense officials.
  - Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction.
  - Iran is disregarding its treaty obligations.
  - Iran is actively involved in terrorism.
  - Iran is trying to destroy democracy in Iraq.
  - Iran is a threat to the region.
- I/O Message to the Iranian military: “You are exposed. Lethal force can come at you from any direction at any time.”
- Covert Message: “The United States cannot tolerate Iraq with nuclear weapons. Iraq’s involvement in Iran must stop.”
Decision: Strategic Communications

- White House Office of Global Communications will begin Phase 1 of the Iran Strategic Communications Plan
- NSC will coordinate the development of the details of Phases 2 & 3.
Nuclear Related Facilities

The map shows locations of nuclear-related facilities in Iran, with a focus on Tehran.
Back Up
Support for Israel

- **Ofek-5**
  - Launched, May 2002
  - High resolution imagery

- **Ofek-6**
  - Launch failed, 6 September 2004
  - “Remote sensing”

- An Israeli attack may require some support.
  - But it can be done quietly.
International Pressure

Diplomats: Iran Resumes Nuclear Program

Tuesday July 27, 2004 7:31 PM
By GEORGE JAHN
Associated Press Writer

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Iran is once again building centrifuges that can be used to make nuclear weaponry, breaking the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency’s seals on the equipment in a show of defiance against international efforts to monitor its program, diplomats said Tuesday.

Iran has not restarted enriching uranium with the centrifuges - a step that would raise further alarm. But the resumption of centrifuge construction is likely to push European nations, which have been seeking a negotiated resolution, closer to the United States’ more confrontational stance.
Organizing for a Major Campaign

CENTCOM

Joint Staff
Deputy Director for
Information Operations

Consulting Communications
Groups

State Public Affairs

Global Information Center
(White House)

UK
Director of Communications
and Strategy

VTC to UK I/O Office

Global Message
To: Embassies, USG Offices

E-mail

0930 Morning Telecon

ASD for Public Affairs
Israel puts Iran in its sights

By James Reynolds
BBC correspondent in Jerusalem

Israel's defence establishment is looking east with concern.

This summer, some here warn that Iran may become a nuclear power, perhaps within the next three or four years.

The Jewish state wants the world to act. If diplomacy fails, Israel warns that it knows how to work alone.

"Israel has many, many capabilities," says Danny Yatom, a former head of Mossad, Israel's international intelligence agency.

"And in the past Israel has carried out long-range military operations, like when we bombed the nuclear facility of Iraq [in 1981]. And since then one can imagine that we've improved our capabilities."
The Pressure from Outside

We’re Fighting Iran in Iraq
August 17, 2004

Listen to Rush...
(...describe how we’re fighting Iran in Iraq)

BEGIN TRANSCRIPT

RUSH: I want to just run something by all of you. This seems such a contentious issue and we just had the story about how undecided women looking at Iraq and they don’t think we should be there but they think Kerry is not the guy; he’s a “wussy boy” according to one suburban Philadelphia woman. But they instinctively know that Iraq is important; we just can’t pull stales, pull up stakes and get out of there. And they just don’t feel confident that Kerry is going to keep them safe. Let me ask you to remember something. Try a different context on Iraq, if you will. And this is based on this so-called little cleric over there, Muqtada al-Sadr, who, by the way, still no word on his application for a U.S. Purple Heart, based on his taking shrapnel last week in a firefight with U.S. troops.

In the Cold War, we actually had wars. We had little battles and skirmishes, but never with the principal. We were never really at war with the Soviet Union. We fought the war, that war was fought with surrogates in many cases. We fought the communists in Korea. We fought the communists in Vietnam. We fought the communists in Cuba. We fought them in Afghanistan, with surrogates. The war on terrorism. You look at it this way, and I mentioned this yesterday. The war on terror is a war on Iran. That’s not Iraq with a “C” but Iran with an “N.” I said this in response to a call yesterday. The war on terror really has its epicenter in Iran, and until that’s dealt with, it’s really not going to be over.
Rumsfeld: Iran aids rebels

By Rawan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld charged yesterday that Iran is fueling the deadly insurgency in Iraq with money and fighters.

But, in an interview with editors and reporters of The Washington Times, Mr. Rumsfeld acknowledged that the United States has limited options because other nations are "not willing" to join in pressuring Iran, which has shown behavior that Mr. Rumsfeld said is "not part of the civilized world."

The defense secretary, a main architect of President Bush's strategy of attacking Islamic terrorists worldwide, declared of the insurgency in Iraq, "They're losing."
The Pressure from Outside

Michael Ledeen
NRO Contributing Editor

July 19, 2004, 8:38 a.m.

The Discovery of Iran
Are you sitting down? Iran is a terrorist state.

The organizers of the Council on Foreign Relations special task force to promote the appeasement of Iran must be cursing their uncommonly bad luck. They scheduled a meeting in Washington today to call for increasing normalization of relations between the United States and Iran. With a fine eye for dark comedy, the Council persuaded two relics of the catastrophic Carter years to appear: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates. The principal advocate of the policy, however, is undoubtedly the president of the Council, Richard Haas, who has long seen rapprochement with the mullahs as an "historic opportunity" for the United States. Haas was the head of Colin Powell's Policy Planning Staff.
Decision Making

- Informal, chaotic, complex and based upon consensus...

Supreme National Security Council

President

Supreme Leader

Assembly Of Experts

Cabinet

Guardian Council

Expediency Council

Khatami

Rafsanjani

Kharrazi
Shahab-3

11 August - Iranian Defense Ministry announced a field test of the latest version of this medium-range ballistic missile.

- Based upon the North Korean Nodong-1
- Modified with Russian technology
The Threat in Iraq

...attacks against the coalition

Significant Acts

- Operation Iron Hammer Announced
- Anniversary of Invasion
- Fallujah and al-Sadr Sedition
- Transition to Interim Government
- Interim Government Announced

Moving Average

Daily

August 87/day

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
...against the pipelines

Attacks or Attempts
January - 2
February - 2
March - 6
April - 4
May - 7
June - 12
July - 16
December - 18
Afghan Strategy

October - Poppy Strategy initiated

Provincial Reconstruction Team & Afghanistan National Army

COALITION PRT
NATO PRT
COALITION EXPANSION
FURTHER EXPANSION

As of 27 April 2004

Afghan National Army (ANA)
Over 8,000 soldiers
2,500 deployed throughout AFG
15 Battalions in Central Corps
Training at Kabul Military Training Center
Coalition Training Effort

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
We are here.

Decision Flow

- Initial Policy Guidance
- Lead Agency Designated
- Interagency WMD Elimination TF Formed
- Working Groups and Committees
- Develop Policy Options
- Vet Options with Agencies and Combatant Command
- Update and Feedback
- Fusion/Deconfliction with Other USG Policies
- Develop Draft Policies
- Execute WMD Elimination Operations
- Issue Guidance and Directives
- Presidential Decision

The Atlantic Monthly War Game
Players in USG Strategic Communication

DOD Information Operations

USD (P)  USD (I)
JS DDIO  ASD(SO-LIC)
Combatant Commands

White House Office of Global Communications

Public Affairs/ Diplomacy

ASD(PA)
USD(P)
State Department
USAID

NSC/DOS Strat Comms PCC

Other Government Information Activities

NSC CT Info Strategy PCC

CIA  NSC
Treasury  Justice

PCC = Policy Coordination Committee

Source: Capt. Gerald Mauer, Assistant Deputy Director for Information Operations, Joint Staff, 2 July 03
Issue: Support in the United States
Other Times, Other War

- Do you think it was a mistake send troops to...?