PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

The report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. government programs to train Iraqi police. It is based on analysis of data, interviews with officials, instructors, and trainees, and direct observation of training at relevant institutions in Jordan and Iraq. The joint State/DoD team met with top military commanders responsible for training, officials at Embassy Baghdad, and Iraqi officials including the Minister of the Interior.

Recommendations in the report are based on the best knowledge available to the Offices of Inspectors General and have been discussed with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations.

We appreciate the cooperation of all those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

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# Table of Contents

**Executive Summary**  
Chapter 1. Policy Issues  
   - The Problem with Numbers  
   - Training to Iraqi Perceived Needs  
   - The Question of Sustainability  
   - Building Leadership  
Chapter 2. The Training Process  
   - Recruiting and Selecting Trainees  
   - Vetting Prospective Trainees  
   - Basic Training  
   - Revising the Basic Police Training Curriculum  
   - Transition Integration Program  
   - Specialized Training  
   - Advanced Training  
   - Ad Hoc Training/Individual Initiatives  
Chapter 3. Post-Training Issues  
   - Measuring Results  
   - Leakage: Trainees Who Do Not Enter Police Ranks  
   - Police Partnership Programs  
   - Equipment and Readiness  
   - Mentoring  
Chapter 4. Looking Ahead  
   - Whither the Jordan International Police Training Center  
   - Guiding the Ministry of Interior on Target  
   - Intra-USG Relationships  
   - Toward Disengagement: Transitioning Police Training to the Iraqis  
   - Future U.S. Involvement in Police Training  
Chapter 5. Informal Recommendations  

**List of Appendixes**  
A Scope and Methodology  
B History and Background of Iraqi Police  
C Principal Interlocutors—Organizations Visited  
D Acronyms  
E National Security Presidential Directive 36  
F Report Distribution  
G Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMOMOI)Comments  
H Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) Comments  
I International Civilian Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) Comments  
J Team Members
Executive Summary

Purpose of this Assessment

The Inspectors General of the Departments of Defense and State established an interagency IG Team (IG Team) to collaborate on this management and program assessment of the Iraqi police training program.

The purposes were to:

- evaluate the U.S. government funded (appropriated funds) programs in accomplishing the training and equipping of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), and
- examine the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) activities for developing, implementing, and conducting training for the IPS.


“Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq . . . . The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission . . . .”

To carry out the responsibilities directed by NSPD–36, DoD created the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) under the overall direction of Commander, Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I). MNF–I’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) manages the IPS training program. While DoD has primary responsibility for security operations in Iraq, including training of security forces, historically the DoS is responsible for security assistance in nation building operations. The DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) possesses the institutional experience in training police forces and, therefore, was tasked, even before NSPD–36, to develop an appropriate training program for the Iraqi Police Service.
Scope

The Departments of Defense and State share oversight responsibilities for U.S. Government-funded training of the Iraqi police. In October 2004, the Inspectors General of the DoD and DoS initiated this interagency project to fully examine the processes and organizational relationships associated with the training of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).

From October 2004 through February 2005, the IG Team researched preliminary data in the Washington DC area. Between February 22 and March 5, 2005, the IG Team visited the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Subsequently, the team conducted fieldwork in Iraq from March 6–27, 2005. Appendix A contains more detail on the scope and methodology used in this project. The assessment was completed in accordance with the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, “Quality Standards for Inspections,” January 2005.

As with all efforts in Iraq, the Coalition programs to train police are continually evolving. The cutoff date for this assessment was April, 2005. Subsequent developments generally are not reflected in the report.

Putting Police Training in Context

The initial assumption was that the Iraqi police training programs would be conducted in a post-conflict environment. Contrary to these expectations, the IPS is evolving in an environment of high-level violence and terrorism intermingled with a problematic insurgency movement.

Conceptually, the Coalition’s objective is to train the IPS to provide security in urban areas throughout the country. In order to meet the IPS capacity required, two academies were established: the Baghdad Public Service Academy (renamed the Baghdad Police College) and an academy at Muwwaqqar, Jordan—the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Several regional academies were subsequently added. Ironically, the IPS emerged as the prime target of the terrorists and insurgents. Over the course of the last year, more than 1,600 members of the IPS have been killed. In addition, many intending recruits, congregating in anticipation of joining IPS ranks, have been targeted by suicide bombers. Still, recruits show up.

Given the dangers involved, it is not surprising that every aspect of the training program has been difficult. Several governments have shown the willingness to participate in training—but only outside Iraq. Likewise it has been difficult to engage instructor and mentoring services of non-military expatriates who are willing to work in-country. Even

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1 Regular military units of the Iraqi Army are to be stationed in the rural areas, responsible for traditional national defense and protection of Iraq’s borders.
more, full utilization of instructors and mentors throughout Iraq is constrained by strict security procedures governing the movement of Coalition personnel in country.

Finally, the constantly changing ‘street reality’ of Iraq demands great agility and ingenuity in designing and executing training programs. Against formidable odds, Coalition authorities, with increasing Iraqi participation, are meeting the challenges to create a credible, capable IPS.

Accolades followed the commendable performance of the IPS in helping assure the January 30 electoral success. As the IG Team traveled widely in Iraq, members observed a reasonable number of policemen on the streets. At police stations visited, there was evidence of at least tentative IPS outreach to the public. A favorable degree of self-assurance among the police was evident. Embassy public opinion polls showed increasing public confidence in the IPS. Thus, despite some weaknesses, the IG Team concludes that Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) programs have resulted in a qualified success.

Key Judgments

- Although the IPS is not yet capable of single-handedly meeting the security challenges, relevant Coalition training efforts have resulted in a qualified success. Underscoring this conclusion are:
  - the good performance of the police during the January elections,
  - the increased visibility of police on the streets, and
  - polls indicating a growing public respect for and confidence in the police force.
- Recruitment and vetting procedures are faulty. Despite recent improvements, too many recruits are marginally literate; some show up for training with criminal records or physical handicaps; and some recruits allegedly are infiltrating insurgents. Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and IPS officials contend that Iraqis are better able to screen candidates than are Coalition military personnel. The IG Team agrees.
- Most of the IPS training programs have been designed and executed by the Coalition with insufficient input from Iraqi leaders. To a significant degree, key decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) still pertain. There is a pressing need for closer dialogue with the Iraqi government in determining the process, content and direction of the training programs.
- Since inception, the Coalition objective has been to create a sizeable, orthodox ‘law and order’ police force. The goal is to train and equip 135,000 police by the end of 2006. This emphasis on numbers overshadows the attention that should be given to the qualitative performance of those trained.
- Relevant to all aspects of U.S. government-funded training is the Iraqi government’s capacity and determination to sustain the IPS force structure. Within present budget

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2 A “Greater Baghdad” poll indicated that the percentage of those with ‘quite a lot’ and ‘a great deal’ of confidence in the IP to improve the situation in Iraq increased from a combined total 70% in September, 2004, to 81% in March, 2005.
constraints, the Iraqi MOI cannot fund the ministry’s existing staff of about 170,000, let alone the additional numbers projected for training. Part of this dilemma may be resolved through a present effort to document MOI personnel and identify ‘ghost employees’ and others who are not performing effectively. Removing such personnel from MOI rolls will be difficult.

• MOI officials are not enthusiastic about training Iraqis at the JIPTC. As the Iraqi government progressively assumes responsibility for IPS training, it is likely their use of JIPTC will atrophy. Planning for the future utilization of JIPTC facilities—and the attendant involvement of international contingents—must be addressed as soon as possible.

• Iraqi officials, notably to include the Minister of Interior, are adamant that henceforth training of raw recruits should be suspended in favor of in-service training. In principle, CPATT agrees that this shift will be reflected in the next training cycles. Plans need to be made now to revise curricula, decide on facilities utilization, and adjust instructor staffs.

• Unless and until the MOI takes full responsibility for the management and administration of the IPS training program, the Coalition is destined to fall short in helping to create an effective police force. The ‘handoff’ will be a process, not an event. Attention must be given to formulating—in close consultation with Iraqi counterparts—an agreed plan for that process.

• Concurrent with the ultimate assumption of full responsibilities by the Iraqi government and consistent with NSPD–36, the Department of Defense and the Department of State need to formulate plans for assumption of residual U.S. Government training responsibilities by the Department of State.

**Formal Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1:** Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 2:** Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 3:** A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of in-service IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.)

**Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and
provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 5:** Appropriate parties need to explore the merits, feasibility and conceivable sources of any U.S. Government funding to cover MOI salary shortfalls during the current fiscal year. This determination should take into account possible out-year implications for such support. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 6:** A joint Coalition/MOI assessment should be conducted to determine operation and maintenance costs of Coalition-built and/or renovated training facilities and to determine how and whether those costs can be sustained. (Action: MNSTC–I in collaboration with Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 7:** Coalition and MOI leaders/trainers should identify a mutually agreeable target number or percentage of IPS trainees who demonstrate ambition and talent for subsequent leadership training. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 8:** A joint committee of Coalition and MOI officials should screen and select officers for advanced training based on mutually established qualification standards. (Action: MNSTC–I in conjunction with MOI.)

**Recommendation 9:** The Coalition recruiting program should be placed under the direction of the MOI, with MNC–I and CPATT providing assistance. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNC–I, MNSTC–I, and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 10:** Coalition authorities should assess the extent and quality of Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a non-binding memorandum of agreement with the Ministry on access to and utilization of such material. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 11:** Coalition and Iraqi authorities should establish a non-binding agreement that states the MOI is responsible for vetting candidates for Coalition-sponsored police training. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad and in collaboration with MOI.)

**Recommendation 12:** Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering Public Order Brigade (POB) or Emergency Response Unit (ERU) training. An in-service police training program should be developed for “currently serving” POB and ERU members who are not graduates of a police academy. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with the MOI.)
Recommendation 13: Contractual arrangements with expatriate instructors should specify that individually devised training courses will be submitted in advance for consideration and possible approval by MNSTC–I and CPATT. (Action: MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 14: A non-binding agreement should be negotiated by the U.S. Government with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that specifies that only applicants in possession of MOI-issued identification cards, explicitly stating that the bearer is a member of the IPS, will be accepted for training by the Coalition. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

Recommendation 15: Tables of Organization and Equipment should be developed for police stations and deployable police units throughout the country. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI.)

Recommendation 16: Coalition authorities should establish internal controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the IPS. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and MNC–I and in consultation with MOI.)

Recommendation 17: Coalition resources, in close coordination with counterparts in the MOI and IPS, should develop an operational IPS Readiness Reporting System for the MOI. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI.)

Recommendation 18: Coalition commanders should conduct a requirements analysis to determine the number of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) who can be gainfully engaged under prevailing circumstances and adjust the number of these mentors accordingly. (MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

Recommendation 19: Standard operating procedures should be developed for the IPLOs, to define the relationships and responsibilities among the police liaison officers and military police. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

Recommendation 20: The Department of State must keep Coalition governments apprised of developments at JIPTC, specifically those that relate to provision of training staff at that facility. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Recommendation 21: The Department of State should decide whether and where an ILEA should be established in the Middle East. If Jordan is selected as a venue, negotiations for such a transformation of JIPTC should proceed quickly. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Recommendation 22: Coalition commanders should obtain from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior a written commitment to assume responsibility for direct payment of the salaries of Iraqis trained by the Coalition at JIPTC. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with MOI.)
Recommendation 23: Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and MOI and in consultation with MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 24: Top priority should be given to recruiting ‘3161’ personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then to assigning a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Action: Embassy Baghdad through IRMO.)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Baghdad should obtain from the MOI a written commitment to assure Coalition authorities can access data relevant to tracking and mentoring IPS personnel trained in U.S. Government-funded programs. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 26: Coalition and MOI officials should develop standard operating procedures for personnel administration of the Iraqi Police Service. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

Recommendation 27: The Department of State should assign one or more INL officers to work directly within CPATT to ensure INL perspectives are considered in the development of the IPS. (Action: Department of State in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 28: MNSTC–I should perform an assessment of security and IPS infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where additional responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI.)

Recommendation 29: The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. The working group should identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DoD to DoS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF–I, MNSTC–I, and INL.)

Recommendation 30: The Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), should prepare a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to define funding arrangements for future U.S. involvement in Iraqi Police Service-related programs. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Resource Management (RM) and Department of Defense’s Office of the Under Secretary for Policy in consultation with OMB.)
Chapter 1: Policy Issues

The Problem with Numbers

Perhaps even more than the military, the Iraqi police during the Saddam Hussein era were perceived to be corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression. Accordingly, an early decision of the CPA was to cashier police officers closely tied to the former regime. Other members of the IPS abandoned their duties or were casualties of the conflict. Only about 30,000, mostly low-ranking police remained on duty as a residual force—a number clearly insufficient to enforce law and order even had stability been established. Consistent with the CPA goal of erasing troublesome aspects of the Hussein regime, command and control of the remnants of the police force were decentralized. This further diluted cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.

The deficit of policemen was only one of the myriad problems that confronted Coalition planners after the June 2004 transition from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). More vexing is the growth of terrorism and insurgency that continue to challenge both Coalition military forces and the nascent Iraqi military and police forces.

Faced with this situation, Coalition officials perceived a primary objective should be the fastest possible creation of a sizeable police force. To determine a force-strength target, planners reviewed per capita police-to-population ratios in neighboring Islamic countries. On this basis, 135,000 “trained and equipped” was considered to be the required number of Iraqi police (IP). The IIG agreed to this figure, and the IG Team accepts the logic of this methodology.

Nonetheless, aiming for numbers poses other issues. With the mix of IPs already on the force plus new recruits, it is hard to determine how many IPs are “trained and equipped.” There are differing views on which units should be counted or how to validate the numbers against the goal of 135,000. Attrition and the failure to hire trainees (and/or trainees’ decisions not to join the IPS) are additional factors that cloud the numbers’ calculations. Coalition training subsequently has been driven by a focus on the numbers metric.

With a high IP casualty toll (over 1,600 policemen have lost their lives over the past year), widely publicized incidents in which the IP failed in the face of attacks, and skepticism among foreign observers, there is a perception that training programs have produced ‘cannon fodder’—numbers of nominal policemen incapable of defending themselves, let alone the Iraqi public.

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3 Per the May 2003, ORHA/CPA Assessment of the Iraq Police, the 2003 pre-war strength of the Iraqi Police Force under the General Director of Police was 58,006.
4 The 135,000 IP figure resulted from a MNSTC-I Troop-to-Task study completed in June 2004.
The only reliable figures are the number of graduates from Coalition training—76,172, as of April 17, 2005. However, an undetermined number of graduates never enter the IPS, either because they opt out or because the MOI chooses not to enroll them as active duty policemen.

A variety of security forces comprise the IPS. The way these forces are categorized and counted further bedevils the problem with numbers. In January 2005, the Minister of Interior laid out his vision for a ‘regular police’ force of 79,000 (Figure 1). These regular police would be supplemented by the specialized police force (i.e., Public Order Battalions (POB) and Special Police Commando Units) of 50,000, plus a mechanized brigade of 6,000. Altogether, these forces would total 135,000. In contrast, MNF–I regards the POB, Commandos, and the mechanized brigade to be additional to the Coalition-proposed regular IPS force of 135,000. In conversation with the IG Team, the Minister of Interior asserted that there are now more than 125,000 IP on the rolls. He went on to state that “... the numbers are okay; what we need is better quality, more training.”

Figure 1. Ministry of Interior proposed police structure splits police into 79,000 regular police and 56,000 specialized police

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5 The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), the Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP), the Bureau of Diplomatic Protection (BDP), the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), and the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) are not counted in the target numbers for IP. However, Coalition training programs encompass these units.

6 The current (May 2005) Minister of Interior, Bayan Baqur Jaber, is reviewing proposals relating to Ministry force end strength.
In reviewing the quantity vs. quality complex of issues, one obvious conclusion is that numbers alone rarely prevail against well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led forces. As one Iraqi police officer noted, “. . . 150,000 American troops readily defeated Saddam Hussein’s army of about one million.”

The IG Team is convinced that the dialogue concerning the strength and shape of the IPS must be changed. Accepting the MOI formulation of the IPS would enable MNSTC–I and CPATT to move beyond the issue of numbers and shift attention to the quality of training.

Admittedly, qualitative parameters will be less amenable to objective measurement than is the numbers metric. Nonetheless, the IG Team suggests that a better-prepared IP will result in better performance that, in turn, will be readily apparent to the Iraqi public and the media. Achieving the qualitative goals will be judged by what happens on the streets of Iraq.

**Recommendation 1:** Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Training to Iraqi-perceived Needs**

Much of the planning and execution of the IPS training program has been done by Coalition military leaders without sufficient input from Iraqi officials. One high-ranking official in CPATT told the IG Team that “. . . until recently, Iraqi views were given absolutely no consideration. They (the Iraqis) still do not have a deciding vote.” Another stated, “We are not learning our lessons. We still develop great ideas and plans, and then lay them on Iraqis.”

During the time of the CPA, such an approach was both inevitable and, perhaps, appropriate. In the wake of the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, no Iraqi policy makers were in a position to make authoritative decisions. The CPA decision to cleanse the political system of Hussein sympathizers—notably, the ‘de-Ba’athification’ effort—effectively decapitated the IPS of its standing leadership. Even though some former police officers have been reincorporated into the force, it was necessary to start almost from scratch to build a new police force. The result was a ‘bottom-up’ approach with primary emphasis on minimal basic training.

Overall, there is little consensus on how to train Iraqi police. One exception is the universal agreement that the eight weeks devoted to the basic course is insufficient time to produce a capable policeman. Thus, there is tacit consensus that the training program to date has not created an effective IPS. (There is no consensus on how long a time would be required to achieve the desired results.)
As this assessment was being conducted, MNSTC–I and CPATT leaders were planning to lengthen the basic training course to 10 weeks. This seems to be an appropriate step, but the IG Team makes no recommendation as to the optimum time required for such training.  

At the outset of the CPA effort to build IPS capacity, the assumption—even to some extent, the reality—was that training could be molded within a rapidly stabilizing political and security environment. The unexpected virulence and scope of subsequent terrorism and insurgency induced changes in the program, but such modifications have lagged the ‘street reality’ in Iraq.

Adjustments in the training course have been and are being made. During this assessment, the JIPTC staff completed a CPATT-directed revision of the basic curriculum to include more ‘hands on,’ self-protection exercises. Other IPS in-country academies are adopting these changes. IP personnel and MOI officials strongly support the adjustments and the shift in emphasis.

A CPA decision to decentralize command and control of the IPS has had unintended consequences. Decentralization was consistent with the intent to disperse political power. Commandable in concept, the emerging result within the IPS is a pattern of fiefdoms, subject to political machinations. An example of this political maneuvering is the situation of competing chiefs of police in Najaf where one responds to the provincial governor, the other to the MOI.

Pay problems have been an equally troubling result of decentralization. Under the CPA-designed system, much of the central government’s funding is allocated to the provincial governors. Thereafter, the monies are sub-allocated to respective elements, such as the police. Accordingly, each provincial chief of police controls his share of sub-allotted funds. Allegations of mismanagement and corruption in the disbursement of pay for IPs, equipment purchases, etc., are credible. Re-centralization of control is not the total answer to these issues—especially to corruption—but the IG Team concludes that tighter MOI control is desirable.

**Recommendation 2:** Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

With the June 28, 2004, transition from the CPA to the IIG, the locus of decisions regarding the IPS began to shift. At first modestly, but now with increasing forcefulness, the MOI articulates relevant Iraqi positions and policies. Dialogue among key stakeholders (MNSTC–I, CPATT, and the MOI) quickened notably during the course of the fieldwork for this assessment. For example, the Minister of Interior told the IG Team...
that, henceforth, police training should focus on in-service members of the force—“no new recruits.”

The implications for the training program are multiple and complex.

CPATT leaders indicate willingness to adapt to the Minister’s decision. The CPATT Commander told the IG Team that, as of the cycle beginning in June 2005, the focus will be on training in-service IPs. The questions relative to course content must be addressed on an urgent basis. The easy solution—to recycle under-trained IPs through the basic course—may not be appropriate, in light of differing levels of experience and prior training among this more seasoned cadre.

**Recommendation 3:** A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of in-service IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.)

It is not clear if MOI officials have addressed implications of the Minister’s dictum regarding the shift from new recruits to in-service training. Specifically, if the number of in-service students approximates present new recruit levels, the available ‘street strength’ of the IPS could drop by as much as 10 percent. This reduction of numbers on the street seems unwise and unsustainable. On the other hand, a smaller number of IPs in training would reduce the number of instructors required and utilization of existing facilities.

As Iraqi officials articulate positions on IPS issues, an emerging concept is the development of a ‘third force’—a capability between orthodox police and internal security military units. Consistent with this objective, the MOI enthusiastically embraces the preparation of the Public Order Brigades (POB). An MOI initiative, Special Police Commando Units and an IPS mechanized brigade are now operative. CPATT conceived the POB program and is engaged in training the Special Police Commandos. At the same time, the MOI has not claimed ownership of the CPATT-trained Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP), or even the SWAT teams that have performed well in operations in Mosul and elsewhere. MOI attitudes relative to these units are reflected in frequent failure to pay IPs serving in those units. The IG Team concludes that, as the Iraqis eventually assume responsibility for IPS training, the status of these Coalition-conceived units may languish.

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8 In an undated memorandum, issued about the time of this assessment, then Minister Naqib states “New cadets will only join the 8 week course if existing Iraqi police forces do not fill all available classroom space…”

9 Currently, the basic courses are geared to train about 4,000 cadets per month. With the overlapping pattern, this means that about 8,000 IPs are in such training at any point in time. The ‘street strength’ of the IPS is assumed to be about 80,000.

10 The IG Team understands the underlying implications of moving in the direction of a paramilitary capability rather than the more orthodox policing model originally conceived. However, that debate is beyond the scope of this assessment.
**Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

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The Question of Sustainability

The true measure of the training achievement will be in the Iraqi government’s determination and capacity to sustain the IPS force structure over time. Unless and until the MOI claims and commits to full ‘ownership’ of the IPS training programs and employs qualified graduates from those programs, Coalition efforts will fall short of the goal of creating an acceptably effective instrument of law and order. ‘Ownership’ of IPS training implies that, at some point yet to be defined, the Iraqi Government will assume full responsibility for funding such training. In this respect, there are both policy and resource impediments.

On the resource front, an immediate issue is the MOI budget. For FY05 (January 1–December 31, 2005), the MOI budget is adequate to fund salaries of 128,000 employees. Some time before this fieldwork, then IIG Prime Minister Allawi approved funding for 156,000. The Council of Ministers did not ratify this decision; hence, the Minister of Finance did not fund MOI’s increased requirement. Meanwhile, present MOI personnel (both IPs and staff, the latter predominantly at MOI headquarters in Baghdad) number about 170,000. By training additional IPs, CPATT effectively exacerbates the budget shortfall.\(^\text{11}\)

A factor in the MOI’s financial capability to sustain the growing IPS force is the considerable, though undetermined, number of ‘ghost’ employees on the ministry’s roster. Although not productively engaged in the MOI’s structure, these persons are, nonetheless, on the payroll. Some encumber sinecures for family or tribal members. Others are retired personnel who draw salaries in a socio-economic system without adequate—or any—pensions.

It is conceivable that the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) may allocate additional FY05 funds to the MOI. Absent such action, some Coalition officials opine that capital development funds could be shifted within the MOI budget to cover salary shortfalls, although the MOI Deputy Minister states categorically that shifting resources between funding ‘chapters’ is not possible. One senior Coalition official posits that, contingent on Congressional approval of the DoD supplemental legislation and the requested $5.7 billion additional training fund, the U.S. may be able to cover the prospective MOI budget deficit relative to IPS salaries. At best, this would be a stopgap measure. More

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\(^{11}\) As discussed elsewhere in this report, not all trainees subsequently are hired as policemen by the MOI.
importantly, the IG Team believes any such action would establish an unfortunate financial and political precedent.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Recommendation 5:} Appropriate parties need to explore the merits, feasibility and conceivable sources of any U.S. Government funding to cover MOI salary shortfalls during the current fiscal year. This determination should take into account possible out-year implications for such support. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

The increasing numbers of Iraqi instructors involved in relevant programs is one aspect in which the MOI is beginning to assert ownership of IPS training. At JIPTC, an IP general headed a contingent of 12 Iraqi instructors. By mid-April, 60 Iraqi instructors were at JIPTC. Similarly, the number of Iraqi instructors is increasing at regional academies. For example, at the Babylon Police Academy (al-Hillah) and at the al Kut academy, Iraqis conduct all classroom and range instruction under the watchful care of International Police Trainers. Familiarity with the actual conditions in Iraq and the IPS culture, as well as the ability to communicate with the cadets in their own language enhances the value of an indigenous training cadre.

The Team encourages this trend toward more Iraqi instructors. At the same time, CPATT must concentrate on establishing effective train-the-trainer programs. CPATT must ensure quality instruction and curricula consistency.

The Coalition IPS training program is capital intensive. Thus far, the U.S. Government has spent about $190 million in building or renovating training facilities both at JIPTC and inside Iraq.\textsuperscript{13} By and large, the Coalition created the facilities. The MOI will inherit them. The Deputy Minister of Interior (Finance) told the IG Team that the “MOI has no funding in the Ministry’s FY05 budget for police academies.” Thus, the Coalition will bear the full cost of operating and maintaining these facilities. Yet to be determined are the costs for out-year operation and maintenance (O&M) and the MOI’s determination and ability to shoulder those costs.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Recommendation 6:} A joint Coalition/MOI assessment should be conducted to determine operation and maintenance costs of Coalition-built and/or renovated training facilities and to determine how and whether those costs can be sustained by the MOI in the future. (Action: MNSTC–I in collaboration with Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with the MOI.)

\textsuperscript{12} Senior U.S. military commanders are seized with the conundrum of providing U.S. support without developing an over-dependency on the part of the MOI.

\textsuperscript{13} This does not include O&M costs.

\textsuperscript{14} As in the case of payroll issues, the IG Team cautions against funding decisions that might set a precedent for future U.S. Government O&M support.
Building Leadership

Rebuilding a national police service for Iraq presents major challenges. The first hurdle was to enroll sufficient numbers to be a credible force. This prefigured a ‘bottom-up’ approach with the major focus for basic training of new recruits. The importance of that objective has overshadowed the need to ensure the IPS has effective, committed leadership. Based on direct observation of IP officers and numerous exchanges with both Coalition officials and Iraqis involved in training, the IG Team concludes that both the numbers and quality of police leaders now need to be given priority.

The problem starts with a relative shortage of mid-level leaders and managers. Many police chiefs and their deputies are accustomed to the IPS culture that prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. Old habits and methods (e.g., reliance on forced confessions, taking the initiative only when directed, and rigid delineation of responsibilities) work against effective and efficient policing.

The need for attention to these aspects is self-evident. In instances where good leadership is present (often provided by Coalition military personnel or International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs)), IPs perform satisfactorily and stand their ground in the face of attacks. The absence of such leaders correlates closely with instances in which IP stations have been overrun, often with shocking casualties among ill-prepared and ill-led policemen.

Senior IP officers interviewed by the IG Team were outspoken in identifying insufficient numbers (and quality) of officers as a major weakness within the IPS. They urged restoration of the former ‘police college’ system, preferably with a three-year curriculum, such as that at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) that predated the Saddam Hussein era. MNSTC–I and CPATT are moving ahead to restart officer training at the BPC, although present plans are for a six-month course rather than the more extended course favored by the Iraqis. In a free-form discussion with the Chargé d’Affaires, IPLOs were equally vocal in identifying leadership development as a major weakness in the present training program.

**Recommendation 7:** Coalition and MOI leaders/trainers should identify a mutually agreeable target number or percentage of IPS trainees who demonstrate ambition and talent for subsequent leadership training. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI.)

At present, CPATT conducts short leadership courses (generally two weeks’ duration) at the Adnan Palace in Baghdad.\(^\text{15}\) As in the case of the eight-week basic training course, the time devoted for this ‘advanced training’ may be insufficient. The training essentially can be shaped by CPATT (in consultation with the MOI). The IG Team informally

\(^{15}\) As of April 17, 2005, 853 Iraqis had gone through management and leadership courses in executive leadership, senior planning, mid-level management and first line supervision.
recommends that CPATT review the course content and duration of the leadership training courses.

More importantly, trainees allegedly have been selected more on a basis of favoritism than on capability or potential. The IG Team concludes that the palpable need for better-trained commanders and managers will help move the MOI in the direction of merit-based nominations. Although selection of candidates for leadership training is appropriately the province of the MOI, CPATT needs to participate in the process. Trainers are well positioned to help identify good candidates as future IPS leaders. The objective is to assure cost effectiveness in expenditure of U.S. funds on this training.

**Recommendation 8:** A joint committee of Coalition and MOI officials should screen and select officers for advanced training based on mutually established qualification standards.  
*(Action: MNSTC–I in conjunction with MOI.)*
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Chapter 2: The Training Process

Recruiting and Selecting Trainees

As a result of the conflict in 2003 and the ensuing state of chaos and looting, much of the IPS infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged. Many of the IPs who served during the Saddam Hussein era either abandoned their positions, were casualties of war, or were cashiered. On May 2, 2003, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA—the predecessor of the CPA) called for police in Baghdad to return to work. Coalition force commanders made similar announcements for secured areas outside the capital. In June 2003, the CPA and MOI issued a directive that all police officers had to return to work no later than July 3. Those failing to do so were subject to immediate termination. According to International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) officials, about 38,000 had returned to the IPS as of July. To bolster the force, an additional 30,000 police were recruited by Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF–7) and the Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs). The driving objective was to get “boots on the ground.” In doing so, the CPA enunciated minimal requirements for entry into the IPS.

Subsequently, to meet MNSTC–I training quotas, two patterns of recruiting evolved. Iraqis did most of the recruiting in the Baghdad area. Coalition forces (working through the major subordinate commands or MSCs) were in charge of recruiting in the rest of the country. Iraqi recruiters appear to have enforced minimum requirements as enunciated by CPA, while the MSCs sent to JIPTC some recruits who did not meet those minimum standards.

In the Baghdad area, applicants learn of recruitment via word of mouth. In light of the relatively good pay prospects, this simple system attracts more than enough applicants. Many simply show up at police stations or at the Baghdad Police College (BPC).

The IG Team observed recruiting and selection (a sequentially seamless process) at the BPC. After passing through elemental security screening, aspirants are admitted into the walled facility on a first-come, first-served basis. If, as frequently is the case, more show up than can be processed on a given day, identifying data is taken on those who are turned away. They are given numbers (again, in order of their place in the line) and told when to return to be among those first admitted.

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16 Subsequent attacks by insurgents and terrorists have exacerbated those problems.
17 Standards were: (1) minimum age of 20; (2) completed secondary school with ability to read, write and communicate in Arabic; (3) no affiliation with the Ba'ath party in accordance with the standards enumerated in Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1; (4) no reported history of human rights violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of other persons; (5) no criminal history involving violence, theft or violating the public trust; (6) physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities; (7) each applicant's uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye with normal color vision.
Once admitted to the facility, the process is very basic. On entry into a classroom setting, each applicant is given an identifying number that corresponds to his or her file. The first step is a timed written test, designed and administered by an American contractor. Iraqis proctor the test. Results are machine graded in the presence of an IPS official. Since responding to questions involves understanding the written material, the test presumably establishes basic literacy of the person being examined. Applicants who do not achieve the minimal threshold score are called forward by number, courteously escorted off the premises, and dismissed.

A second stage in the process consists of an interview and physical examination. At BPC, the processing observed by the IG Team covered all of the minimum standards prescribed by the CPA.

The physical exam appears especially cursory. At the time of the IG Team’s observation, most applicants appeared to be in their late teens to early 20’s and fully functional without any physical handicaps. However, a physician stated he did not have sufficient time to complete a thorough medical examination of so many applicants in such a short time (70 students on the day in question). Consequently, the examination consisted of completing a medical history questionnaire, checking applicants’ eyes for squinting, and verifying a steady pulse. The doctor then pronounced the applicant fit or unfit. There was no testing to determine physical stamina, dental review, or body checks for even readily detectable identification marks such as scars or tattoos. The doctor also told the IG Team that a considerable number of students appeared to suffer some form of mental problems, hard to diagnose during the interview process.

Elsewhere in the country, MSCs recruit and select candidates to fill available training slots as directed in a monthly “fragmentary order” (FRAGO). The MSCs use various recruiting tools including recommendations from the command’s recruiting unit, IPLOs, serving IPS personnel, and from other reliable sources in a given community. These Coalition recruiters are encouraged to accept all recruits who are sponsored by local officials.

To date, all those going to JIPTC for basic training have been recruited and selected by the MSCs. Even though the processes used by the MSCs theoretically are the same as those used by the Iraqi recruiters, the MOI apparently does not have a sense of commitment to those trainees who enter training via the MSC route.

The FRAGO contains detailed instructions on transportation and timing for movement of MSC-selected trainees. Those destined for JIPTC are taken to the Baghdad International Airport for onward movement to Jordan. The MSCs are involved with IPS personnel in

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18 No female trainees are sent to JIPTC. Although plans call for women cadets at regional academies in Iraq, thus far only BPC has trained women IPs.
19 See discussion on vetting below.
recruiting for the BPC classes as well as for the regional training centers inside Iraq, based upon the needs of those training facilities.

In discussion with the IG Team at JIPTC, Iraqi cadets and instructors stated that earlier recruiting had included offering the recruits guns and badges upon completion of training. They asserted some recruits joined because of the offer of employment without knowing that they were being sent to Jordan for training. Others allegedly were paid a fee by recruiters. It is widely assumed that some trainees reversed that pattern and bribed recruiters to secure a training slot. Some were led to believe they would be accommodated in fine hotels in Amman. Allegedly, all were advised they would receive about $200 a month during training.  

Despite the written test, attrition statistics show that illiterates make it into basic training. Less frequent are cases of those with easily detectable physical or mental impairment. Some cadets clearly are older than the established age limits. Coincident to this assessment, about 20 senior IP officials (including four general officers) were sent from the Mosul area to basic training at JIPTC. Occasionally, trainees are separated when information is revealed about past criminal behavior or allegations of involvement with the insurgency. Other common causes for dismissal from training are infractions of discipline, illness or inability to adjust (normally homesickness). The team was advised at JIPTC that a surprising number of students arrive with drugs that are confiscated during in-processing. These instances support a

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20 None of these interlocutors were among the first recruits, but their version of events — oral history — is plausible and continues to affect recruiting efforts to some degree.

21 When this was discovered, the officers were given the option of returning to Iraq forthwith or enrolling in the basic course. Several chose the latter course.

22 Several Iraqi sources advised the IG Team that there are known insurgents within the ranks of students. However, they did not indicate the basis for such allegations.
widely shared perception that screening of IP candidates is at best superficial, sometimes inconsistent.

In order for the IPS recruiting mission to be successful, MSCs should work in close coordination with IPS officials. Participation of the latter will enhance the MOI’s commitment to such trainees. At a minimum, the interview of each applicant by a senior IPS officer should be required as part of the selection process. In keeping with the objective of nurturing MOI ‘ownership’ of IPS training, a logical step would be to place responsibility for recruiting and selection on Iraqi officials.

**Recommendation 9:** The Coalition recruiting program should be placed under the direction of the MOI, with MNC–I and CPATT providing assistance. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNC–I, MNSTC–I, and Embassy Baghdad.)

Without questioning the patriotism that motivates many members of the IPS, it must be acknowledged that large numbers of policemen join the force for purely pecuniary reasons. Many apply with only a vague notion of what is expected of them as trainees or members of the IPS. More systematic orientation of those selected for training would complement recruiting, selection, and assignment of trainees. For those destined to go to JIPTC, this should occur before departure from Iraq. Parallel programs should be conducted at the BPC and each regional academy. For raw recruits (i.e., those entering the IPS for the first time), the orientation should include an option to withdraw from the program at that stage. The IG Team made an informal recommendation on this matter. (See Chapter 5)

**Vetting Prospective Trainees**

Inducting criminals into the IPS is a continual concern. Even more troubling is infiltration by intending terrorists or insurgents. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that such persons indeed are among the ranks of the IPS. This underscores the need for the most rigorous possible review of each applicant’s records.

To gain an understanding of the vetting process, the IG Team met with Iraqi police cadets and instructors, International Police Trainers (IPT) at various police training academies, officials of the MOI and Coalition authorities. All Iraqis interviewed suggested that vetting performed by Coalition forces is not as thorough as what could be done by the MOI. The IG Team was told that, especially early in 2003, only a cursory background check, if even that, was conducted before policemen were trained or entered the force.

In terms of policy, several IPS interviewees expressed reservations about aspects of Coalition vetting. For example, they contended that no Iraqi would recruit or employ a candidate who had tattoos. In their culture body tattoos are indicative of a person who has a criminal record or at least a propensity to violate societal norms. Likewise, the longer-term prospects for female members of the IP are problematic. In some areas, notably in Kurdistan, women are accepted members in both the police and military. In
most other regions, it is likely that female IPs will be relegated to supporting roles, at best as administrative staff.

It is widely contended that the vetting process is stymied by the lack or inaccessibility of personnel or police records. As with recruiting and selection of trainees, vetting is especially difficult if carried out by non-Iraqis. Indeed, the Coalition’s ability to conduct thorough background checks on IPS personnel is severely limited. Use of polygraph techniques is impracticable, given the numbers of candidates to be processed. Effective communications across language and cultural barriers is an issue too.

Nonetheless, the IG Team concludes that more can and should be done. For example, a knowledgeable official with ICITAP informed the team that the criminal identification laboratory in Baghdad survived the post-invasion looting, as did the MOI’s Crime Bureau database. Some Iraqis interviewed by the IG Team likewise contend that more information is available than previously presumed by Coalition authorities. Relevant documentation is often kept by mukhtars (village elders).

**Recommendation 10:** Coalition authorities should assess the extent and quality of Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a non-binding memorandum of agreement with the Ministry on access to and utilization of such material. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with the MOI.)

The MOI eventually will be able to screen all IPS personnel, in part by accessing the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) system being developed in the United States. Although fingerprints collected to date by the Qualifying Committee (QC) are being screened against the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and Interpol watch lists, they have not been checked against existing Iraqi criminal fingerprint records.

Iraqis familiar with local dialects can distinguish the area that a recruit comes from, a helpful bit of information in terms of vetting. Another frequent recommendation from Iraqi interlocutors was that applicants for initial training should be endorsed by some well-regarded member of his or her community—a personal guarantor of sorts, able to testify to the good character of the intending policeman.

Despite weaknesses discussed above, there is progress. The IG Team commends Coalition staff for formalizing a January 2005 standard operating procedure (SOP) covering IPS recruiting.

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23 The laboratory is outmoded, but reportedly contains sections for ballistics, fingerprinting, casting, crime scene photography, blood sample analysis and counterfeiting. Supposedly, the database contains some 700,000 fingerprints stored on cards and computers.

24 Over 400,000 Iraqi fingerprint cards and an Iraqi (Russian built) AFIS with 100,000 entries were shipped to the United States for loading into a new Iraqi AFIS.
In light of the present, difficult employment environment, service in the IPS is financially attractive. That factor adds to the vulnerability to petty corruption in Iraqi-conducted vetting and recruiting. Nonetheless, the IG Team concludes that early MOI assumption of responsibility for those functions would accomplish several goals:

- increasing Iraqi ‘ownership’ of the training program,
- matching capabilities with functions more closely,
- and overcoming language-related impediments.

**Recommendation 11**: Coalition and Iraqi authorities should establish a non-binding agreement that states the MOI is responsible for vetting candidates for Coalition-sponsored police training. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNF–I and MNSTC–I.)

**Basic Training**

The eight-week basic training course for the IPS is offered primarily at Baghdad Police College (BPC) and the Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC).

Additionally, basic training has been conducted at regional training academies at al-Kut, al-Hillah, al-Asad, Basrah, Mosul and Sulaymaniyah.

The curriculum used was a revised ICITAP course originally developed for training in Kosovo. From the beginning Coalition planners intended the eight-week basic course to serve as a starting point and not as the ultimate training solution. A field training and mentoring program was to have supplemented the rudimentary basic training course.

Given the April 2004 rise in the insurgency, it became apparent that the field training envisioned in the original concept could not be executed. Yet the Coalition was reluctant to increase the length of basic training because of the urgent need to build IPS capacity and get policemen on the streets. As the IP increasingly became targets of the insurgency, MNF–I recognized the need to change the direction and emphasis of the
training. The basic recruit curriculum was changed to focus on officer survival skills in an insurgency.\textsuperscript{25}

The eight-week training course yields a maximum 320 hours of training time. To accommodate an increase in hours spent on counter-insurgency training and self-defense skills without increasing overall course length, some classroom subjects were eliminated while other related subjects were reduced. Courses on democratic policing principles are critically important to the mission and should not be eliminated or reduced. To recover a significant amount of time that is currently lost to translation, the IG Team informally recommends that CPATT develop Arabic training videos for those repetitive courses that are suitable for audiovisual presentations. (See Chapter 5)

A revised curriculum was being implemented during the IG Team’s inspection of the JIPTC facility in Jordan. A standard curriculum, across all of the facilities conducting basic police training, is a fundamentally sound concept from a management perspective, positively affecting issues other than mere standardization. Standardized curriculum drives standardized equipment and personnel requirements, resulting in budgetary savings.

Currently, the basic course does not include night training. As the Coalition adapts its training plan to deal with the insurgency, it must prepare the IPS to conduct operations in the dark. The enemy is using the cover of darkness to plant improvised explosive devices and conduct other night time operations. Experts agree that police tactics, patrolling, and intelligence gathering activities during daylight hours are markedly different than the tactics employed at night. Thus, the team informally recommends incorporation of night training in the tactics phase of the basic course. (See Chapter 5)

The Team observed a lack of discipline among the basic recruits at several of the training sites. This was not the case at those facilities conducting specialized training for the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and the Public Order Brigades (POB). As practiced in the specialized training programs, the use of properly trained Iraqi drill instructors would facilitate discipline and help to create a sense of esprit-de-corps among the cadets. While it is recognized that Iraqis are family and tribal oriented, the training programs must foster a sense of esprit-de-corps and teach teamwork. The IG Team makes an informal recommendation on this matter. (See Chapter 5)

**Revising the Basic Police Training Curriculum**

The basic IP training curriculum started out with 75 percent classroom training and 25 percent ‘hands-on’ exercises. Presumably these percentages were a good mix for training in Kosovo, considering there was a stable post-conflict situation, a much higher ratio of international trainers to trainees, and a higher educational level among the students. MNSTC–I and CPATT recognize that the training program must be dynamic rather than

\textsuperscript{25} CPATT directed JIPTC’s staff to modify the basic training curriculum to incorporate survival skills, while retaining the same eight week duration.
static. Adjustments and revisions are required; many have been incorporated, including substantial changes to the curriculum that have essentially reversed the previous ratio of classroom to hands-on time.

Based on their broad experience in providing police instruction, a large number of the International Police Trainers (IPTs) have concluded that Iraqi police candidates grasp lessons more quickly and completely when presented via ‘hands-on’ exercises rather than in classroom settings. Thus, the JIPTC staff made arrangements for the Architecture Department at the University of Jordan to prepare three-dimensional models for tabletop exercises. It is assumed this will work better for Iraqi trainees who have difficulty using and understanding diagrams or maps.

The prevalent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by terrorists and insurgents in Iraq underscores the need to train IPs to deal with such dangers. At JIPTC, the Center constructed a training field based on the physical layout of a typical Iraqi street. Trainers use this mock-up to give the students the practical experience to manage IED post-detonation situations, crowd control, and safe approach as a precaution for secondary explosives.

An existing hangar at JIPTC will be converted to provide areas for realistic crime scene investigation scenarios. The training complex will provide an area to practice search techniques in and out of buildings, a booby-trap room, and a vehicle stop area for checkpoint training. The curriculum is being further modified to include vehicle patrol tactics and foot patrol tactics.

IPS family members are frequent targets for intimidation and violence by insurgents. Trainees need to be aware of personal security issues and how to protect their families. IPs are vulnerable when transiting to and from work and when patrolling and manning check points.

**Transition Integration Program**

One of the challenges of building a viable police force was to retrain the veteran policemen who served during the Saddam Hussein era. This group must be retrained with the objective of instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and
democratic policing principles. To achieve this goal, CPATT implemented an in-service training program called the Transition Integration Program (TIP). The program also incorporates attention to applicable Iraqi criminal law and procedures to be observed for arrest and detention. Additionally, the TIP was designed to accomplish several other key tasks:

- Identify existing IPS personnel who were academically, intellectually, or morally unsuitable;
- Identify potential leaders within the IPS; and
- Identify potential IPS instructors and field training officers.

TIP training takes place at Coalition forward operating bases (FOBs) and at some of the regional academies. The course is three weeks long and covers 126 hours of instruction. Course subjects include: (1) the philosophy and role of the IPS, (2) prohibitions against torture, (3) police ethics and values, and (4) the code of conduct. About one third of the course time is devoted to firearms instruction on 9mm and AK–47 weaponry.

As of late April this year, 35,526 IPS veterans had completed the TIP program. The program, however, is not without its critics. For example, the Chief of Police at al-Hillah would like to replace the three week TIP course with a longer in-service course that would encompass map reading, hostage rescue, night tactics, etc. As in the case of basic training, the argument is for hands-on training as opposed to the more theoretical approach of the present TIP program.

The IG Team concludes that the TIP program is a worthwhile and value-added endeavor. By definition, TIP training is for in-service IPs, and satisfies one of the MOI’s objectives. Many policemen who have attended the course appear to be well motivated and dedicated to the concept of a rule of law regime at the service of Iraqi citizens. The TIP training imparts skills directly relevant to those objectives. How and whether the TIP program, per se, continues will depend in part on the changes proposed by the Minister of Interior.

**Specialized Police Training**

As currently organized, there are several specialized forces within the IPS. These include the Public Order Brigades (POB) and the 8th Mechanized Police Brigade, collectively termed the “Civil Intervention Force” (CIF). Additional specialized forces are the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP), Provincial SWAT Teams, and the Special Police Commandos.

The CIF is a Coalition-initiated, high end, national level, civil intervention force trained to secure large geographic areas by using military tactics. The CIF is activated to restore order in cities where the police have become totally ineffective.

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26 The TIP was conceptualized by ICITAP in the fall of 2002 during an assessment of the police in Kabul, Afghanistan. In June of 2003 the ICITAP Iraq team adapted the TIP for members of the then fledgling Iraqi Police Service.
Civil Intervention Forces (CIF)

The Public Order Brigades and the Mechanized Police Brigade are national level resources designed to counter large-scale civil disobedience and insurgency activities. Although initiated by the Coalition, the Iraqi government has sanctioned and accepted sponsorship of these units by virtue of their capability to quell large-scale insurrection. The POBs have been deployed throughout the country and have proven particularly valuable in providing security in large communities where police functions have failed. The Iraqi intention is to train four POBs, each consisting of three battalions of 400 personnel each.

POB training is accomplished through classroom instruction, outside drills, and practical applications with extensive weapons and tactics exercises. Law enforcement training is limited to police ethics and use of force continuum. A majority of the POB recruits are neither IPs nor graduates of a police academy. POB units have successfully deployed and participated in counterinsurgency operations. However, the IG Team concludes that the modest training they receive in law enforcement is insufficient to their future integration into and identity with the IPS.

Emergency Response Unit

The ERU provides a high-end, national-level, law enforcement tactical unit capability for high-risk search, arrest, hostage rescue, and crisis response operations. Consisting of just over 370 personnel, the ERU is a Coalition-initiated capability that has not been sanctioned or supported by the Iraqi government. As a result, ERU members are not on the MOI payroll, nor do they have police credentials or weapons authorization cards. There are currently three ERU companies, with a fourth serving as a headquarters company. Despite non-sponsorship by the MOI, elements of the ERU have successfully participated in several high-level missions with remarkable results. Like the POBs, the ERU companies train and deploy as a unit. Camaraderie,

Figure 5. ERU battalion in battle equipment

27 POBs have been successfully deployed to Fallujah, Samarra, Mosul, and areas of Baghdad to restore order.

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morale, and esprit-de-corps are high, despite severe pay issues. Nevertheless, given the lack of sponsorship, attrition is a problem.

The ERU units have no element responsible for gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence. Students interviewed by the IG Team stated that the ERU relies on US Special Forces for operational intelligence. This intelligence data is filtered through the MOI, an unwieldy and time consuming process. Formal sponsorship and integration of the ERU within existing IPS structures would serve to alleviate this problem. Recommendation 4 addresses this issue.

ERU cadets receive limited basic police training followed by an additional four-week advanced/specialized course of instruction. Most of the cadets had not gone through basic police training prior to attending the ERU course.

**Recommendation 12**: Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering POB or ERU training. An in-service police training program should be developed for “currently serving” POB and ERU members who are not graduates of a police academy. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with the MOI.)

*Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP)*

The BDP’s mission is to protect and safeguard high level government officials and visiting dignitaries. So far, 395 candidates have completed training. There is no requirement for members of the BDP to be policemen or to have previously received basic police training. BDP agents have no arrest powers, nor do they carry police credentials or weapons’ permits. The MOI does not recognize the BDP.

Students undergoing BDP training generally are selected from the guarded dignitary’s family and/or tribe. Based on this selection criterion

![Figure 6. BDP students simulate dignitary cordon protection](OIG photo)

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29 At the time of this assessment, pay for these candidates was five months in arrears. Many have quit or dropped out. The training contractor has tried to provide temporary relief to the trainees by paying each a $75/month stipend.
many of the trained BDP personnel will be replaced with the April 2005 change in government leadership. Incumbents to office will select their own trusted agents and relatives to serve in this capacity.

Provincial Special Weapons and Tactics (P–SWAT)

Provincial Special Weapons and Tactics (P–SWAT) teams provide a provincial-level, high-end, rapid-response, tactical unit responsible for high-risk arrest and hostage rescue under the direct authority of the city police chiefs. The teams fall under the operational control of the regional chiefs of police and are therefore more responsive than the ERU to emerging regional situations.

These are 27-member teams consisting of a command group, an entry group and an assault team. Recruits for P–SWAT training and qualification come from the IPS ranks in the provinces wherein the team is assigned. As of this report, seven teams have been trained. The P–SWAT program suffers from recruiting and attrition problems, issues that are being being addressed by CPATT.

Advanced Training

Coalition military forces are the mainstay of security in Iraq, a situation likely to pertain for some time. Conceptually, full law and order responsibilities eventually will devolve to the IPS. To accomplish that goal, IPS training must expand beyond the basic level and include in-depth police science instruction. To address this requirement, CPATT has developed advanced training courses, mostly conducted at the Adnan Palace in Baghdad.29 Students in these courses are officers with the rank of lieutenant and above. Most of the officers are from the Baghdad area and commute daily from their homes. Problematic security en route results in sometimes-spotty attendance.

The IPS nominates candidates for advanced training. An IPS major general, detailed to work with CPATT at Adnan Palace, gets the course schedules. He, in turn, sends a letter to the MOI’s “Board of Training,” which then selects the police officers to attend.

Critics within CPATT and among some instructors assert that the MOI’s selection of candidates appears to be based more on cronyism and loyalties than on merit. For some attendees, the courses are regarded as a reward, not as a serious professional commitment. The IPS major general at Adnan Palace is among those who urge incorporation of more rigorous testing as courses progress. He believes that is the only way to get and keep the students’ attention.

Department of Justice (DOJ) instructors for specialized courses at the Adnan Palace include professionals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the Drug Enforcement

29 Some courses are also taught at Irbil in northern Iraq.
Administration (DEA). Coordination of these efforts in Iraq is done by ICITAP officials within CPATT.

Members of the IG Team observed a class on fingerprinting taught by FBI Agents. The session was a lecture only using a Power Point projector. There were no associated practical exercises. The students seemed attentive and class participation was good. As usual, the pace of instruction in class tended to move slowly because of the need for an interpreter. A practical exercise in fingerprinting would have better clarified the concepts, providing greater student involvement, making the class more interesting, and holding the attention of the students.

**Ad Hoc Training Programs/Individual Initiatives**

Conceptually, all basic training in Iraq as well as at JIPTC is standardized. However, in reality, each of the academy directors has had previous police experience. Not surprisingly, the director often has a strong personal view as to what training is most relevant, which topics should take priority, and which courses will have the most time allocated. This natural inclination to modify the established training has caused variations in the curriculum where no two academies teach the same subject matter in the same way. An Iraqi General at the Basrah Academy commented that instructors from different nations teach similar courses in different ways. This echoes what the IG Team learned at JIPTC and is indicative of using a multinational training staff representing different traditions and backgrounds.

The IG Team endorses MNSTC–I and CPATT efforts to ensure common basic training throughout the system. At the same time, there is room for individual initiatives in meeting special or unique training needs. However, when significant variation in instructional methodology occurs, CPATT headquarters should be apprised of its existence and the rationale for the variance.

**Recommendation 13:** Contractual arrangements with expatriate instructors should specify that individually devised training courses will be submitted in advance for consideration and possible approval by MNSTC–I and CPATT. (Action: MNSTC–I.)
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Chapter 3: Post-Training Issues

Measuring Results

It is difficult to assess the results of Coalition training programs. A major inhibiting factor is the lack of any system by which to track graduates, an issue addressed elsewhere in this report.

A number of American and other expatriate interlocutors express doubts about the effectiveness of the IP training program:

- “. . . we are preparing them (the IP) for failure....”
- it is “. . . widely perceived that the police are under-trained and underpaid....”

In several conversations with the IG Team, CPATT and Embassy officials outlined the need to rebuild “failed forces” such as those in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, sections of Baghdad, and Mosul where IP units had “completely collapsed” under attack.

The International Police Liaison Officers’ (IPLOs) daily reports chronicle disturbing accounts of instances in which IPS personnel are not professional in the performance of their duties. There are frequent reports of breakdowns in discipline, feuds among police units, and prisoner abuse. In the absence of viable tracking systems, the IG Team is not able to determine whether or to what degree Coalition-trained police may be perpetrators of such actions. The failure to impose proper discipline rests with IPS leaders (some of whom have been directly, even violently, involved in the unseemly questionable incidents). The examples set by poor leaders for Coalition-trained personnel (mostly new recruits) bode ill.

Counter to negative reports are the positive accolades related to (1) the IP’s commendable performance during the January 30 elections, (2) their notable visibility on the streets, and (3) the rising public confidence in the IPS. Such indicators underscore the broader achievements of the training programs. Whatever the problems and misgivings, there is consensus that the IPS is improving and is more capable because of Coalition training.

In the absence of incorporating a useful, individual tracking system within the MOI and the possibility of a more robust mentoring system, the best—arguably the only—available measure of success of the training programs is the day-to-day performance of the cops on the “beat.”

Leakage: Trainees Who Do Not Enter Police Ranks

Since inception of the Coalition training effort, a nettlesome issue has been the fact that some graduates do not enter the IPS after completing training. Keeping track of the numbers trained but not assigned is an elusive problem. Some U.S. sources assert that
the number might be as high as a third or more of those who have gone through basic training.

The causes for this ‘leakage’ are multiple. An undetermined number of those trained simply disappear from CPATT or MOI visibility. The ‘no-show’ motivations apparently range from family or tribal pressures through offers of other employment to fear of entering what is obviously a very dangerous profession. At least as troublesome is the failure of the MOI to employ graduates. The IG Team credits reports that some returnees report to police stations only to be turned away on the pretext that the relevant police chief did not recruit them, and therefore has no obligation to put them on the force. This aspect is most pronounced in relation to trainees from JIPTC.

Although some ‘wastage’ is reasonable to anticipate, efforts to minimize the problem are needed. The Team suggests that the MOI should establish a documentation file on each candidate prior to the start of training. Such a measure should define MOI’s commitment to hire the person upon completion of training. Another measure is the issuance of Police identification cards, which should be completed in five to six months.

**Recommendation 14:** A non-binding agreement should be negotiated by the U.S. Government with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that specifies that only applicants in possession of MOI-issued identification cards, explicitly stating that the bearer is a member of the IPS, will be accepted for training by the Coalition. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.)

As a response to the pressing need to quantify and rationalize the number of active duty police, the MOI (with MNSTC–I support and assistance) has created a Qualifying Committee (QC) to gather biometric data which can be used to maintain a census and demography of the ministry. Theoretically, the QC process will enable the MOI to identify those who should be removed from the payrolls. Likewise, the process should create a database for use in personnel tracking. The QC vetted over 55,000 records as of March 2005, and another 37,000 were in process at the time of this assessment. Since the effort began in September 2004, the QC had completed the first round of collection in 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Officials plan to establish a few permanent data collection sites in these provinces.

**Police Partnership Programs**

In an effort to maintain momentum on rebuilding failed IPS forces, CPATT developed, with MOI concurrence, a Police Partnership Program (P3). The plan embeds military and IPLO teams within the ministry, in provincial police headquarters, and at police stations in the cities where the IPS failed (e.g., parts of Baghdad, Mosul, Samara and Fallujah). The principal function of the P3 teams is to provide hands-on leadership. One of the key elements of this program is to identify leaders within the IPS and MOI, and assist those

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30 In view of deep-rooted family and tribal loyalties, the IG Team concludes that purging of MOI rolls is an objective difficult to achieve.
leaders fight the insurgency. As such, P3 is a natural extension of mentoring and a means to help develop IPS leaders.

A pilot P3 program became operational recently in Baghdad. The initial results reported to the command were very positive and measurable in assessing the development of the IPS as they progress toward a self-sustaining institution.

At provincial police headquarters, the P3 teams assist senior IPS officers learn decision making skills. These P3 teams consist of subject matter experts who support their IPS units in nine functional areas:

- intelligence
- operations and plans
- personnel administration
- logistics
- finance & contracts
- counter-insurgency
- special police operations
- communications
- training

Team leaders coordinate efforts to foster good policing. P3 teams coordinate security and transportation arrangements with the local Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Team leaders are charged with cultivating productive interpersonal relations with the IPS leadership.

**Equipment and Readiness**

In addition to training, the Coalition forces are providing equipment for the IPS. Since June 2004, MNSTC–I has facilitated the distribution of equipment to Iraqi security forces. MNSTC–I has simplified the process for equipping the police. Establishing requirements via a TO&E is a critical first step in identifying the readiness state of IPS elements. To transfer “on-hand” data to a TO&E would be a difficult task given the security situation. Nevertheless, it is essential in order to gain proper visibility and control over equipment needs and distribution.

**Recommendation 15:** Tables of Organization and Equipment should be developed for police stations and deployable police units throughout the country. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI.)

The numbers of participants involved in training and equipping the police, plus the problems associated with corruption in the system, often mean that equipment needs are

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31 In addition to MNSTC-I logistics resources, IPS police stations frequently receive ammunition and weapons directly from the Major Subordinate Commands.
disproportionately met. This variance is apparent at the recruit training centers. At the Baghdad Police College, for example, recruit graduates are issued the 9 mm Glock sidearm upon completion of training, a practice no longer observed at JIPTC.  

Clearly there is a need to standardize issuance of equipment. While the IG Team did not specifically examine the process by which the Coalition supplies the IPS, we were informed that IPS units have routinely received equipment and supplies, in many instances, from various Coalition sources outside a structured tracking system. The question of accountability for controlled equipment is particularly critical. The availability of weapons, ammunition, and explosive materials is a major factor in the prevailing security environment. The specter of weapons issued to members of the IPS but falling into the wrong hands is a concern. Both the Military Police (MPs) and IPLOs work to inculcate the principles of accountability when they visit IPS units.

**Recommendation 16:** Coalition authorities should establish internal control mechanisms to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the IPS. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and MNC–I and in consultation with MOI.)

The MOI has no centralized readiness reporting system for police units that includes equipment status, nor is there in place an automated database system with which senior management can monitor equipment issues. A basic command and control system is being established to connect police stations to their regional command centers, thence to a national monitoring system. When operational, this will be a major tool for improving effectiveness of the IPS.

Under CPATT guidance, IPLOs and MPs periodically complete IPS Facility Assessment Forms for each police station visited. When completed, these forms provide extensive information on the manning, training, and equipment status for each site visited. Thus far, only a small fraction of the estimated 940 police stations have been assessed using this tool.

As the Coalition seeks to transfer complete responsibility for IPS manning, training, and equipping to the Iraqi government, it seems reasonable to accelerate development of a functional IPS Readiness Reporting System. The inherent utility of the Facility Assessment Form (or similar form) is obvious and it can be used to support a Readiness Reporting System.

With the deployment of Police Partnership Program (P3) teams to the provinces and within MOI, CPATT has an opportunity to assist in developing a readiness reporting system as a means for tracking the status of IPS preparedness. Coalition teams can coordinate efforts to demonstrate the usefulness of a readiness reporting tool throughout the IPS command structure. Iraqi understanding and acceptance of accurate and timely

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32 Apparently BPC issues the weapons as a motivational tool, a reward for successful completion of the training course. The practice was discontinued at JIPTC when it was determined that many of the JIPTC graduates were not subsequently employed as policemen. Anecdotally, many of those who were employed supposedly had to surrender their weapon to senior officers for their personal use.
reporting requirements are crucial. Development of a readiness reporting methodology that embraces Iraqi input would ensure sustained ownership of the system.

**Recommendation 17:** Coalition resources, in close coordination with counterparts in the MOI and IPS, should develop an operational IPS Readiness Reporting System for the MOI. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI.)

**Mentoring**

A strong mentoring program is integral to the concept of training Iraqi police. Initially, this was to be the function of IPLO field training officers, each working closely with a small number of policemen who had received basic training. This concept would mirror a model that worked satisfactorily in Bosnia and Kosovo. INL contracted with DynCorp to provide the IPLOs. The first 24-member contingent arrived in Iraq during November 2003. Most IPLOs are retired policemen. By March 2005, this number had risen to about 500 (Figure 7 below). INL has proposed funding for an additional 400 IPLOs.

In actuality, the mentoring program in Iraq has not materialized as planned. The security situation is so precarious that any post-training mentoring is, at best, intermittent. There have been periods during which the IPLOs were unable to move beyond the confines of their quarters. Consequently, IPLO interaction with Iraqi policemen is largely with instructors/supervisors at the BPC and regional academies or during periodic visits to police stations. To accomplish the latter, the IPLOs must rely on Coalition military forces for transportation and security. The military police (MP) who provide that logistical assistance act as additional mentors once on site.

As the security situation has evolved, so has the work of the IPLOs. IPLOs now devote much of their time and attention to assessing police stations and units. There, the IPLOs gather data on equipment status and availability, discipline problems, and reports of incidents involving the IPS. This is documented in Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMR), which are derived from the Facility Assessment Forms prepared by MPs and IPLOs. In theory, this information will enable the MOI to more effectively manage both personnel and material resources of the IPS.

Lines of authority and responsibility for mentoring are not well defined. As the contract administrator, INL has administrative responsibility for the IPLO program. This includes providing life support (e.g., food and lodging, basic security, etc.). CPATT provides operational control. However, Coalition military officials tend to rely on MPs for the mentoring function. Consequently, the IPLOs are sometimes underutilized.

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33 As of 1 May 2005, the IPLOs were assigned as follows: Region I - Baghdad (98), Region II – Tikrit (94), Region III – Mosul (30), Region IV – Ramadi (34), Region V – Babylon (43), Region VI – Basrah (24), with the CPATT command staff (9), National Assets Bureau (75), Administrative Bureau (26) and various other areas (63).

34 On March 9, 2005— during the course of this assessment—a massive suicide truck bomb targeted the al-Sadeer Hotel in Baghdad. Thirty-five IPLOs were injured, the most serious casualty with the loss of an eye.
Recommendation 18: Coalition commanders should conduct a requirements analysis to determine the number of IPLOs who can be gainfully engaged under prevailing circumstances and adjust the number of these mentors accordingly. (MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

Recommendation 19: Standard operating procedures should be developed for the IPLOs, to define the relationships and responsibilities among the police liaison officers and military police. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)
Chapter 4: Looking Ahead

Whither the Jordan International Police Training Center

With modest exceptions, recruiting non-American, international police instructors to work inside Iraq is difficult. From the outset, an important objective was to involve as many governments as possible in the IPS coalition training process. Consequently, the training center was established outside Iraq and in Amman, Jordan.

Negotiations between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Public Security Department (PSD) of Jordan cleared the way for creation of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Upon the June 2004 transition from the CPA to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), U.S. Government stewardship of this Center devolved to the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). Thereafter, the agreement was renegotiated on a government-to-government basis between the U.S. and Jordan.\footnote{“Letter of Agreement between The Government of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and The Government of the United States of America Concerning the Training of Iraqi Police in Jordan,” signed September 24, 2004.}

On April 18, 2003, INL awarded a contract to DynCorp International. Initially conceived to be the mechanism via which to employ IPLOs, the contract evolved and assigned to DynCorp the responsibility for construction, operation, and maintenance of a training center at Muwwaqqar, about thirty miles northeast of Amman.

Figure 8. Aerial view of Jordan International Police Training Center
(Courtesy: JIPTC)
Amman, Jordan (Figure 8).\textsuperscript{36} Construction began in the fall of 2003, and the facility was up and running within three weeks. The first class of 456 Iraqi cadets arrived in November 2003. As of the time of this assessment, the U.S.-incurred costs for this remarkable accomplishment were $89,558,000 in completed construction and $98,110,000 in operating and maintenance costs (O&M) between November 2003 and January 2005. In addition, $15,970,000 will be spent on pending construction.\textsuperscript{37} By present agreement, JIPTC is to revert to full and direct Jordanian ownership around February 2006, when it is anticipated the original goal to train 32,000 Iraqis at JIPTC will be met.\textsuperscript{38}

As noted previously, insofar as is possible, MOI’s strong preference is to conduct as much IP training as possible inside Iraq. Another dynamic is MOI’s decision to discontinue training of raw recruits in favor of in-service training. These considerations drive resource implications for JIPTC, even if training of Iraqis at that venue continues for some time. That, in turn, will entail development of different curricula and, conceivably, recruiting instructors with skills different than those presently engaged.

The IG Team concludes that as the MOI assumes increasing responsibility for and control of the programs, use of JIPTC facilities for training of Iraqi cadets may be discontinued altogether. Any such decision by the MOI would raise multiple concerns. The involvement in IP training by some Coalition partners—importantly to include Jordan—would be at risk. Despite a history of often-troubled bilateral relations between Baghdad and Amman, the Jordanians arguably are the non-Iraqi Arabs most supportive of efforts to stabilize the situation in Iraq. The political legitimacy and outreach of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) will be diminished if other governments withdraw from participation at JIPTC.

**Recommendation 20:** The Department of State must keep Coalition governments apprised of developments at JIPTC, specifically those that relate to provision of training staff at that facility. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Under any anticipated scenario, future utilization of the JIPTC facility will come into focus when the targeted goal of 32,000 Iraqis complete training there. Some consideration is being given to transforming the facility into a regional International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), similar to those established in Hungary, Botswana, and Thailand. The permissive operating environment in Jordan has obvious merit, as does proximity to regional governments that might want to send trainees there. Conversion of JIPTC concomitantly would give the U.S. Government a better return on its investment.

\textsuperscript{36} The State Department OIG conducted a contract procurement audit of this contract (AUD/IQO-04-47, September 2004).

\textsuperscript{37} Figures supplied by JIPTC. Without reflecting additional expenditures (e.g. post January, 2005 O&M costs), the costs—assuming achievement of the JIPTC goal of 32,000—would be about $6,364 per trainee.

\textsuperscript{38} During fieldwork for this assessment, negotiations were undertaken to extend the U.S – Jordanian agreement through June 2006. Concurrently, plans were in train to recruit international instructors for that extended program duration.
Informal soundings indicate that the Government of Jordan may be amenable to such a proposal.

**Recommendation 21:** The Department of State should decide whether and where an ILEA should be established in the Middle East. If Jordan is selected as a venue, negotiations for such a transformation of JIPTC should proceed quickly. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

One of the issues particularly vexing in relation to training at JIPTC is the MOI’s frequent tardiness in paying the cadets. By agreement, cadets are paid after the first four weeks of instruction and upon graduation. The failure of the MOI to forward salary funding on a timely basis (and, hence, JIPTC’s inability to pay the cadets) has prompted serious disturbances. To forestall such incidents, INL on seven occasions (prior to mid-April 2005) ‘advanced’ funds against an MOI commitment to reimburse the amounts. MOI did not provide funds to cover salary payments due on April 24 and 26, 2005. Hence, JIPTC requested an advance of $429,350 to cover those costs. That brought MOI arrearages to approximately $840,000. Although INL staff has concluded that the procedure is permissible, this episodic financial exposure and vulnerability incurred by INL is troubling.

To address this problem, the JIPTC Director is pressing to have MOI make the second payment when the trainee returns to Iraq. Such a solution would help solve the tracking problem previously discussed and establish a procedure for enrolling graduates on the IPS roster. This procedural improvement should be pursued. It only partially addresses the problem, since MOI delinquency in making the first salary payments might still occur.

**Recommendation 22:** Coalition commanders should obtain from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior a written commitment to assume responsibility for direct payment of the salaries of Iraqis trained by the Coalition at JIPTC. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad, and in consultation with MOI)

Coordination between CPATT officials and JIPTC staff considerably improved with the assignment of a CPATT liaison officer in early 2005. High-ranking MNSTC–I and CPATT officials visit JIPTC with some frequency, normally to attend graduation ceremonies. Although some JIPTC instructors and staff desire more feedback from Iraq, the IG Team was impressed with the constructive dialogue among stakeholders.

Even so, it is difficult for JIPTC instructors to fully relate to the circumstances that will confront trainees once they are full-fledged members of the IPS. Direct exposure by International Police Trainers (IPTs) to the ‘street situation’ in Iraq would be of significant value. JIPTC leaders are pursuing the concept of an exchange of instructors to achieve that end. Not all of the 16 governments presently represented among the JIPTC staff will permit members of their respective contingents to go to Iraq. Individual instructors also may not be willing to do so. However, the IG Team strongly endorses this initiative.
Guiding the Ministry of Interior on Target

The lack of SOPs and utilization of even basic information technology hampers the MOI ability to manage the IPS. High on the list is the need for a centralized, computerized financial management and personnel system.

During the CPA period, Coalition officials—primarily Americans—were de facto ministers throughout the Iraqi governmental structure. With the June 2004 transition to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was created within Embassy Iraq.39 As Iraqi officials assumed leadership of ministries, the CPA-appointed officials ceded place to IRMO advisors. As with many CPA advisors, the latter are appointed as ‘3161’ U.S. Government employees.40

Establishing and maintaining internal security remains the top priority of both the Coalition and the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). It follows that assigning advisors to the MOI commands more IRMO personnel resources than any other area of governance. IRMO staffing plans provide fifty-one ‘3161’ personnel to the MOI. In practice, only thirty-five are assigned—still the largest number of advisors within any Iraqi ministry. The IRMO senior advisor and his immediate staff have offices collocated with one of those of the Minister of Interior. At the time of this assessment (with the IIG still in place), that advisor met with the Minister on a daily basis, sometimes several times each day. The advisor’s focus appropriately was on broad policy issues, to include those relative to police training.

While the work of the senior advisor has been very important and largely successful, the IG Team perceives that IRMO assistance to the MOI should advance to more technical levels.

At present, the MOI personnel management system is conceptually centralized, but lacks key feedback mechanisms. The system is not computerized, nor does the system deal with payroll issues. Personnel and payroll are interrelated functions, but are handled independently. Payroll is managed on a manual, ledger basis. Data collected by the Qualifying Committee will be grist for developing modern payroll and personnel administration within the ministry.

The assignment of advisors to the MOI must match mutually perceived needs and capabilities. The IG Team shares a view expressed frequently by Coalition and Embassy Baghdad officials that the greatest immediate need is for assistance in technical areas. However, as on other issues involving interaction on police training, the requirements for advisors to the MOI must be defined in close consultation with ITG officials.

39 IRMO is conceived as a temporary organization. The office is under authority of the Chief of Mission.
40 Section 3161 of 5 U.S.C. provides for the establishment of temporary organizations under law or executive order, exempt from federal employee hiring requirements, e.g., classification and competition.
Recommendation 23: Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and consultation with MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 24: Top priority should be given to recruiting ‘3161’ personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then to assigning a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Embassy Baghdad through IRMO.)

Elsewhere in this report is a discussion of the Qualifying Committee (QC), the joint Coalition/MOI effort to establish baselines for MOI employees. As of March 2005, the QC process had collected data on about 92,000 MOI employees in 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.

Presumably the majority of those on whom data is collected are members of the IPS. Once organized and readily accessible, this material will enable the MOI manage the force in terms of assignments, promotion, discipline, mentoring, and additional training. So long as the Coalition and/or Embassy Baghdad are involved in police training, it is imperative to have access to such information. Equally important is the need for SOPs for IPS personnel administration.

Recommendation 25: Embassy Baghdad should obtain from the MOI a written commitment to assure Coalition authorities can access data relevant to tracking and mentoring IPS personnel trained in U.S. Government-funded programs. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 26: Coalition and MOI officials should develop standard operating procedures for personnel administration of the Iraqi Police Service. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

Intra-USG Coordination

Disregarding, for the moment, international participation in Iraq’s security development, the complex interrelationships of U.S.-only organizations involved in developing a viable IPS are daunting and problematic. The resources being invested in developing security within Iraq and the importance attached to that effort require harmonious and close working relationships among the various USG agencies concerned. Thus far, coordination among agencies has been collegial.

Part of the problem is the number and variety of participants. NSPD–36 gives the DoD lead responsibility in rebuilding the IPS. However, DoD must solicit assistance from other agencies that specialize in nation-building activities. For reconstitution of police functions in a nation-building scenario, the DoD must rely on the expertise resident in other agencies. These agencies include the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). Additionally,
consultants from the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) serve an important advisory role in assisting the Ministry of Interior develop policy and processes for the IPS.

To focus the overall security training and equipping effort in Iraq, DoD established the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq. Under MNSTC–I, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) has the lead for police issues.

ICITAP has continuously engaged the Iraq police training issue since early 2003. They have an active voice in policy issues by virtue of maintaining a presence on the CPATT staff. Such is not the case with INL. Organizationally, INL maintains a separate two-person office in Embassy Baghdad providing administrative support for contracted IPLOs in Iraq, but they are on the periphery of the in-country decision-making team.

Institutional and philosophical differences in approach exist between MNSTC–I and INL with regard to training police. INL (and ICITAP too for that matter) views police training as a subset of an overarching criminal justice, institutional development continuum. Theirs is a long-term view. They recognize the critical importance of developing a transparent, community policing function that is intimately linked to the court and prison systems. INL knows that when the military mission is completed, the police development mission will revert to them.

In contrast, MNSTC–I has a more short-term view. As a military organization, MNSTC–I is interested in completing the mission; at the moment that mission is to train, equip, and deploy 135,000 IPs. The military metric for success is “hitting the number.” Thus, the sooner the mission is completed, the sooner success is attained.

The IG Team recognizes the value an outside voice brings to the spirit of debate. However, the team is convinced that the interests of all parties would be better served if INL were represented “within” the organization responsible for mission accomplishment. Given the eventual transition of responsibility, from DoD to DoS, for U.S. involvement in Iraqi police training coordination, active INL engagement at the appropriate level within the Coalition military establishment would be especially valuable in developing plans for that changeover.

**Recommendation 27:** The Department of State should assign one or more INL officers to work directly within CPATT to ensure INL perspectives are considered in the development of the IPS. (Action: Department of State in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and MNSTC-I.)

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41 One of the principal deputy commanders at CPATT is from ICITAP.
Coordination between the trainers and war fighters within the MNF–I family is an issue. Figure 9 above reflects the top-level command relationships within MNF–I with respect to police training. Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) exercises tactical command over the military Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), but MNSTC–I must coordinate through the MSCs to obtain police recruits, to obtain IP station assessments, and, in some cases, to have the regional MPs provide local police training. The MP Brigade in the Baghdad area worked very closely with CPATT/MNSTC–I to provide services and assistance to the local police. But service provided in distant provinces is often “hit-and-miss” and not coordinated through a single command structure. This is evident in the shotgun approach to equipment issuance. There is no single source for equipping the Iraqi police. Sometimes they receive their supplies from MSC sources, at other times from MNSTC–I sources. The establishment of the Provincial Police Partnership Teams should help to alleviate this problem.

**Toward Disengagement: Transitioning Police Training to the Iraqis**

Unless and until the Iraqi government, through the MOI, takes full “ownership” of the IP training program, the Coalition will fall short in helping to create an effective police force, with the attendant result of prolonged military deployment in country. Transfer of ownership to the Iraqi government will involve more than the mere development of

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42 The Major Subordinate Commanders exercise control over the six major geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) within Iraq.
police infrastructure and processes, but a deliberate effort to have the Iraqis make the
decisions about its police force structure and the training attendant to it.

Perhaps the first and most obvious step in migrating control of the police training
function to the Iraqi government is to ensure they are completely engaged in decisions
about their training today. This has not always been the case. Heretofore, Coalition
process has followed the example set by the CPA—directing by decree rather than
collaborative engagement. A senior CPATT official told the IG Team, “…many of us do
not realize that CPA has gone away. We have not asked the Iraqis what they want or
need.” This attitude is evident in Coalition initiatives to establish, under the MOI, the
Emergency Response Unit (ERU) or the Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP). The
MOI was not consulted on their development, disavows ownership of them, and provides
only grudging support. Referring to Coalition-initiated police units, the same CPATT
interlocutor continued, “…the MOI was not engaged, does not want them. We are
interfering with their sense of operations/order.”

MNSTC–I and CPATT have made positive strides in this area. They have meetings with
Iraqi counterparts regarding training issues on a daily basis. CPATT has assigned a large
number of its personnel to act as consultants, in coordination with IRMO, to various parts
of the Ministry of Interior. They are also integral parts of the Police Partnership Teams
assigned to the MOI.

As responsibility for police training moves to the Iraqi government, the Coalition needs
to shift correspondingly into a strictly support role. This can be accomplished by
continuing to provide policy advisory services through IRMO and sustained manning of
the P3 or similar programs.

The “handoff” of responsibility for IPS training and force development will be a process,
not an event. Attention must be given to formulating—in close consultation with Iraqi
counterparts—an agreed upon plan for that process. The relegation of responsibility for
police training need not be limited to the upper level management of the MOI in
Baghdad. Coalition planners should recognize that ownership of portions of the overall
program can and should proceed at a different pace in different regions of the country.
Security within the Kurdish region, for example, is already sufficiently developed that
Coalition military involvement in IP recruiting and training can be significantly reduced.
Similarly, some areas in southern Iraq are adequately stabilized to the point where a
move toward complete Iraqi responsibility for training may be accelerated.

**Recommendation 28:** MNSTC–I should perform an assessment of security and IPS
infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where additional
responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police. (Action:
MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI.)

As Iraqi leadership assumes more responsibility for the planning and operation of the IPS
training and force development process, great care must be exercised to allow them the
leeway to use their own initiative and allow them to occasionally “fail.” Achieving the
delicate balance between support and dependency is crucial to developing a robust system capable of operating on its own.

Future U.S. Involvement in Police Training

At an unspecified date, responsibility for U.S. interaction with the Iraqi government on security matters is to shift from the DoD to DoS.\(^{43}\) The Secretaries of State and Defense are to determine the timing of that transition. The IG Team subscribes to the proposition that this shift will depend on when Iraq emerges from the existing environment of conflict. Nevertheless, it is timely to plan for the post-conflict role for the U.S. Government in organizing, equipping, and training the Iraqi security forces, specifically the IPS.

In relation to the IPS, shifting direct authority to the Secretary of State and Chief of Mission (COM) will entail a corollary transfer of responsibility from MNSTC–I and CPATT to INL. Previous extensive INL experience in conducting police training, buttressed by a supporting role in present IPS programs in Iraq, prefigures what should be a smooth transition.

Issues to be addressed in anticipation of the changeover include the nature of future engagement (e.g., whether this will entail instruction by U.S. Government employees and, if so, how many). Similarly, if INL-supervised training is to be performed by personnel from other agencies (notably, Department of Justice ICITAP, ATF, or FBI employees) or by contractors, preliminary plans should define issues such as numbers required, tours of duty, etc. The presumption of a non-conflict environment (or much lower level of violence than at present) does not preclude the necessity to project security-related requirements that will devolve to the Department of State as Coalition military forces draw down.

Recommendation 29: The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. The working group should identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DoD to DoS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF–I, MNSTC–I, and INL.)

Logically, control over funds appropriated for programs relevant to U.S. Government involvement in IPS programs should rest with the Department responsible for those programs. Nonetheless, legislation under consideration states that such control will remain with the Department of Defense. Whether or not that formulation prevails, preparation of interdepartmental agreements on responsibility for financial management (specifically to encompass internal controls) will make the transition of program responsibilities smoother.

\(^{43}\) NSPD-36 of May 11, 2004.
Recommendation 30: The Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), should prepare a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to define funding arrangements for future U.S. involvement in Iraqi Police Service-related programs. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Resource Management (RM) and Department of Defense’s Office of the Under Secretary for Policy in consultation with OMB.)
Chapter 5: Informal Recommendations

1. **Issue:** At JIPTC, one of the aspects of poor discipline is related to a misperception among cadets of what conditions/regulations pertain at that facility. For example, some of those interviewed by the IG Team expressed surprise at the fact that they are not permitted to leave the base. Others asserted that they had not been informed about limits on communicating with their families in Iraq, etc.

   **Recommendation:** Prior to departure from Iraq, JIPTC enrollees should be given orientation on living conditions, rules, and regulations that will form the framework of their experience while in Jordan. The orientation should be crafted by JIPTC staff, approved by CPATT, and conducted by IP personnel.

2. **Issue:** At each of the IP training facilities visited by the IG Team in Iraq, cadets are responsible for cleanliness and appearance of their barracks. In addition to instilling discipline and a sense of responsibility, this is cost effective. Contrarily, at JIPTC a commercial contractor performs these housekeeping chores.

   **Recommendation:** When and as permitted under the existing contract, trainees should be responsible for maintaining barracks at JIPTC, preferably monitored and enforced by Iraqi instructors or group captains.

3. **Issue:** Few among the cadre of international instructors speak Arabic. The need to work through consecutive interpretation using language assistants (LA) slows the process measurably. It also poses issues of quality of interpretation (depending on the skills of the respective LA) and the possibility that the LA, deliberately or inadvertently, takes over the function of the instructor. The need for interpretation could be reduced through greater use of audiovisual instruction (specifically on material such as Iraqi law).

   **Recommendation:** CPATT should work with the MOI to develop audiovisual presentations on select classroom topics. These materials should be narrated by Iraqis, thereby ensuring greater comprehension. With such audiovisual material presented to classes at all academies, an additional benefit would be standardization of instruction on these topics.

4. **Issue:** There is a widely held perception that the advanced courses for IP, most conducted at Adnan Palace in Baghdad, are too short in length and that numbers of candidates for these courses are selected by the MOI on non-merit criteria. The course content should also be under continuous review.

   **Recommendation:** CPATT should work with the MOI to establish formal criteria for IP nominations for advanced training and to assure concurrence on the content and duration of such training.
5. **Issue:** Corruption across the range of Iraqi officialdom is accepted, prima facie. The MOI and IP are far from immune. In interviews with the IG Team, several cadets said they had ‘paid’ agents to be enrolled in IP training. Other interlocutors were blunt in asserting that chiefs of police ‘take a cut’ from IP salaries. Some report that IP must buy weapons and ammunition.

**Recommendation:** Although U.S. Government officials cannot impose and enforce integrity on Iraqis, training courses should include units on ethics, anti-corruption, personal responsibility, principled governance, and recourse to units (e.g., the Commission on Public Integrity – CPI) charged with ferreting out corruption.

6. **Issue:** At JIPTC and other police academies, codes of conduct are distributed to cadets. The IG Team was informed that no such standardized guidelines exist for IP on the active duty force.

**Recommendation:** CPATT should work with the MOI to develop and disseminate a code of conduct for the IP.

7. **Issue:** A common complaint among IPLOs and some other expatriate instructors or mentors is that there is insufficient communications (especially feedback) from MNSTC–I and CPATT.

**Recommendation:** MNSTC–I and CPATT should consider more systematized ways of exchanging views with the IPLOs and other instructors or mentors.

8. **Issue:** At police stations visited by the IG Team, the IP concept of ‘community policing’ was equated with distribution of ‘goodies’ to people in the precincts. Since access to such material items was essentially that of Coalition forces, the IP regarded their role to be that of helping with the distribution. Suggestions that the IP have a capacity to do some things on their own (perform other community services—e.g. painting a school, cleaning up an open area, coaching sports, etc.) appeared novel to the IP.

**Recommendation:** CPATT should strengthen the community-policing segment in the training curricula and follow through with mentoring of the IP force. Actions to engage IP in community policing should be incorporated as an item for observation and recording in the IPLO Daily SITREPS submitted by MP and IPLO observers to CPATT.

9. **Issue:** There are between 750,000 to 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in Iraq. Because of the nature of their socio-economic situation, this segment of the population presents some special law and order challenges.

**Recommendation:** Coalition planners should ensure that the situation of refugees and IDP are discussed specifically in training classes dealing with human rights and community policing.
10. **Issue:** In the aftermath of a March 9 truck bomb that targeted the al-Sadeer Hotel in Baghdad, the Charge d’affaires visited the site and discussed issues with about 35 IPLOs. Among issues raised was the absence of SOPs for these liaison officers.

**Recommendation:** CPATT, in conjunction with INL and coordination with DynCorp, should develop and distribute SOPs for IPLOs working in Iraq. The SOPs should delineate responsibilities between MP and IPLO personnel who mentor IP and visit stations.

11. **Issue:** The MNC–I Corps Police Service Recruiting standard operating procedure (SOP), dated 21 January 2005, part 2 section 2c, states that “…MSCs *should* partner with their respective local IPS officials in submitting applicant information to obtain criminal history records.” Additionally, part 3 section 4c, of the SOP provides that, “…if practical, MSCs *should* perform their IPS recruiting program in combination with local IPS officials.” The use of the word *should* in this SOP implies MSC discretion as to whether or not to involve the IPS officials in recruiting and vetting.

**Recommendation:** The word *should* in the sections of the MNC–I Corps SOP mentioned above that pertain to partnering with Iraqis, needs to be replaced by the word *shall*.

12. **Issue:** There is no provision for night training for police at any of the recruit training academies. Assuming that much of the activity of insurgents and criminals occurs at night, there is a need for night training.

**Recommendation:** As part of its on-going reevaluation of the training curricula, CPATT should consider adding training modules on basic night operations at the recruit training sites.

13. **Issue:** Coalition-conducted basic training encompasses some testing, although geared to relatively low levels of comprehension. Even that modest process is not incorporated in advanced and specialized training—principally that conducted at Adnan Palace in Baghdad. Some interlocutors opined that incorporation of testing in those courses would enhance student attention to the subject matter at hand.

**Recommendation:** CPATT should consider and possibly incorporate appropriate testing in advanced and specialized training courses.

14. **Issue:** A marked lack of discipline is apparent among the recruits at several of the training sites. The use of properly trained Iraqi drill instructors would facilitate instilling discipline and help to create a sense of esprit-de-corps among the cadets.

**Recommendation:** In consultation with the MOI, CPATT should assess the discipline needs at each sponsored police training academy and develop appropriate plans and programs to ensure a properly trained, Iraqi drill instructor cadre is on hand to provide guidance and teach discipline to the trainees.
Appendix A — Scope and Methodology

This assessment was a self-initiated evaluation of the Coalition effort to train and develop the Iraqi Police Service. Our review focused on the plans and programs in place for training the Iraqi Police Service and an examination of the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between those Department of State and Department of Defense organizations responsible for developing, implementing, and conducting police training.

In accomplishing this assessment, we examined the MNF–I Campaign Plan and related orders dealing with Iraqi security training. We interviewed security policymakers and implementers of Iraqi police training in the United States as well as in Jordan and Iraq. We interviewed key members of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq, and the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, receiving numerous, comprehensive briefings from subject matter experts within those organizations. We observed basic, advanced, and specialized police training in Jordan and at various sites throughout Iraq. We interviewed International Police Trainers, International Police Liaison Officers, Iraqi governmental officials, Iraqi police instructors, Iraqi police recruits, and veteran policemen. During the course of fieldwork, we interviewed over 300 individuals involved in one aspect or another with Iraqi police training. Appendix C provides a listing of the key policymakers and organizations contacted during the course of this evaluation.

From October 2004 through February 2005, we researched available data in the Washington DC area. As part of early preparation, we convened a panel of subject matter experts on police training issues in December 2004. Between February 22 and March 5, 2005, we visited the Jordan International Police Training Center. Subsequently, we conducted fieldwork in Iraq from March 6 to March 27, 2005.

Limitations. This assessment was limited to those activities surrounding the training of the Iraqi police forces only with no intent to evaluate training for Dignitary Protection Services, Border Police, Facilities Protection Service, or Highway Patrol, except where training curricula and/or resources among these groups was shared with Iraqi police training. Notwithstanding shared resources, the final report of this project focuses only on training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service.

Standard. We performed this assessment in accordance with the standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency published in Quality Standards for Inspections,” January 2005.

Prior Coverage

During the past three years, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and General Accountability Office (GAO) have issued four reports relating to the Iraqi Police Service. The CPA report is not available online. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov.
CPA


GAO


Appendix B — History and Background of Iraqi Police

Police Training Under Saddam

Three levels of police existed under the previous regime: Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Assistant Officers, and Officers. At the most basic level, NCOs possessed little formal education, normally only completing primary school. When hired, they were trained within their provincial area in an unstructured program that could last up to three months. Standards and length of training varied widely from province to province. Upon graduation, NCOs were responsible for most of the daily contact with Iraqi citizens. NCOs were the first responders to calls for service and were responsible for dealing with disputes and for the maintenance of public order.

At the mid-grades, Assistant Officers completed secondary school education, usually from the Police High School, and then underwent on-the-job training. They were normally assigned to various administrative functions within the Iraqi Police Force. They would only respond to serious crimes and only in a supervisory capacity. Their duties usually consisted of administrative work for the Officer corps.

Officers were also secondary school graduates, but were further educated at the Police Professional College in Baghdad, undergoing a three-year course of instruction. Upon graduation, the Officers received the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree in police science; however, the curriculum was steeped in military doctrine and training. After graduation, the academy Officers were posted around the country and normally served in the assigned region for the rest of their careers. Traditional training in leadership, management, and command and staff functions was not institutionalized.

Police Training Developed Under Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took the first steps to assist the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in developing an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) that would be a respected force based on public trust and confidence. Creating this force from the brutal and corrupt remnants of the Saddam regime police would probably have required dissolution of the entire force and slow rebuilding into a force that echoed the new democratic ideals of Iraq. The security situation, however, dictated rapid infusion of police into the cities and governorates, a requirement that mandated an accelerated training program. To optimize required quantity and equally-important quality, CPA designed a program based on the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) “Kosovo” model that would give police recruits eight weeks of training. They planned to complement the eight-week basic program with a structured on-the-job training program guided by an experienced mentor.

44 (Note: Iraqi NCOs are unlike U.S. NCOs and a direct comparison should not be made.)
45 Also known as “Field Training”
In order to meet the capacity required, two academies were established: the Baghdad Public Safety Academy (more recently renamed the Baghdad Police College) and an academy in Jordan, outside Amman, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Several regional academies were subsequently added.

The basic training instructional program consisted of two distinct, but integrated, components: academy training and field training. New police recruits would spend two months at one of the academies, training in modern policing methods. New cadets would receive 320 standardized hours of intensive education in modern policing techniques. The basic course would include academic and practical training in firearms (pistols), defensive tactics, and emergency vehicle operation. The academic instruction also included policing in a democracy, constitutional framework, human rights, use of force, police ethics and code of conduct, gender issues, community policing, traffic accident management, etc.

For recruits who completed the academy courses, the concept prescribed subsequent participation in a structured field training program, focusing on the practical application of the coursework and seeking further development of proactive, service-oriented policing skills. During this probationary period, newly-graduated cadets were to be paired one-on-one with a senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Field Training Officer (FTO), who would function as a mentor. International Police Advisors (later renamed International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs)) would oversee the program. The concept consisted of four phases conducted over a six-month period involving daily, weekly, and monthly evaluations by senior IPS FTOs.

The CPA plan relied upon building a foundation in the classroom, but also counted on the structured and mentored training that was to occur in the months following graduation. In March 2004, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was established, and an initial Field Training Coordinator Program was implemented locally in Baghdad. Unfortunately, the deteriorating security environment, coupled with a dearth of experienced IPS and insufficient numbers of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs), precluded full implementation of the mentoring program.

**Police Training Developed Under Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I)**

In June 2004 the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq was established to assume responsibility for all Coalition-sponsored security training for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including the IPS and the Iraqi Military. CPATT was organizationally aligned under MNSTC–I.

By the end of 2004, it was evident that a viable IPS mentoring program could not be established, and that IPLOs would not be able to bridge the gap because of security issues and the sheer numbers required. As a result, the curriculum was significantly changed, adapting it to prepare the trainees to meet the threats and risks they were going to face as
police on the street. Whereas previously, recruits spent 25 percent of the time at the academy on practical exercises, with the remaining time spent on academics; that ratio is now roughly reversed. The academic program is being reduced from 40 to 20 subjects and a modular program creates flexibility to adjust the program in rapid response to operational lessons learned. Greater emphasis is now placed on critical tactical operations. All of these instructional areas are reinforced with hands-on field exercises with the greatest possible realism. In an example of one of the changes being incorporated, the existing driving track is being modified to accommodate both driving instruction and scenario-based training on improvised explosive devices. A mock IPS station is also being constructed to familiarize trainees with the environment they will encounter in the field. Instead of marksmanship training that focused primarily on pistols, more extensive AK–47 training is being added.
Appendix C — Principal Interlocutors—Organizations Visited

Department of State
- Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DSS/ATA)
- Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence & Threat Analysis (DSS/ITA))
- Bureau of Near East Affairs, Office of Iraq (NEA/I)

Department of Defense
- Defense Support Office–Iraq

Department of Justice
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), International Training & Assistance Unit
- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), International Training Section
- Criminal Division, International Criminal Investigations Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- International Affairs Directorate

National Security Council

Central Intelligence Agency

American Embassy – Amman Jordan

American Embassy – Baghdad
- Ambassador John Negroponte
- Deputy Chief of Mission James Jeffrey
- Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), Ambassador William Taylor
- Director, Pol/Mil, Ambassador Ron Neumann
- INL Post Director, William Francisco

Iraqi Ministry of Interior
- Minister of Interior, Falah al Naqib
- Deputy Minister of Interior (Finance), Ms. Hala Shakr

Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I)
- General George W. Casey, Jr., Commanding General

Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I)
- LTG David H. Petraeus, Commanding General
- MG Joseph F. Fil, Jr., Commander, Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)

Baghdad Police College

Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)

Regional Police Training Facilities

Local Iraqi Police Stations (Baghdad)
- Chief of Station Police, Baghdad
- Chief of Patrol Police, Baghdad
**Appendix D — Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFIS</td>
<td>Automated Fingerprint Identification System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (DOJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Bureau of Dignitary Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Baghdad Police College (formerly Baghdad Public Service Academy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIF</td>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF–7</td>
<td>Coalition Joint Task Force 7</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPATT</td>
<td>Civilian Police Assistance Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoDIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoSIG</td>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>Field Training Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHP</td>
<td>Iraqi Highway Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIG</td>
<td>Iraqi Interim Government (June 2004 – April 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Iraqi Policeman</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPLO</td>
<td>International Police Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPT</td>
<td>International Police Trainer</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRMO–MOI</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office – Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraqi Relief Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITG</td>
<td>Iraqi Transitional Government (April 2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIPTC</td>
<td>Jordan International Police Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC–I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF–I</td>
<td>Multinational Force – Iraq</td>
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<td>MNSTC–I</td>
<td>Multinational Security Training Command – Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Iraq)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior (Iraq)</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Major Subordinate Command</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>P3</td>
<td>Police Partnership Program</td>
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<td>PCO</td>
<td>Project and Contract Office (Iraq)</td>
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<tr>
<td>POB</td>
<td>Public Order Brigade/Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSMR</td>
<td>Police Station Monthly Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>P–SWAT</td>
<td>Provincial Special Weapons and Tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>QC</td>
<td>Qualifying Committee (Iraq)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (formerly CPA-IG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>Special Weapons and Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Transition and Integration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF VETERAN AFFAIRS
THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


We have seen a period of significant advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) not later than June 30, 2004 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully.
During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA is terminated, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission, who, on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States Government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, and employees seconded to an International Organization.

Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support.

The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when those functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NDDO-38 of June 2, 1982.

The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an office in the Department of State will assume from the CPA those authorities and responsibilities that continue after CPA termination.

I establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of State and, if the Secretary of State so designates, within the U.S. Mission in Baghdad, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other United States Government agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort.
The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization.

I also establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of Defense to be called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State shall select a Director for PCO. PCO personnel in Iraq shall be permanently or temporarily assigned under Chief of Mission authority. PCO shall provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission. PCO’s services may include engineering, auditing, and other contract-related services.

The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. To accomplish our mission, I direct the heads of U.S. departments and agencies to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis, assistance, services and other support, to include security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel, with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State shall identify for the heads of relevant departments and agencies the expected requirements for non-reimbursable support for their use in preparing future budget requests. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall ensure that future budget submissions request the funding and authorities I determine necessary to support the U.S. Mission in Iraq.

This NSPD shall be effective immediately, shall constitute an Executive order solely for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 3161, and shall not be subject to Executive order 11036 of June 19, 1962, as amended. The CPA shall terminate not later than June 30, 2004. Upon the termination of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-14, dated January 26, 2003.

[Signature]

65
Appendix F — Report Distribution

Department of Defense

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
  Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Policy Support)
  Director, International Security Programs**
  Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
    Director, ME/NA
    Director, Northern Gulf Affairs**
  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict)
  Principal Director, Stability Operations

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Inspector General, Joint Staff
Director for Operations (J-3)
Director for Logistics (J-4)
Director for Strategic Plans & Policy (J-5)**
Director for Force Structure, Resources & Assessment (J-8)

Combatant Commands

Commander, U.S. Central Command
  Inspector General, U.S. Central Command**
  Commander, Multinational Force – Iraq
    Inspector General, Multinational Force – Iraq**
    Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq**
    Civilian Police Assistance Training Team**
    Commander, Multinational Corps – Iraq

Department of State

Office of the Secretary of State

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Under Secretary for Global Affairs (G)
  Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)**
    Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC)**
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T)

67
Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs (PM)
Counselor for the Department (C)

**Embassies**

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Chargé d’Affaires

U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq  
Ambassador  
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Political Affairs  
Political-Military Affairs**  
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office**

**Department of Justice**

Office of the Inspector General  
Criminal Division  
International Criminal Investigative Police Assistance Team (ICITAP)**

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  
International Training & Assistance Unit, FBI Academy

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)  
International Training Section, DEA Academy

**Other Federal Organizations**

National Security Council  
Office of Management and Budget  
Government Accountability Office

**Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

Senate Armed Services Committee  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
Senate Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism, Foreign Relations Committee  
House Armed Services Committee  
House International Relations Committee  
House Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia, International Relations Committee

** Recipient of Draft Report
MEMORANDUM

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: IRMO Front Office
FROM: Steve Castiel, Senior Consultant, IRMO-Ministry of Interior
SUBJECT: IRMO-MOI Comments on IG “Joint Assessment of Iraqi Police Training”

Comments

The development of civilian-led security services is one of the most critical factors in the maturation of a sustainable democracy. The advisors of IRMO-MOI apply this fundamental belief in all their daily interactions. It is for this reason that IRMO-MOI endorses the Joint Inspectors General Assessment of Iraqi Police Training as a document that rightfully draws attention to both the strengths and weaknesses of current Iraqi Police training programs and concepts. With the minor exceptions noted below, IRMO-MOI is in concurrence with the IG team in their assessment.

IRMO-MOI agrees with the IG assessment that military solutions to policing issues are specifically useful in the short term. Civilian oversight and policy development are paramount to long-term success in Iraq; this philosophy is vital in the transition to full Iraqi control of MOI functions. IRMO-MOI advisors have established a certain trust and working relationship with the Iraqi Government not equaled in other organizations. The IRMO-MOI team has valuable experience in both pre and post-TOA Iraq, and has a thorough institutional knowledge and acquired expertise in the Iraqi cultural and political climate. It is for this reason that IRMO-MOI serves as the primary bridge between Coalition entities and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

It is important to mention that the IRMO-MOI advisory role spans far beyond the police issues discussed in the IG Assessment. In addition to policing, Ministry of Interior officials consult daily with IRMO-MOI advisors on a wide array of institutional development issues ranging from logistics, payroll, human resources, internal security policy, rule of law coordination, identification cards, etc. — all in addition to the policing issues mentioned in the IG Assessment. For example, IRMO-MOI advisors were the lead policy consultants for election security in the 2011 January elections. Such shared successes have helped seal the bond between the Iraqi Ministry officials and their IRMO advisors.

As part of this continuing cooperation with the Ministry, groups of IRMO-MOI advisors plan to live at FOB Shield, a living facility adjacent to the Ministry of Interior headquarters at the Baghdad Police College, for rotations of roughly one week. This program was not fully developed when the Assessment Team was conducting fieldwork in Iraq. The initiative would
allow more daily interaction with officials at the Ministry and develop a more thorough relationship between advisors and their counterparts at the mid and lower-levels of the Ministry.

Suggested Changes

1. Ensure that IG Recommendations listed on pages 7-10 are changed consistently throughout the body of the document to reflect IRMO-MOI Suggested Changes below.

2. Recommend consistent acronym use for Iraqi Transitional Government to avoid confusion. Document references it variously as either ITG or TIG.

3. When speaking of Ministry of Interior Commandos, the word “Commando” should always use a capital “C.” This avoids confusion with other “commando-like” units in the Iraqi Army and elsewhere in ISF.

4. Page 6, bullet 5: MOI existing staff includes over 200,000 individuals. Figure should be changed accordingly in bullet 5 (from “about 170,000” to “over 200,000”) and in all other relevant sections throughout IG Assessment.

5. Page 7, Recommendation 4: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Diplomatic Protection and SWAT units into a similar command structure with the Public Order Brigades, Commando units and Mechanized Brigades, as appropriate. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with CPATT.)

6. Page 8: Recommendation 10 is listed twice. Delete one.

7. Page 8, Recommendation 12: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 12:** Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering POB or ERU training. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with the MOI.)

8. Page 8, Recommendation 14: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 14:** A non-binding agreement should be negotiated by the U.S. Government with the Iraq Ministry of Interior that specifies that only applicants in possession of MOI-issued identification cards, explicitly stating that the bearer is a member of the IPS, will be accepted for advanced/refresher training by the Coalition. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.)

9. Page 9, Recommendation 24: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 24:** Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and MOI and in consultation with MNSTC-I and CPATT on issues specifically related to police training.)

UNCLASSIFIED
10. **Page 9, Recommendation 25**: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 25**: Top priority should be given to recruiting '3161' personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then assign a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Embassy Baghdad through IRMO-MOI and the Ministry of Interior.)

11. **Page 10, Recommendation 29**: Change as follows:

   **Recommendation 29**: MNSTC-I and CPATT should perform an assessment of security and IPS infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where additional responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police, rather than MSC. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT and consultation with the MOI.)

   Comment: Transferring "complete" responsibility would go against the current Ministry vision to retain a centralized training structure.

12. **Page 11, Para 5**: Change: "over 1,600 lost their lives in the past six months" to "over 2,000 lost their lives since May 2003."

13. **Page 12, Para 2**: Add: "The current Minister of Interior Bayan Baqir Jaber is currently reviewing multiple proposals relating to Ministry of Interior force end strength."

14. **Page 13, Para 5**: Change: "MSTC-I" to "MNSTC-I." 

15. **Page 15, Para 1**: Add: "There is currently a plan in place that will place current police in this training without causing significant drops in "street strength."

16. **Page 16, Para 1**: Change: "about 170,000" to "over 200,000".

17. **Page 25, Para 2**: Before last sentence, add: "Regional Academy curricula should serve as supplemental to current 8-week course and should be tailored to the security environment of the region.

18. **Page 26, Paras 6 and 7**: Paragraphs 6 and 7 are inconsistent in their description of the inception of CIF. CIF was initiated by CPA MOI advisors and eventually developed into POB and Mecc Police. To retain consistency and accuracy, change as follows:

   The CIF is a Coalition initiated, high end, national level, civil intervention force trained to occupy large geographic areas by using military tactics. The CIF is activated to restore order in cities where the police have become totally ineffective, or to secure an area after major military operations.

19. **Page 27, Para 3**: Remove "rapid response."

20. **Page 38, Para 3**: At beginning of final sentence, insert "As with many CPA advisors,"
21. **Page 38, Para 5**: Change as follows:

While the work of the senior advisor has been very important and largely successful, the IG team perceives that IRMO assistance to the MOI should also now address the pressing needs at more technical levels.

Comment: The above changes resolve the internal inconsistencies between Page 38 Para 5, and Page 40 Para 1. Additionally, the changes accurately portray the abilities and mission of IRMO-MOI.

22. **Page 41, Para 4**: Change as follows:

MNSTC-I and CPATT have made positive strides in this area. Meetings with Iraqi counterparts regarding training issues occur on a daily basis. CPATT has assigned a large number of its personnel to act as consultants, in coordination with IRMO-MOI, to various parts of the Ministry of Interior. They are also part and parcel of the P3 teams being assigned to the MOI.
HEADQUARTERS
CIVILIAN POLICE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM
AENAN PALACE, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09316

4 July 2005

Mr. Joe A. Baker
Senior Program Analyst
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General
Inspections & Evaluations Directorate
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Dear Mr. Baker:

We are most grateful to the Joint Department of Defense/Department of Defense Inspector General team for their time, thoroughness and effort for the report following their visit. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) welcomes all critical analyses and constructive comments. This report contains few surprises as most of these items were disclosed by CPATT and discussed with the Inspector General team. It should be noted that the Iraqi Transitional Government appointed a new Minister of Interior in early May. As expected in this dynamic environment, there have been many changes since your team’s visit.

CPATT has the responsibility to develop the capability of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces to enforce the rule of law. Since this critical endeavor is unique to all those involved, we are open to critical analysis of our endeavors and recognize that as the situation changes, much of our planning will need to change to reflect lessons learned.

Democracies are not underpinned by Armed Forces, but rather they are built upon police forces through the will of the people. The communities must be secured before effective policing can occur. Coalition Forces must create the conditions to introduce community policing to a society that has no concept of community policing. The work of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, CPATT, IRMO and the Iraqi MOI is unique in the annals of counter-insurgency history. The lessons learned from this endeavor should be considered for future operations.

As a general comment, while the matters addressed in the report are generally accurate, the tone of the report does not always recognize the considerable efforts of CPATT and Iraq Reconstruction Management Office – Ministry of Interior (IRM-O-MOI) to develop the capabilities of the MOI police forces during an active insurgency that greatly restricts all movement in many parts of the country without an authorized military convoy provided by coalition forces.

The point of contact is the undersigned at DSN: 318-239-7735, COMM: 703-343-7735, or e-mail at michael.smith@iraq.centcom.mil.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Michael R. Smith
MICHAEL R. SMITH
Colonel, Infantry
Chief of Staff, CPATT
CPATT Responses to the Joint DOD/DOS Formal Recommendations

The CPATT responses to the formal Joint DOD/DOS recommendations follow. As noted, in a few instances, changes are suggested to the Team’s recommendations (track changes was activated to ease your review) to clarify the intent based on the specific finding or to reflect changes in circumstances since the team’s visit (e.g., the new Minister has directed that the Emergency Response Unit report directly to his office). Since these responses address a draft report, adjustments may be needed to reflect changes to the report.

The tone of the report seems harsh in that it does not provide a full context for the overall security environment throughout most of Iraq. It does not always recognize the considerable efforts of CPATT, IRIOMC, MOI and the Iraqi MOI to develop the capabilities of the MOI police forces during this active insurgency. As the team may recall, authorized military convoys provided by coalition forces are needed for almost all movements outside of the international zone and coalition forward operating bases; certain areas in the Kurdish Region, such as Sulaymaniyah, represent a rare exception. It should be noted that the Iraqi forces continue to exhibit exceptional courage and bravery as they take on an increasing role in the security environment. Last week, an Iraqi Policeman gave his life by hugging a suicide bomber, thus preventing far greater damage to civilians and fellow policemen.

Please contact me at DSN: 318-239-7736, COMM: 703-343-7736, or by e-mail at michael.smith@iraq.centcom.mil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation 1:</th>
<th>Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs.</th>
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<td>Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I, CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.</td>
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**Response to Recommendation 1:** In May 2005, the new Minister of Interior was appointed. The revised curriculum has been implemented at all academies. The new curriculum features modularity and focuses on current situational requirements for policing in an insurgency. In addition, procedures have been improved for recruiting, vetting and accountability of cadets upon graduation of the academies.

The new Minister signed a memorandum announcing the following groups as training priorities: 1) currently serving untrained policemen, and 2) newly hired recruits from Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra and south Baghdad. As a result, the focus of the IPS basic academies has shifted to support the Minister’s priorities. In conjunction with the Iraqi training leadership, the revised eight week basic academy curriculum and the new two week integration program began in June 2005. In addition, a three day sustainment program was launched that focused on skills identified by the MOI. The Police Officer Academy (Lieutenant and above), with a curriculum developed jointly by the MOI and CPATT, will offer a six month and nine month program for serving IPS officers in August and October 2005, respectively. The full three-year officer program will commence in October 2006.
**Recommendation 2:** Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad in coordination with CPATT.)

**Response to Recommendation 2:** The new Minister is conducting a review of the existing organization to assess its effectiveness. He reaffirmed his authority to appoint the provincial Chiefs of Police and has committed to working with the elected Provincial Councils in order to improve effectiveness and strengthen relationships between the Ministry and provinces. IRMO-MOI and CPATT will continue to support the Minister’s effort to improve controls.

**Recommendation 3:** A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of in-service IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT and in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior)

**Response to Recommendation 3:** The CPATT Training and Standards Division has commenced weekly meetings with the MOI training leadership team. The Programs of Instruction for the new officer programs noted above were jointly developed and approved by the MOI and CPATT. At the request of MOI training leadership, CPATT is developing additional advanced courses. MOI training leadership has offered to establish provincial training teams to conduct sustainment training and the IPS Training Integration Programs (TIP) for serving police with certain training experience.

**Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should work with the Minister to clarify the reporting relationship of the MOI forces including the Emergency Response Unit, Center for Dignitary Protection, provincial SWAT units, Public Order Brigades, commando units and Mechanized Brigades.

**Response to Recommendation 4:** During May 2005, the new Minister reorganized the reporting relationship of the Ministry’s forces. The Commandos, Public Order and Mechanized units, which are all national assets, report to a single organization within the Ministry on the same tier as Deputy Minister. The Emergency Response Unit will report directly to the Minister. In addition, coalition forces, together with the Ministry of Interior, are developing a plan to transfer responsibility for the Center for Dignitary Protection and training of Provincial SWAT teams to the Ministry during 2005. The Minister has provided specific direction for additions to the MOI payroll which, when fully implemented, will resolve the payroll issues. The provincial SWAT units will remain under the control of the respective provincial Chiefs of Police.

**Recommendation 5:** Appropriate parties need to explore the merits, feasibility and conceivab...
sources of any U.S. Government funding to cover MOI salary shortfalls during the current fiscal year. This determination should take into account possible one-year implications for such support. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Response to Recommendation 8:** Current policy precludes U.S. Government funding of MOI salaries. In order to create more MOI funding for salaries, the MOI has requested that funds be transferred from capital spending accounts to the salaries account. In coordination with the MOI, MNSTC-I has agreed to fund certain capital projects that were impacted by this decision. In addition, the Minister will submit a request for supplemental funding through established Iraqi procedures to address funding shortfalls and emerging requirements.

**Recommendation 6:** A joint Coalition/MOI assessment should be conducted to determine operation and maintenance costs of Coalition-built and/or renovated training facilities and to determine how and whether the cost of maintaining these facilities can be sustained by the MOI in the future. (Action: MNSTC-I in collaboration with CPATT and Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with the MOI.)

**Response to Recommendation 6:** The MOI, IRMO-MOI and CPATT have formed a working group to develop the MOI budget for 2006. This budget will include all costs associated with recruiting, training, equipping and sustaining the academies and forces that have been established by the Ministry and the coalition. As part of this initiative, the working group will develop a transition plan to transfer operational responsibility to the MOI using a phased approach by June 2006.

**Recommendation 7:** Coalition and MOI leaders should identify candidates who demonstrate ambition and talent for subsequent leadership training. In addition, the coalition should evaluate feasibility of re-establishing a three-year police officer college. (Action: CPATT in consultation with the MOI.)

**Response to Recommendation 7:** During each training course, CPATT advisors and Iraqi leaders identify students that demonstrate the aptitude to be trainers and recommend selection for attendance at a Trans-the-Trainer program. In mid-April, CPATT initiated bi-weekly meetings with the Dean of the Baghdad Police College. Through these meetings, it was jointly agreed that a three-year police college curriculum would be developed in addition to the previously approved six-month and nine-month programs that were created for serving police officers (Lieutenant and above). Prerequisites for attendance at these are being established.

**Recommendation 8:** A joint committee of Coalition and MOI officials should screen and select officers for advanced training based on mutually established qualification standards. (Action: CPATT in conjunction with MOI.)

**Response to Recommendation 8:** Regional recruiting centers, run by the provincial Chiefs of Police with coalition oversight, are being established that will use agreed upon standardized qualification requirements. CPATT and the MOI have also determined requirements for candidates entering applications for the two...
Recommendation 9: The Coalition recruiting program should be placed under the direction of the MOI, with MNC-I and CPATT providing assistance. (Action: MNF-I in consultation with MNC-I, MNSTC-I, CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.)

Response to Recommendation 9: The new Minister and the CG, CPATT have agreed to a plan to transfer responsibility for recruiting from CPATT/MNC-I to provincial recruiting under the auspices of the MOI. The provincial Police Chiefs will establish recruiting procedures and teams, and after vetting of prospective police candidates, will approve their attendance at academies and their tentative assignments to positions on the police force. This plan also establishes Regional Recruiting Centers in Mosul, al Hillah, al Kut and al Basrah in addition to Baghdad. The recruiting centers will administer qualification testing, including literacy testing and perform vetting procedures including but not limited, to a statement that they were not a member of the Ba'ath party, background check with the local tribal leadership, criminal background check, retinal scan and fingerprint check. CPATT will provide oversight to ensure the academies continue to be filled with qualified students. The provincial recruiting teams and regional in-processing teams will be staffed by provincial police.

Recommendation 10: Coalition authorities should assess the quality of Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a non-binding memorandum of agreement with that ministry on access to and utilization of such material. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with the MOI.)

Response to Recommendation 10: CPATT has reviewed the vetting procedures used by the MOI which include a review of Iraqi criminal records and input from local finans. Fingerprints taken for each applicant are entered in to the Automated Fingerprint Information System (AFIS) which compares those fingerprints to the Iraqi criminal identification database. This function will be transferred to the MOI offices at Adham Palace, with coalition oversight, within the next few months.

Recommendation 11: Establish an agreement that states the MOI is responsible for vetting candidates for Coalition-sponsored police training. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and CPATT.)

Response to Recommendation 11: In coordination with the MOI, CPATT is developing a transition plan that will transfer responsibility for recruiting and vetting to Regional Recruiting Centers under the direction of the MOI. CPATT will continue to provide oversight throughout the transition period.

Recommendation 12: Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that PDS cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering PDS or ERU training. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with the MOI.)
Response to Recommendation 12: At the present time, the MOI has determined that graduation from a specific MOI course is not a prerequisite for attending the POB or ERU training. As the security environment improves, the MOI may revisit the training prerequisites for these units.

Recommendation 13: Contractual arrangements with expatriate instructors should specify that individually devised training courses will be approved by MNSTC-I and CPATT. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT.)

Response to Recommendation 13: CPATT has distributed a revised and standardized eight-week program of instruction, which has been tailored to the current Iraqi security situation, to all IPS academies teaching the eight-week course. The current agreement requires CPATT contracted instructors to comply with the directions from CPATT. Instructors are directed to use the approved program of instruction, and encouraged to provide personal experiences to emphasize teaching points. In addition, CPATT has established procedures to review, modify and approve changes to the programs of instruction.

Recommendation 14: The coalition, in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior, should ensure that local Chiefs of Police are involved in the hiring process and implement procedures to document applicants selected as cadets, noting the city and province of the approved applicant. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT and Embassy Baghdad.)

Response to Recommendation 14: In May 2005, the new Minister signed a memorandum announcing training priorities for (1) serving untrained police, and (2) newly-hired recruits from Mosul, Fallujah, Samarra and south Baghdad. The provincial Chiefs of Police, in conjunction with coalition forces, are now involved in the selection and vetting of new recruits. Approved applicants receive a letter directing them to report at a specific date, time and location for basic police training. Procedures have been implemented to ensure that cadets receive their station assignments prior to graduation. Upon reporting to their assigned station, these graduates are hired and added to the MOI roles.

Recommendation 15: Tables of Organization and Equipment should be developed for each police station and deployable police unit throughout the country. (Action: CPATT and IPLOs, in coordination with MOI.)

Response to Recommendation 15: In conjunction with the respective MOI units, CPATT has drafted Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for Iraqi Police stations, Iraqi Highway Patrol, Public Order units, Commando units, Mechanized Police, Border Enforcement units, and Emergency Response units. These drafts will be reviewed by MNSTC-I. The approved TOEs will serve as the basis for identifying equipment and resource requirements and provide a basis to evaluate the readiness of each unit.

Recommendation 16: A standardized set of equipment should be issued to the police cadets upon arrival at a training academy. CPATT, together with the MOI, should develop procedures...
for the issuance of individual equipment specifying what equipment will be retained by the trainee upon graduation. (Action: MNSTC-I, CPATT in coordination with MOI)

Response to Recommendation 16: CPATT, in conjunction with the MOI, has established procedures for the issuance and accountability of individual equipment at the basic police academy, including equipment retained by the cadet after graduation. The importance of personal accountability for assigned equipment is emphasized throughout the course. Individual weapons are now issued when the graduate reports to their assigned duty station

Recommendation 17: The coalition should assist the MOI in establishing internal controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the IPS. (Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I, CPATT and MNC-I and in consultation with MOI)

Response to Recommendation 17: The MOI uses a manual paper-based system to monitor and record equipment and supplies. The MOI has identified the requirement to develop an automated system that will not only facilitate accounting and reporting but also provide a basis for readiness reporting. CPATT and IRCO-MOI will work with the MOI to develop a system to meet their requirements that provides an appropriate documentation.

Recommendation 18: Coalition resources, in close coordination with counterparts in the MOI and IPS, should develop an operational IPS Readiness Reporting System for the MOI. (Action: MNSTC-I/CPATT in coordination with MOI)

Response to Recommendation 18: The Police Partnership Program (P3) will be implemented during July 2005. As part of this program, a Police Station Monthly Report is prepared for each police station visited during the month. These reports, together with district and provincial Chiefs of Police assessments, will be used as a basis to prepare the monthly provincial Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA).

Recommendation 19: CPATT, with input from coalition commanders, should conduct a requirements analysis to determine the number of IPLOs who can be gainfully engaged under prevailing circumstances and adjust the number of these officers accordingly. (MNSTC-I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL)

Response to Recommendation 19: An analysis of International Police Liaison Officer (IPLO) requirements, conducted by CPATT with input from MNC-I units, was prepared in June 2005. As a result of this review, we are endeavoring to increase the authorized strength of IPLOs.

Recommendation 20: Standard operating procedures should be developed for the IPLOs, to define the relationships and responsibilities among the police liaison officers and military police. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with CPATT, Embassy Baghdad and INL)

Response to Recommendation 20: A standard operating procedure manual is being developed for the IPLO Program. This manual will include, but not be limited to, the roles and
Responsibilities of IPLOs, relationship to the U.S. military police units and coalition forces as well as guidance for interaction with their Iraqi counterparts.

Recommendation 21: Formally notify all Coalition governments that participate in JIPTC training of potential changes and instructor assistance requirements. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Recommendation 22: The Department of State should decide whether and where an ILBA should be established in the Middle East. If Jordan is selected as a venue, negotiations for such a transformation of JIPTC should proceed immediately. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Recommendation 23: The Ministry of Interior should establish procedures to ensure that funds are transferred to, and received by, the senior Iraqi liaison officer at the Jordanian International Police Training Center (JIPTC) to ensure that cadets are paid on a timely basis. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in coordination with MNSTC-I and CPATT.)

Response to Recommendation 23: The MOI has sent a senior officer to JIPTC to administer payment of cadets directly and has increased the lead time for money transfers for cadet pay.

Recommendation 24: Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and consultation with MNSTC-I and CPATT.)

Recommendation 25: Top priority should be given to recruiting “3161” personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then assign a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Embassy Baghdad through IRMO and in consultation with MNSTC-I and CPATT.)

Recommendation 26: Embassy Baghdad should obtain from the MOI a written commitment to assure Coalition authorities can access data relevant to tracking and mentoring of IPS trained in U.S. Government-funded programs. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNSTC-I and CPATT.)

Recommendation 27: IRMO-MOI and CPATT should posit MOI officials in the development of standard operating procedures for personnel administration of the Iraqi police service.

Response to Recommendation 27: IRMO-MOI and the CPATT P3 MOI team are working with the MOI to develop ministerial capabilities, including the development of personnel administration systems to improve management accountability and reporting. The development of standard operating procedures will be part of this initiative.
**Recommendation 28:** The Department of State should assign one or more INL officers to work directly within CPATT to ensure INL perspectives are considered in the development of the IPS. (Action: INL in coordination with Embassy Baghdad, MNSTC-I and CPATT.)

**Response to Recommendation 28:** Beginning in April 2005, weekly meetings have been conducted with MNSTC-I, IRMO-MOI, INL, MNF-I and CPATT to improve coordination, communication and synchronization among these key coalition entities.

**Recommendation 29:** MNSTC-I and CPATT should perform an assessment of security and IPS infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where complete responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police, rather than MSC. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with CPATT and consultation with the MOL.)

**Response to Recommendation 29:** A plan was approved in June 2005 that establishes a time line for the transition of each academy to Iraqi control. CPATT and IRMO-MOI have formed transition teams to plan and execute the transfer of responsibility, including training, life support, and force protection for the national and regional academies to MOI control.

**Recommendation 30:** The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense and Justice. The working group should be to identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DOD to DOS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, CPATT and INL.)

**Recommendation 31:** The Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should prepare a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to define funding arrangements for future U.S. involvement in ISF-related programs. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Resource Management (RM) and Department of Defense’s Office of the Under Secretary for Policy in consultation with OMB.)
June 24, 2005

Ambassador David E. Zweifel
Department of State
SA 3, Suite 8100
2121 Virginia Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037

RE: Draft Report: Joint Assessment of Iraqi Police Training

Dear Ambassador Zweifel:

DOJ/ICITAP greatly appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft “Joint Assessment of Iraqi Police Training (“Report”). The Department compliments the IG Team’s efforts to address this extremely important and enormously complex initiative.

DOJ concurs with many of the Report’s recommendations, which support the original conclusions and standing recommendations formulated by ICITAP professionals throughout both the pre- and post-conflict period. Regrettably, the Report in our view minimizes, and in certain instances omits, the crucial leadership role that ICITAP has played over the last 30 months, and continues to play in the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The Report is and should be forward looking. However, a description of the efforts of ICITAP and the Coalition military since May 2003 to develop the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is essential to understanding the current environment and ongoing challenges. In January/February 2003, the ICITAP representative detailed to ORHA developed a series of planning recommendation papers. In May 2003, ICITAP led the law enforcement team that prepared a detailed assessment of the Iraqi Police. The ICITAP recommendations to ORIA, and the May 2003 ICITAP IP Assessment combined to become the roadmap for development of the new IPS. Since the summer of 2003, ICITAP and the Coalition military have forged a strong and productive working relationship to train, equip, mentor and deploy IPS personnel and to develop the IPS as a sustainable and productive law enforcement institution. The Report fails to describe that partnership and its accomplishments. Given ICITAP’s role as the primary lead in police training and development initiatives in Iraq, the absence of an affirmative recommendation that ICITAP continue in this role is inexplicable.

The facts demonstrate that DOJ/ICITAP is deeply invested in the success of the USG’s law enforcement (police and corrections) missions in Iraq. As the Report notes, ICITAP and DOD jointly founded the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Since CPATT’s inception an ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement Advisor (an FTE) has held the principal deputy position (the equivalent of a one star general). ICITAP has also delivered more than 15 distinct basic, advanced or specialized police training courses. Over 330 ICITAP
International Police Trainers (IPTs) are actively deployed in Iraq and Jordan in support of these efforts.

ICITAP is not a private for-profit contractor. ICITAP is the USG’s lead implementing agency in the area of international law enforcement development and training worldwide. ICITAP has been significantly involved in every international post-conflict U.S. criminal justice assistance program: Panama, Haiti, Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq. Unlike any commercial contractor, ICITAP draws upon the considerable law enforcement operational and developmental experience and expertise of the Department of Justice in formulating police assistance technical assistance and training. ICITAP’s leadership in the advancement of the IPS, both within CPA and CPATT, reflects almost 20 years of unequaled experience in the field of police training and development. ICITAP continues to be dedicated to inter-agency cooperation and the ultimate success of the USG’s mission in Iraq.

The United States has highly significant national security and operational law enforcement interests in Iraq. The Department of Justice has a lead role both in protecting our national security and preventing and prosecuting terrorism and other transnational crimes. In our view, the Report should give greater consideration to those interests when addressing how to prospectively staff and manage Iraqi police development and training programs. There is a critical nexus among USG operational law enforcement imperatives, strong partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi law enforcement agencies, international norms and practices, and the training and technical assistance provided to the Iraqis. Neither private contractors nor other agencies possess the Department of Justice’s combination of law enforcement operational responsibility, international law enforcement expertise and rule of law institution building. We believe that it is axiomatic that DOJ should continue to be the lead in developing and training the Iraqi Police Service and rule of law institutions. It is unfortunate that no representatives from DOJ were included in the DOS/DOD IG Team in order that this view might be represented.

DOJ believes strongly that the Report should unequivocally recommend that DOJ/ICITAP continue as a principal partner and leader in the planning and management of IPS development and training programs in the future.

Attached as Appendix A are proposed clarifications with respect to a number of specific assertions in the Report. We would be glad to meet with you to discuss this further.

We look forward to continuing to work with the DOS/DOD IG Team.

Sincerely,

Joseph M. Jones
Chief
United States Department of Justice  
Response to DOS/DOD Draft Joint Assessment of Iraqi Police Training  
June, 2005  

Appendix A

COMMENTS/CLARIFICATIONS

Page 4: Purpose of this Assessment (cont.)

The Report states: The DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) possesses the institutional resources to carry out that function and, therefore, were tasked, even before NSPD-36, to develop an appropriate training program for the Iraqi Police Service. Consequently, the Joint International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was established in Amman, Jordan.

Proposed Substitution:
DOJ/ICITAP deployed a team to Iraq on May 15, 2003... ICITAP, using funding provided by INL, was tasked to assess the Iraqi police and, simultaneously, develop the appropriate training programs for the IPS in both Iraq and Jordan. It was ICITAP’s Senior Law Enforcement Adviser in Kosovo, Steve Bennett, who established and managed the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) on behalf of CPA. [1]

Page 5: Putting Police Training in Context (cont.)

The document states: Thus, despite obvious weaknesses, the IG team concludes that CPATT programs have resulted in qualified success.

This is the first mention of CPATT in the Report. CPATT’s establishment, purpose, and the integral role of ICITAP in its operation should be explained at this point in the Report to provide context.

Proposed Substitution:
CPATT was established in March of 2004 prior to the formation of MNSTC-I through a joint effort by DOD and DOJ/ICITAP.

Page 7: Key Judgments (cont.)

The Report states: Concurrent with the ultimate assumption of full responsibilities by the Iraqi government and consistent with the May 11, 2004, NSPD-36, plans need to be formulated for assumption of residual USG training responsibilities by the Department of State.

[1] Since May 2003, ICITAP has developed the following instructional programs for the Iraqi Police Service: Basic Training, TIP, FTC, Basic Criminal Investigations, Kidnapping Investigations, Civil Disorder Management, Internal Controls, Incident Command, Executive Leadership, Mid-level Management, 1st Line supervision, Train-the-Trainer, Trainer Staff Development and Election Security Train-the-Trainer.
Proposed Substitution:
Plans need to be formulated for assumption of residual USG training responsibilities by the Department of State with “continued program design, management and implementation by the Department of Justice, ICITAP”.

Page 13: Training to Iraqi-perceived Needs (cont.)

The Report states: Adjustments have been and are being made. During this assessment, the JIPTC staff completed revision of the basic curriculum to include more ‘hands on,’ self-protection exercises.

Proposed Substitution:
The authority of CPATT over both JIPTC and the Baghdad Academy is made clear later in the Report (See p. 24, fn 25 [see below]). We propose that CPATT’s responsibility for quality assurance/control over JIPTC be described at this earlier point in the Report. Without that explanation, the current text could be interpreted as suggesting that JIPTC operates separately and outside of the direction and control of MNSTC-I and CPATT.

Footnote 25 - CPATT directed JIPTC’s staff to modify the basic training curriculum to incorporate survival skills, while retaining the same eight week duration.

The Report should indicate that the primary personnel involved in the rewrite of the basic training curriculum were ICITAP International Police Trainers stationed at JIPTC and other international police officers.

Page 19: Recruiting and Selecting Trainees (cont.)

The document states: To bolster the force, the CPA recruited an additional 30,000 police in 30 days. The driving objective was to produce ‘boots on the ground.’ In doing so, the CPA enunciated minimal requirements for entry into the IPS.

Proposed Substitution:
This section needs clarification. In fact, CPA did not itself recruit, nor did it issue any order to recruit an additional 30,000 police in 30 days. Prior to the first graduation of 466 new IPS recruits on January 29, 2004, from the CPA/ICITAP established basic training academy in Jordan (JIPTC), the increases in IPS numbers were carried out by the CJTF-7 and the Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Prior to the start of the CPA approved basic training programs, the overwhelming majority (almost 100%) of this increase likely occurred in MSCs outside of Baghdad. This may be verified through the CJTF-7 weekly reports submitted by the MSCs.

In June 2003, the CPA staff drafted for the CPA Senior Advisor to the MOI, a document entitled Recommendations and Strategies for “reconstituting” an interim Iraqi Police service. Section 3, Vetting of Current Personnel, articulated basic minimum requirements for vetting existing police officers who had returned to service. The requirements include those listed in footnote 17
of Sec. 3; although this is not a complete listing. But, in any case, this document was not an authorization by CPA for the hiring of new IPS recruits without a formal/approved basic training program. These vetting standards also became the foundation for the formal recruiting criteria at the JIPTC and Baghdad academies.

Page 26: Transition and Integration Program

The Report states: From the outset it was apparent that veteran police – those who served during the Saddam Hussein era – must be retrained with the objective of instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and democratic policing principles. To achieve this goal, CPATT developed a training program called the Transition Integration Program (TIP).

Proposed Substitution:
This section needs clarification. The TIP was not developed by CPATT. The TIP was conceptualized by ICITAP in the fall of 2002 during an assessment of the police in Kabul, Afghanistan. In early 2003 it was refined further for use as a program by a US sponsored international team of trainers led by ICITAP. This team subsequently deployed to Kabul in the spring of 2003. In June of 2003 the ICITAP Iraq team adapted the TIP for members of the then fledgling Iraqi Police Service.

The Report states: The IG team concludes that the TIP program is a worthwhile endeavor. Many of those who have attended the course appear to be well motivated and dedicated to the concept of a rule of law regime at the service of Iraqi citizens. The TIP training imparts skills directly relevant to those objectives. How and whether the TIP program per se continues will depend in part on the changes proposed by the Minister of Interior. By definition, TIP training is for in-service IPs, one of the Minister’s stated objectives.

Proposed Substitution:
ICITAP, as the developer of the TIP, concurs with the Report’s favorable assessment of the benefits of the TIP, which by definition is an in-service training program, and not a “course”. The TIP is designed to augment the knowledge, skills and abilities of existing police personnel by introducing them to international standards of policing. The TIP introduces and reinforces the importance of the protection and promotion of basic human rights, the principles of democratic policing, modern policing techniques, the rule of law as set forth in, for example, applicable criminal laws and procedures, laws of arrest and detention, and firearms proficiency. This course is designed to change the philosophy, behavior, actions and activities of all police officers, regardless of their assignment in the agency.

Additionally the TIP was designed and operationalized by ICITAP in the summer of 2003 in order to accomplish several other key tasks:

1. Identify existing IPS personnel that were academically, intellectually, or morally unsuitable;

2. Identify potential leaders within the IPS;
3. Identify potential IPS instructors and field training officers.

The TIP can be easily adjusted by the MOI/IPS with assistance from ICITAP to address changing conditions and dynamics faced by IPS personnel.

Page 29: Advanced Training (cont.)

The Report states: Department of Justice (DOJ) instructors for specialized courses at the Adnan Palace have included professionals from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Coordination of these efforts in Iraq is done by ICITAP officials.

Proposed Substitution:
This section needs clarification. The vast majority of DOJ instructors of specialized courses are provided by ICITAP. ICITAP developed and currently delivers a number of advanced courses, including Basic Criminal Investigations, Kidnapping Investigations, Civil Disorder Management, Internal Controls, Incident Command, Executive Leadership, Mid-level Management, 1st Line Supervision, Train-the-Trainer, Trainer Staff Development and Election Security Train-the-Trainer. This should be mentioned in the passage.

Page 33/34: Mentoring

The Report states: A strong mentoring component is integral to the concept of training Iraqi police. Initially, this was to be the function of IPLO field training officers, each working closely with a small number of policemen who had received basic training. This would mirror a model that worked satisfactorily in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This section needs clarification. ICITAP strongly concurs that the development and delivery of a structured and standardized field training program for newly graduated officers is critical to the success of any basic program. This is particularly true when the basic program is so short – in this case eight weeks. However, in the latter part of the summer of 2003 ICITAP was directed by the CPA and CJTF-7 to significantly modify its basic training program by greatly accelerating the pace of new recruit training. This translated into larger classes and a shorter training period. Knowing that its academy program would produce an unprecedented number of new recruits every four weeks, it became quickly evident to ICITAP that there would never be a sufficient number of IPLOs to even approach the “mentor to recruit ratio” that was achieved in Kosovo and Bosnia. Thus, it was ICITAP that designed a field training program modeled after the program ICITAP designed for OSCE in Macedonia in 2001-2003, a program in which the mentor to recruit ratio was much lower than in Bosnia or Kosovo.

As briefly noted on page 48, the program originally designed by ICITAP called for the training of qualified IPS officers to function as the Field Training Officers (FTOs) and for the IPLOs to function as Field Training Coordinators (FTCs). Once new recruits completed the 8-week academy program they were to complete four stages of the field training program in order to be considered a functional police officer capable of independent work. Thus, transforming a new
recruit into a functional police officer (i.e., the Basic Training Program (BTP)) would involve four stages:

- Stage I (8 weeks) Basic Academic Instruction – Classroom/Practical
- Stage II (4 weeks) Controlled Activity - Daily/Weekly Evaluations
- Stage III (8 weeks) Directed Activity - Daily/Weekly Evaluations
- Stage IV (12 weeks) Semi- Autonomous Activity - Weekly/Monthly Evaluations

During the field program newly graduated officers were to be assigned to an IPS FTO (most likely a Lieutenant or Captain) who would function as a mentor. The key to the success of the Field Training Program would rest with the training, effectiveness and dedication of those officers selected to serve as FTOs. A new recruit’s development would be documented through the use of a Professional Development Record (PDR), which would be created specifically for this program effort. The PDR would provide a programmatic approach to a new officer’s development that incorporates structured classroom study and the evaluation of the practical application of learned skills. The PDR would be utilized by the IPS FTO as the principal evaluation tool, and would provide a permanent record of the performance of the recruit during his probationary status. The program would also utilize the limited number of IPLOs as Field Training Coordinators (FTCs). In this way the Field Training Program for all new cadets could be closely monitored. The IPLOs would evaluate the progress of all new cadets as well as the effectiveness of their IPS Field Training Officers through a series of interviews and evaluations during the probationary period. Although ICTAP’s field program has not been implemented for the reasons cited by the IG team, the program construct remains sound and readily applicable when conditions permit.

The Report states: INL contracted with DynCorp to provide the IPLOs, the first 24-member contingent of which arrived in Iraq during November 2003. Most IPLOs are retired policemen. By March 2005, this number had risen to about 500. INL has proposed funding for an additional 400 IPLOs, bringing combined strength to levels approximating the ratio achieved for mentors in the Balkan situation.

While additional civilian police manpower would be extremely useful to the overall Iraqi police development and training programs, an additional 400 IPLOs will not bring IPLO strength to levels even remotely close to “approximating the ratio achieved for mentors in the Balkan situation”. To approximate the ratios of Kosovo or Bosnia numbers for the Iraqi dynamic, would require the deployment of tens of thousands of IPLOs. It should be noted that training and mentoring needs of this magnitude were predicted in the early ICTAP-created planning documents described above.

Comparison of three missions

1. **Kosovo:** Population of 1.9 million, 7,257 Kosovo police trained to date (30 classes over 5.5 years, average of 242 cadets per class, 1,300 cadets per year) and 4,761 UN CIVPOL mentors (max in March 2002).
2. **Bosnia:** Population of 4 million, approximately **17,000+ unformed police officers**, and **1,700/2,057 UN CIVPOL mentors** (max in May 2001).

3. **Iraq:** Population of 26 million, **99,864 IPS on duty** and up to **500 US IPLOs**.
   *Baghdad:* Population of 6.6 million, **15,597 IPS on duty** and approximately **250 US IPLOs**.

**Page 36: Whither JIPTC (cont.)**

The Report states: *On April 18, 2003, INL awarded a contract to DynCorp International. Initially conceived to be the mechanism via which to employ IPLOs, the contract evolved into DynCorp responsibility for construction, operation and maintenance of a training center at Mawwaqar, about thirty miles northeast of Amman, Jordan. Construction began in the fall of 2003, and the facility was up and running within three weeks. The first class of 456 Iraqi cadets arrived in November 2003. As of the time of this assessment, the U.S.-incurred costs for this remarkable accomplishment were...”*

Proposed Substitution:

This section needs clarification. The Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) was operationalized under the leadership of ICITAP. At the request of INL and NSC, ICITAP detailed its most senior field Academy Director to establish JIPTC. Steve Bennett, the founder and Director of the Kosovo Police Service Academy, began this initiative in early October of 2003. It was Mr. Bennett and his colleagues from ICITAP, both in the field and DOJ HQ, who combined to develop the curriculum, recruit and name instructors and otherwise create the heart of JIPTC (i.e. its course offerings, instruction and other aspects of a functioning academy). Mr. Bennett took on this assignment only with the condition that he could return to the KPS Academy when, in his judgment, the JIPTC was sufficiently launched. Thus, he continued as the Director until May of 2004, at which time he chose to return to Kosovo. ICITAP continues to provide approximately 65 IPLOs for the ongoing training efforts at JIPTC. DynCorp and INL were responsible for the physical construction and financial management of JIPTC. It is troubling that the Report completely omitted Mr. Bennett and ICITAP’s seminal and ongoing contributions to this “remarkable accomplishment.”

While the Report features the qualifications and contributions of the IPLOs and their contractor, DynCorp, the Report makes no mention of the ICITAP International Police Trainers (IFTs), their contributions or hardships in the operation of the Baghdad Academy and JIPTC. It is widely known that, due to security conditions and the absence of sufficient security equipment (i.e., armored vehicles and personal security details), it was too dangerous for the ICITAP Baghdad IFTs (as well as the corrections advisers) to commute daily from their Red Zone hotel to the Baghdad Academy. Thus, the IFTs were forced to reside under primitive conditions at the Baghdad Academy. (ICITAP Corrections advisers also had to take up residence at the Abu Ghraib prison.)

**Page 39: Recommendation 25**
The Report states: *Top priority should be given to recruiting ‘3161’ personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then assign a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior.* *(Embassy Baghdad through IRMO and in consultation with MNSTC-I and CPATT.)*

We disagree with this recommendation. ICITAP is uniquely qualified to provide support to IRMO in the area of institutional development and capacity building of the MOI and IPS. ICITAP is the only civilian agency that possesses the institutional knowledge of the Iraq program needed to address the development needs of the MOI. It is inefficient for ICITAP, the lead civilian police training agency, to not have a lead role in rebuilding the MOI. In our view, advisers to the MOI should be hired and managed through ICITAP. ICITAP has worked well with the current Senior Adviser to the MOI (a career DOJ law enforcement professional) and we look forward to the same kind of relationship with his successor.

**Page 40: Intra-USG Coordination: Collegial, But Could Improve (cont.)**

The Report states: *ICITAP has continuously engaged the Iraq police training issue since early 2003. They have an active voice in policy issues by virtue of maintaining a presence on the CPATT staff. Such is not the case with INL. Organisationally, INL maintains a separate two-person office in Embassy Baghdad providing logistics support for contracted IPLOs in Iraq, but they are on the periphery of the in-country decision-making team.*

_Institutional and philosophical differences in approach exist between MNSTC-I and INL with regard to training police. INL (and ICITAP too, for that matter) views police training as a subset of an overarching criminal justice, institutional development continuum. Theirs is a long-term view. They recognize the critical importance of developing a transparent, community policing function that is intimately linked to the court and prison systems. INL knows that when the military mission is complete, the police development mission will revert to them._

This section needs clarification. The Report understates the continuing access by INL to both the Chief of Mission/Deputy Chief of Mission (and current Charge d’affairs) and to the senior leadership of CPATT and MNSTC-I. A series of INL officials, including the Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, have made several trips to Baghdad during which they met at length with these individuals. This has been supplemented by regular communications and correspondence between CPATT and INL senior leadership, as well as by a full-time INL representative who focused on programmatic (rather than logistical) issues. Whatever differences may have arisen between DOD/MNSTC-1 and INL were not the result of a lack of access or communication.

Given ICITAP’s leadership over the last 25 months and our unequaled experience in law enforcement development and training, DOJ proposes that the Report offer a more clearly articulated message endorsing a DOJ/DOS partnership in which ICITAP continues as a principal partner and leader in the planning and management of IPS development and training programs in the future.
Page 42: Future U.S. Involvement in Police Training

The document states: In relation to the IPS, shifting direct authority to the Secretary of State and Chief of Mission (COM) will entail a corollary transfer of responsibility from MNSTC-I and CPATT to INL. Previous wide INL experience in conducting police training, buttressed by a supporting role in present IPS programs in Iraq, prefigures what should be a smooth transition.

This section needs clarification. As noted above, in Iraq and other major post-conflict areas over the past twenty (20), international criminal justice assistance programs have been planned, staffed and implemented by ICTAP, in close consultation with INL. This is a partnership that has a proven track record. Other experimental models have fallen well short of the mark, and ICTAP remains the USG’s lead implementing agency in the area of international law enforcement development and training worldwide.

Proposed Substitution:
With funding provided by and in close consultation with INL, ICTAP will continue to function as a principal partner and leader in the planning and management of IPS development and training programs, including after the transfer of responsibility from the military to the Chief of Mission and civilian agencies.

The Report states: Issues to be addressed in anticipation of the changeover include the nature of future engagement (e.g., whether this will entail instruction by U.S. Government employees and, if so, how many). Similarly, if INL-supervised training is to be performed by personnel from other agencies (notably, Department of Justice ICTAP, ATF or FBI employees) or by contractors, preliminary plans should define issues such as numbers required, tours of duty, etc.

As noted above, the Department of Justice’s review of the Report gives rise to serious concerns both with the omission of ICTAP’s lead role and critical contributions thus far, as well as the absence of any affirmative recommendation that ICTAP should continue in that role. DOS and DOJ proceeding in Iraq as partners has been agreed to by senior members of both DOS/INL and DOJ. These are matters of the highest national priority. They should not be left to the sole discretion of a single bureau. The current role and agency responsibilities should not be changed absent compelling evidence to the contrary. The Report contains no such evidence or findings.

Page 43: Recommendation 30

The Report states: The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense and Justice. The working group should be to identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DOD to DOS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, CPATT and INL.)
Proposed Substitution:
While DOJ supports such a working group, the proposal itself should be a joint proposal from DOJ and DOS.
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Appendix J — Team Members

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections of the Department of State, and the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Inspections and Policy of the Department of Defense, Inspections and Evaluations, prepared this report. Personnel who contributed to this report are listed below:

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