What Went Wrong In Fukushima: The Human Factor Japanese officials already have concluded that the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant was not designed to withstand the 40-foot tsunami that hit it on March 11. But different decisions early in the crisis might have reduced the accident's severity.
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What Went Wrong In Fukushima: The Human Factor

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What Went Wrong In Fukushima: The Human Factor

What Went Wrong In Fukushima: The Human Factor

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It's MORNING EDITION, from NPR News. Good morning, I'm Steve Inskeep.


And I'm Renee Montagne.

MONTAGNE: NPR's Richard Harris reports.

RICHARD HARRIS: Some of the stories from the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant seem heroic and, even at times, quite creative. After the tsunami knocked out the power to the reactors and destroyed the diesel back-up system, workers fanned out into plant parking lot full of wrecked cars.

LAKE BARRETT: So people were out scavenging batteries out of cars and trucks, bringing them to the control rooms, wiring them with hot wires to the instrumentation, to try to determine what was the water level in the core and to control the pumps that they had.

HARRIS: Lake Barrett, a retired nuclear engineer who led the Three Mile Island clean-up, says those desperate measures were clearly not enough. But why the heroics failed is not quite so clear.

BARRETT: It's like the anatomy of any complex accident. There are a lot of parts to it. I'm sure there's going to be design features. There's going to be some equipment operability features, and there's probably going to be some personnel, you know, features as well.

HARRIS: Some of the institutional issues have already emerged. Japan's own preliminary investigation showed disagreement and confusion over who should be calling the shots. Barrett says this was partly cultural.

BARRETT: The Japanese decision-making process, of group decision-making and not individual decision-making, might have been a hindrance for dealing with a situation like this. It's hard to know, but the timeframe demands on making decisions like this, that are multi-billion-dollar decisions, would be difficult in the Japanese culture to do, you know, as promptly as maybe it would be done here.

HARRIS: Per Peterson, chairman of nuclear engineering at UC Berkeley says that was a questionable decision.

PER PETERSON: It's quite likely that if the injection of seawater had been initiated earlier, that the damage of fuel could have been limited greatly or even prevented. So I think that there are possible pathways by which the severity of the accident could have been substantially less.

HARRIS: Of course, it's easier to see that now than it might have been in the heat of a crisis.

PETERSON: One has to look at the context of this severe natural disaster. Many of the staff that were there that were contractors who had left the site so that they could go to find their families. And so in that context, one can understand why the decision-making process perhaps did not roll out as well as it might have. But also, clearly, better preparation could have made a big difference here.

HARRIS: Marvin Fertel, at the Nuclear Energy Institute, told a recent panel at the National Academy of Sciences that U.S. operators get better training than their counterparts in Japan.

MARVIN FERTEL: What we like for the operators and the security guards when we're operating the plants is just boredom. Everything is just good, right? So the time we really want them to train and deal with bad events is when they're in a simulator.

HARRIS: These simulators mimic each specific nuclear power plant closely, and allow reactor operators to practice dealing with extreme emergencies, as they would experience them in their own control rooms.

FERTEL: In Japan, we understand they do not, one, have plant-specific simulators. They have generic simulators for the types of plants they have. And two, they don't have one for every plant.

HARRIS: Richard Harris, NPR News.

MONTAGNE: Tomorrow, we'll hear how nuclear plant operators in the U.S. are trained to deal with disaster.

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